Islam and Progress: Between Tradition and Modernity

Julia Roknifard **Orhan Gafarli** **Leslie Terebessy**

https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2020-11-4-104-121

ABSTRACT

In the course of rethinking how Muslim communities have historically reacted to progress and integrated its achievements into their lives, we tried to revisit the reasons why the Islamic world has preserved a deep rift between tradition and modernity. Looking at the debate in theological and near-theological circles amongst Muslim thinkers and theorists of the past, we conclude that one of the major issues in terms of philosophical grounds is that religion has become associated with tradition more than with the revelation. Religion teaches timeless principles, while tradition adheres to past practices, which are time-bound. When tradition is treated as religion, problems arise, for traditional practices can conflict with modern ones. A large portion of the Muslim world has difficulties in adapting to modernity, and this is related to the fact that religiosity has become associated with feudalism and ritual. While a strong suggestion is to discursively separate religion from politics, this article nevertheless begins by exploring how progress in the Muslim world is affected by the confluence of tradition and revelation, among other factors. The two case studies based on the analysis of the specifics of modernization in Turkey and Iran are highlighted the trends that hinder technological progress in the countries of the Islamic world.

KEYWORDS

Islam, Islamic world, technological progress, ijtihad, innovation, Iran, Turkey

Introduction

On the eve of the KL Summit, dubbed as a nascent alternative to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in Kuala Lumpur in 2019, Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad lamented that inability of Muslim nations "to progress and become a developed country had resulted in Muslim nations being perceived as weak and Muslims continued to be suppressed, controlled and abused by other countries."[1] Mahathir Mohamad said despite Muslim nations having the ability and capability to compete with other developed nations, they had no desire to do so. The difficulty discussing the causal links between the tenets of Islam and the relative backwardness of Muslim countries in terms of technological, social and economic progress underlies the multiplicity of factors that hinder the development of these countries. Muslim majority countries mostly belong to developing or least developed economies, which by itself can be a consequence of a colonial past, modern neoliberal policies, the oil curse/resource-based economies, corruption, the unequal distribution of wealth, or geopolitical volatility and not of the religious affiliation of their populace and governing authorities.

The lack of innovation and stimulating policies can also be explained by other factors, such as cultural features that do not stem from Islam itself, for example the extreme importance of "face-saving practices," which diminish the appetite for risk and thus discourage innovation. If culture dictates that failure in an endeavor is the height of shame, then people will likely avoid risking their wealth by investing in start-ups. In his *Development as Freedom*, A. Sen defined freedom and development as interconnected notions. To achieve development, he argues, poverty, tyranny, social deprivation, and the machinery of repression need to be removed.[2] In addition, economic opportunities need to be created and public services improved.

Though China's development and technological advances prove that the correlation between freedom and development is not direct or absolute (freedom can be relative and exist as a comprise, for example, in the form of social benefits without political liberties), A. Sen's idea invites the assumption that the configuration of a given political regime and the policies it deploys might be a reason for backwardness, including intellectual backwardness, which, in turn, does not have any relation to the cultural or religious canvas of society. Apologists of Islam, in turn, would suggest that, just as with other world religions, Muslims were called upon to eliminate poverty through charity and the equitable allocation of resources based on the principles of justice. So, development generally is also taken care of by the tenets of Islam, but it says less about how much freedom (and rule of law) is necessary to pursue justice, equity and movement forwards.

The ability to adapt to modernity and thus progress technologically is "path dependent." That is, it depends greatly on what path particular a culture walked through to reach its current point, and culture, in turn, is a substance rigid to change. The nexus of culture, tradition, religion, and the political employment of cultural and

1 Junita Mat Rashid, "Dr M: Muslim nations can become developed and competitive," New Straits Times, November 30, 2019, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/543419/dr-m-muslim-nations-can-become-developed-and-competitive.

2 Sen 2000.

religious sentiments played a great role in how the Islamic world grappled with the idea of modernity and the progress that was supposed to come along. And even though the Islamic world may also have observed a decline of trust in religious institutions, the demand for spirituality has not waned. This demand, along with the cultural baggage that various Muslim communities carry, has an enduring influence on the developmental processes within respective societies.[1] We take this sociological trend, thoroughly researched by R. Inglehart and his colleagues, as a basis for our discussion on the cultural and ideological premises of this barrier to progress in the Muslim world.

In modern global discourse, we find a plethora of figures that support the idea of progress within, and supported by, Islam. One such example is the work of A.H. AbuSulayman, who maintains that there is a "crisis" in the Muslim mind that needs to be overcome. In his opinion this crisis is one of thought and methodology, not one of belief.[2] However, an important problem with A.H. AbuSulayman's recommendation is that he appears unwilling to put the Muslim tradition under the microscope. He simply assumes that tradition is reliable and uncorrupted. Another proponent of renewal is T.J. Alwani, a former colleague of A.H. AbuSulayman. He agrees with A.H. AbuSulayman that the problem is one of thought and thus calls for "sound thinking"[3] Umer Chapra has also highlighted the requirement to welcome science. According to him, decline took place as a result of the influence of tradition.[4]

What all these commentators share is a concern with a revival of rationalism and sound thinking, while either seeking compatibility with the Islamic tradition or completely detaching religious and scientific thinking. When it comes to the former, unfortunately, calls are made but concrete solutions are not offered. In an attempt to re-examine the ability of Muslim civilization to achieve technological progress, we believe that modern discussion on the topic should be highlighted. Ironically, though, this discussion is often underpinned by references to the past, whether it takes place within a close intellectual circle or on a large platform for policy makers.

Discourse on Knowledge and Progress

Religions blossom when they bring knowledge and truth, and they degenerate when they are reduced to rituals and become institutionalized, when their adherents lose sight of the reasons for being religious. Progress makes demands on everybody, but adaptation appears to be a hurdle in stagnant communities. Various resources are required to assist in the transition from tradition to the present, where knowledge matters, but tradition and community culture are also important. Problems adapting to progress arise due to a deficit of knowledge, or when the tradition is rigid.

In some educational traditions, Muslims are brought up to be suspicious of change and reasoning, which are perceived as evil, they are taught to suspect evil in anything unfamiliar, on the grounds that it is bid'ah (innovation), even though it is

1 Inglehart, Baker 2000, 49.
2 AbuSulayman 1993, 28.
3 Ibid., 4.
4 M. Umer Chapra, "Is Rationalism Possible in the Muslim World?" p. 9, accessed August 11, 2017, http://ierc.sbu.ac.ir/File/Article/Is%20Rationalism%20Possible%20in%20the%20Muslim%20World_93498.pdf.

only innovation in religion itself that is proscribed in Islam. Furthermore, embracing "innovation" in tradition was made to appear as a compromise on religious principles, and embracing the present eventually came to be seen as apostasy, the gravest of misdeeds in Islam. That this has taken place is indicated by the paucity of traditions relating to reason or intellect. From this perspective, the traditions appear truncated, and thus it is puzzling that they are presented as "completing" the Quran, the holy book of Islam, which presents itself as "complete" first and foremost.

The Quran says, "We hurl the truth against falsehood …" (Quran, 21:18), pointing to a way from the morass caused by the traditional denigration of reason that began with the persecution of philosophers at the time of the fourth Abbasid caliph, Musa al-Hadi in 786,[1] and was meant to destroy sciences to the core. The persecution of thinkers betrayed a perception of faith that at the time required believers to prove faith by the sacrifice of reason. That dangerous requirement in itself paved the way for anti-rationalism and in its ultimate form extremism. In order to adjust the entire paradigm to the idea of progress, it would thus need to be freed from the association between religiosity and compliance with the external world and directed more toward inherent values, including the pursuit of knowledge. Let us recall that the prophetic traditions are not the verbatim words of the prophet, but mere paraphrases, hence their reliability differs from that of the Quran.

The problem is epistemological as well as political. And it has been made more controversial by attempts to "Islamize" knowledge, when Palestinian philosopher Ismail al-Faruqi suggested that science be de-Westernized and brought in compliance with Islamic ethos. In other words, he called for paths of reconciliation to be found between the Islamic way of life and modernity when it comes to science. His ideas laid the grounds for further work in that direction by the U.S.-based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). In Muslim majority Malaysia, whose elites drew the very notion of the Islamization of knowledge from S. Muhammad Naquib Alatas' 1978 work *Islam and Secularism*,[2] this effort was pursued by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (ISTAC) and Civilisation and the International Islamic University, functioning under auspices of the OIC.

Supporters of this kind of campaign think they can bring Muslims into modernity by "re-painting" knowledge with the shades of Islam. The movement is based upon a duality between Islamic and un-Islamic knowledge, while the revelation differentiated only between knowledge and ignorance. Muslims might perceive "progress" as problematic because it is associated with Westernization and abandoning tradition. When properly articulated, religion does not hinder, but rather accommodates and even uses the fruits of progress, for example communications technology.

The aversion to progress is a part of a protective mechanism, where progress is rejected because it is associated with negative experiences or expectations, for example the ruining of social institutions, like the family or encroachment upon dignity. This was the experience of Sayyid Qutb, the leading member of Muslim Brotherhood. During his visit to the United States, he was horrified at couples mingling freely in

1 Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 2002, 110.
2 Muhammad Naquib al-Attas 1978.

what he saw as self-indulgence and debauchery. He recoiled it in horror and wrote his books partly in response to this negative experience and his desire to protect the Muslims from a similar fate, should they follow the path of the West. In a move to warn the Egyptian political elite from the curse that comes with modernization, a notion that is sometimes interchangeable with Westernization, he met with President of Egypt G.A. Nasser and asked him to stop the departure from traditional values, for example, by making it compulsory for all Egyptian women to wear a headscarf. Nasser would later mock Sayyid Qutb for this suggestion, pointing to the single most important woman the activist had failed to compel cover her hair – Qutb's own daughter.[1]

When Islamic scholars discuss this issue, many point to the "closure of the gates to *ijtihad*," (independent judgment in juridical matters) and the emergence of *taqlid* (imitation) or the following of tradition even against reason as the main reason why Islamic civilization, after going through a period of bloom in the development of sciences and the cherishing of knowledge, plummeted into this era of darkness, where Muslim societies are only capable of borrowing and not cultivating the fruits of technological progress. Sometimes this closing of the gates to *ijtihad* is presented as the opposite to the Enlightenment in Europe, when thinkers opened wide the doors to reasoning, ushering in the "age of reason." Blame is occasionally placed at the door of Muslim jurists, who around the 10th century proclaimed that all legal issues had been solved and that there was no need for any additional thinking on the subject – that attention should be placed exclusively on practicing the established norms and drawing analogies from existing precedents, where necessary. In the present day, even when it comes to those legal scholars who have been entrusted with spearheading the renewal of Islamic civilization, there is little fresh thinking taking place.

On the other side of the ongoing debate, a few scholars maintain that *ijtihad* among the schools of Islamic jurisprudence continued well beyond the 10th century, while those who believe in the "closure of the gates" became marginalized or extinct.[2] However, the four mainstream schools of jurisprudence remained intact without new ones emerging. This is why it is sometimes believed that the Shia world (where Iran would be the major among the heavyweights) remained faithful to the principles of *ijtihad* because up until now Shia Muslims can choose their own *mujtahids* (those entitled to interpret the existing norms and generate new prescriptions – *fatwas*) and opt for a new one after their demise, instead of relying on the edicts issued by the *mujtahid* they used to follow. Nevertheless, in the present day, the decline in the value of reason leads to calls for a revival of *ijtihad* as a prerequisite for Muslims to progress and adapt to modernity.[3]

The rejection of rationality facilitated the acceptance of the perception, widespread among Sufis, that true piety requires the sacrifice of reasoning on the altar of tradition. This attitude also damaged the spirit of rational enquiry, thereby thwarting the growth of Muslim civilization. A true follower of a Sufi sheikh would practically revere his "master." In a few Muslim countries the reverence for sheiks went to the extent that

1 "(Re)Islamization of Arabia: Nasser on The Muslim Brotherhood and Hijabs (1966 Egypt)-(english) #76," YouTube, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0fswb4a9jcU.
2 Hallaq 1984.
3 Al-Alwani 2005.

they were referred to as "maulana," or "our protector," a term reserved in revelation for Allah. (Quran, 2:286) This dichotomy was employed in building some education systems, some of which refused to teach mathematics and logic in favor of religious disciplines. Persecution of rationalists was yet another blow to the development of thought within Islamic civilization.

Ethics and the Pursuit of Knowledge

The pursuit of knowledge is also a priority tenet of Islam. According to Islamic philosophy, the search for knowledge is one of the things that is supposed help to bring the believer to paradise. At the same time, the pursuit of knowledge has its own limitations. M. Umer Chapra, for example, reminds us that development based on the welfare of society goes beyond material wellbeing, which is understood as aspects of psychological wellbeing, happiness, justice, human kinship, equal and fair treatment and sharing in the fruits of development.[1]

O. Bakar echoes this perception by asserting that technological development is never value-free but culturally determined.[2] He contrasts the Islamic traditional view of technological development and progress with the contemporary Western approach to the matter. According to the category of scholars represented by O. Bakar and those like him, the Western world has walked the path from medieval times, where religion marginalized science, to the contemporary era, where science has not only marginalized religion but has replaced it altogether. As a result of globalization, Muslims have started to look at science and technology in the same way that people from the West view it, that is, by this detaching it from their religious background. Meanwhile, traditional Islamic culture sees the notion of progress as being closely related to the understanding of its moral boundaries.

O. Bakar states that Western culture is the perfect manifestation of arrogance, most notably in its approach to science and technology, as it has been almost completely desacralized by committing to empiricism and materialism and neglecting ethics and spirituality.[3] The creation of nuclear weapons is something that Muslim scholars would present as an example of exercising freedom of choice without ethical constraints. In other words, not all knowledge is beneficial, and some knowledge should be shunned because of spiritual constraints or to serve a greater public good.

This point of view is a development of the criticism suggested centuries ago by Persian philosopher A.H. al-Ghazali in his *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, which some instead perceive as an adversary of reason in the Islamic world. According to A.H. al-Ghazali's categorization, "blameworthy" knowledge is that which can be defined as "leading to any harm whether to its practitioner or anybody else; when it is mostly harmful; and when the pursuit of that kind of knowledge does not give the practitioner any real increase in beneficial knowledge."[4]

O. Bakar argues that the classical premises laid out by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali were supposed to lead to the creation of a culture of scientific and technological development that would be in line with Islam. But that did not happen. Instead, Muslims, being

1 Chapra 2008.
2 Kamali et al. 2016, 18.
3 Ibid., 24.
4 Kamali et al. 2016, 31.

mostly borrowers and users of ideas and technology, are no longer in a position to dictate the direction of science and technology.[1] On the other hand, Ghazali is labeled as a delinquent responsible for driving the Muslim world away from science. According to this point of view, al-Ghazali stated that mathematical sciences have no bearing on religion, per se, but pose a greater danger because they fascinate scholars to the extent that they turn their backs on religion.[2] He is also charged with disrupting the notion of causality for future generations of Muslims through the metaphor of fire and a piece of cotton, which argues that it is not fire (cause) that burns a piece of cotton (effect), rather it is Allah who destroys it.[3] This therefore gives humans with limited power to understand and predict the way things work.

Having discussed the discursive, theological and ethical foundations of how knowledge, science and subsequently technological progress were perceived by the Muslim world, the question of how meaningful the link between Islamic philosophy in all its manifestations and technological progress as an area of practice is remains open. To actually achieve technological productivity and progress, Muslims might need to stop searching for the basis in theological and sacred texts and tradition. Vesting a theologian with the authority to adjudicate on scientific matters resulted did not stimulate development, rather it led to restrictions being imposed on it. That is why progressive thinkers sometimes call for a "reformation" of Islam, much like what happened with Christianity. Here, in fact, those who condone Ghazali's texts on science would interpret his ideas that religious discourse should not be mixed with scientific discourse, as both science and religion would be worse for it.[4]

Turkey: Modernism vs. Conservatism?

Among Turkish authors of modern period, N. Berkes,[5] H.Z. Ülken,[6] M. Türköne,[7] İ. Kara,[8] and A.H. Tanpınar[9] examine the same issues starting from the 18th century of Turkish modernization and the processes that led to the establishment of the republic. Particularly interesting are K. Karpat's works on the New Ottomans, where he exposes the role of political movements in the modernization process within Ottoman Empire. İ. Ortaylı deals with the process of cultural modernization,[10] as well as the changes in historical governance and their effects on modernization.[11] F. Sezgin spoke of the backwardness within the Islamic world and amongst the Ottomans and their efforts to internalize technological development from Europe.[12]

With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the Academy, research into the causes of the technological lag in the Ottoman and Islamic world and how

1 Kamali et al. 2016, 32.
2 Peters 1990, p. 46.
3 Al-Ghazali 1963, 185–186.
4 "A grievous crime indeed against religion has been committed by the man who imagines that Islam is defended by the denial of the mathematical sciences, seeing that there is nothing in revealed truth opposed to these sciences by way of either negation or affirmation, and nothing in these sciences opposed to the truth of religion" (quoted as per Watt 1953).
5 Berkez 2019.
6 Ülken 2019.
7 Türköne, 2003.
8 Kara 2020; 2019.
9 Tanpınar 2012.
10 Ortaylı 2007.
11 Ortaylı 1979.
12 Sezgin 2015.

this process affected the modernization of society began. One of the most important historians of the Republic period, H. Inalcık, discussed such issues as the relationship between the state and religion in the Ottoman Empire and the reaction of different religious communities to modernization in his works.[1] H. Inalcık refers to original sources to decipher the kind of relationship that existed between the Sultan and religious communities.

Turkey has gone through its own history of theological-philosophical debates and relevant transformations of the education system. Until the 16th century, the Maturidi interpretation of religious tenets, which places an emphasis on science and philosophy, was dominant in the Ottoman Empire. Later, it largely shifted to the Ashari theology with its dogmatism and questionable relationship with rationalism. At that time, the Ottoman madrasas (schools) underwent a reform under Sultan Suleiman (1520–1556), when disciplines like mathematics and logic lost their value to the curriculum, which arguably led to the Ottoman State falling behind Europe.[2]

The history of modernization in the Ottoman Empire goes back to the 18th century. At the time known as the tulip period (1703–1730), the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Pasha encouraged innovations in the Empire, while studying the European experience closely. With diplomatic missions dispatched to major cities such as Paris, Vienna and London, the imperial establishment started to learn about the Western way of life and think of how to introduce and adopt the best achievements at home. This began with the introduction of technological innovations, such as the printing press by Ibrahim Müteferrika and Said Efendi, the establishment of a paper factory and the introduction of medical innovations, such as the measles vaccine, to Ottoman society.[3] This period also marked the first collision between tradition and innovation within the Ottoman Empire.[4]

Later, the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, which resulted in the Ottoman side making large concessions under the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, including the loss of Muslim-dominated Crimea and the granting to Russia of the extra-territorial right to build a church in Constantinople and protect all the Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule, forced the imperial leadership to face an unpleasant truth – that the Ottoman Empire was in a state of complete stagnation, uncertainty and technological backwardness compared to its adversary. Radical innovations thus needed to be imposed on society.[5]

In an attempt to reconcile the traditional basis for legitimacy with the ability to introduce new practices, a new "social contract" was signed between the center and imperial vilayets. In order to maintain the communication link between the Ottoman rulers and the provinces, especially Eastern Anatolia, Sultan Mahmut II introduced the Charter of Alliance in 1808. This reconfiguration was supposed to launch a constitutional reform and transform the Empire into the constitutional monarchy.[6] Much has been written about the Charter of Alliance in Turkish-Ottoman historiography. For some,

1 İnalcık 2019.
2 Kalayci 2012; Yıldız 2019.
3 Emecen 2018.
4 Mazanec 2016.
5 Kuzucu 2010.
6 Akyıldız 1998.

the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire represented only a slight adjustment in the continuing relationship between the center and the provinces.[1] However, despite this view – which renders the agreement less significant than it actually was – the constitution was still the first legal text that stipulated power sharing. Nevertheless, Mahmut II (1808–1839) continued with centralist rule despite the Charter of Alliance.

The understanding of the need to modernize, especially in military terms, continued with another period of reform, widely known as Tanzimat (1839–1876), which spurred development of intellectualism and tighter links with the European intellectual tradition. During this period, the Young Ottomans emerged as the first traditionalist intellectual movement as a result of the spread of press and education. The publication of the first Ottoman newspaper *Ceride-i Havadis* (Journal of News) in 1840 and Agah Efendi's *Tercüman-ı Ahval* in 1860 also happened during the Tanzimat period,[2] which advanced the formation of independent public opinion and intellectual circles.

The Young Ottomans themselves represented a conflicting intellectual merger between their openness to technological innovations on the one hand, and the defense of the traditional Ottoman imperial structure on the other. But every single reform initiated by the Ottoman Empire faced backlash, either because they were seen as superficial or introduced at the request of external powers. As a result, these reform initiatives were either delayed or implemented long before society was ready for them, which had a number of consequences.

The second Crimean War of 1854–1856, which took place after the Tanzimat reform, led to the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856, which granted equal rights to minorities in the Empire.[3] This was seen as another attempt at modernization, albeit one that was carried out under external pressure – from France and Great Britain – in exchange for their support with funds and weapons during the war. The first constitutional era 20 years later, in 1876–1878, forced the Ottomans accept the need for profound modernization if they wanted to be embraced by the European family.[4] Acceptance of this constitutional legitimacy led to the emergence of a new political class of governmental bureaucrats, although it was short-lived.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1918) was an anti-reformist who abolished the previous constitutional innovations and essentially became a symbol of three decades of staunch conservatism.[5] Nevertheless, the two years of constitutionalism shaped life of Ottoman politics in the long term, and paved the way for the second constitutional era in 1908, with traditional Ottoman life becoming more open to innovations, including the creation of the Republic several years later. We can thus state that in the 19th century, conservatism in the Ottoman Empire was reactive in nature, a movement to preserve the traditional ways of social life, whereas conservatism in the 20th century had started to take on a more developed and ideological form.[6]

1908 marked the beginning of the second constitutional era, during which the Ottoman Empire was on the losing side in the First World War and was ultimately

1 Can 2016.
2 Mardin 2015.
3 Aytekin 2013.
4 Hanioğlu 2010.
5 Ahmad 1991.
6 Ahmad 1986.

destroyed and captured by occupying powers. Resistance against foreign powers, the abolition of the Sultanate and the establishment of the Republic – all this was an extension of the debate on what should and should not have been accepted from the West.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of the Turkish Republic, believed in modernizing his country, which worried the traditional religious circles of the former empire. For Ataturk, religion was associated with backwardness, hence the most extreme forms of secularization were supported. The Latinization of the Ottoman script in 1928 as part of numerous other reforms eventually led to an increase in literacy levels – from 10% according to the population census in 1927, to 30% 14 years later.[1]

The views of Turkish Islamists and religious conservatives were mainly influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood, although in Turkey itself, no one questioned its own, "special" path. The first anti-Western religious-conservative force, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet*/MSP), came to power in 1973 under the leadership of N. Erbakan. With the assistance of various coalitions in the parliament, they succeeded in determining or significantly influencing Turkish policy for many years. The MSP would never be accused of being liberal – on the contrary, the party always demonstrated a strong anti-Western conservative attitude,[2] and it never advocated for the development of Turkish democratic institutions. However, N. Erbacan's ousting by the military on February 28, 1997 and the closure of his Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) propelled him to the forefront of Turkey's modernization effort.

N. Erbakan, who earned his degree in engineering in Germany, pushed for the development of heavy industry, as well as the construction of iron and steel plants and the establishment of the motor, electronics and electromechanics industries in 1976. Driven by the desire to industrialize the country, N. Erbakan also believed that it should be freed from technological dependence on the West. This was why he was so open to cooperation with the Soviet Union as an alternative for the nascent Turkish industry.

Between 1998 and 2001, young politicians such as R.T. Erdogan, A. Gul, B. Arınc, and others formed a splinter group from the supporters of N. Erbakan, which later on became the Justice and Development Party (AKP). As religious conservatives, they were ready to make compromises with the West – to "get engaged" and yield to the forces of liberalism and globalism. In 2001, the conservative AKP came to power on the back of slogans about liberalizing the economy, human rights, and the constitution. Later in the R.T. Erdogan era, the right began to be dominated by religious rhetoric, with some of those right circles being in opposition to modernization as a whole.

The core motive of R.T. Erdogan's tenure (2001–2020) was the need for technology transfer. Having a strained relationship with the West, especially with the United States, and unable to persuade its Western partners to transfer their technologies or engage in joint R&D projects, R.T. Erdogan turned to Russia and China, which became not only

1 Orhan Bursali, "Osmanlı'da okuma yazma bilenlerin sayısı çok muydu? (Were there many literate people in the Ottoman Empire?)," Cumhuriyet, September 14, 2019, accessed February 17, 2021, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan-bursali/osmanlida-okuma-yazma-bilenlerin-sayisi-cok-muydu-1701918.

2 Tezcan et al. 2015, 1.

ideological, as some might claim, but also technological partners, since the West was not open to sharing. In recent years, Turkey's military industry breakthrough and the domestic production of tanks, helicopters, ships, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),[1] as well as the boom in the domestic automobile industry, evidence the country's strategy to revise its relations with the West and reduce technological dependence on it. The purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems, with the promise if technological transfer, and the construction of nuclear power only underline this policy.

Current discourse in Turkey focuses on the nature of conservatism. R.T. Erdogan's statements about the loss of healthy conservatism are scrutinized in the Turkish press, and many arguments about right-wing conservative views are brought up when discussing culture, socio-political life, and even architecture. So far, Turkish conservatism has been unable to "marry" itself to liberalism, and the discussion of Turkey's stance vis-à-vis the West continues.

It should be noted that Turkey stands out in the Islamic world in that it has a healthy economy (albeit with certain flaws) with strong industrial production, including in the military sphere. The Russian scholar N. Ivanov noted that Muslim civilization, especially the Ottomans as the main candidate for global leadership, had a highly developed and professional army and advanced weaponry, on a par with European armies, up until 1571.[2] However, this topic was often imported to Russian discourse from abroad, initially as a response to the attempts to challenge Muslim civilization as a whole, and later in order to support the universal discussion within the global Muslim community about the ability of Muslims to not only adopt the fruits of technological progress, but also to be innovative themselves.

Religious debates were typically restricted to narrow circles, especially in the harshly secularist republican period. Rather, modernization and the understanding of the need for technological progress can be explained by the Ottoman encounter with more powerful adversaries and their further attempts to compel the Empire to modernize politically. In the modern period, the quest for technological development exists side-by-side with the need for technology transfer, as well Turkey's leading efforts in technological advancement as a part of the larger Islamic world.

Iran: from Modernization to Islamization

The example of Iran presents a good opportunity to test how the change in a country's orientation toward Islam in terms of its legislation and societal norms and regulations affected its standing as an emerging technological leader in the Middle East. In the modern era, the founder of the last dynasty that existed before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Reza Pahlavi, was seen as the driving force behind the country's all-embracing modernization of the 20th century. In order to overcome resistance to modernization, however, he had to eliminate conservative religious opposition, since his modernization plan essentially meant Westernization, which thus triggered a backlash in religious circles.

1 Guc Gonel, "Turkey becoming engine design, manufacturing hub," Anadolu Agency, December 5, 2020, accessed February 17, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-becoming-engine-design-manufacturing-hub/2066665#.
2 Рыбаков et al. 1999, 44.

Reza Pahlavi's policy then included both co-option, or buying the friendship of influential *ulama*, and suppressing those who adopted an uncompromising stance toward modernization. The government spent great efforts to demonstrate the compatibility of modernization with Islam and introduced a distinction between "progressive" ulama, who supported modernization and reforms, and "backwards" ulama who did not, into the public discourse.[1]

Earlier, in 1851, the renowned Qajar Chief Minister known as Amir Kabir (Mirza Taghi Khan Farahani), pushing for the same development agenda, established *Dar al-Funun* (polytechnic college), the first institution of higher learning in Iran, which was later incorporated into the university of Tehran. Remarkably, the Western educated elite of Amir Kabir's time paid attention to "human factories" as "the institutions that foster, guide, and manage human activities," practically giving them a higher importance than the factories themselves.[2]

In 1981, amidst the ongoing cultural transformation, the leader of the Iranian Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared the need to transform the country's education system, develop different academic programs and formulate the future of universities.[3] Currently, the policies related to science and technology undergo vetting by religious bodies (by the Guardian Council, as well as directly or indirectly by the Supreme Leader), which means that they are at least acknowledged as compliant with the Islamic worldview in terms of its interpretation by the Islamic Republic.[4]

That said, Iran is doing better than other countries in the Muslim world in terms of academic achievement and technological advancement. According to the World Bank, Iran ranked 38th in the number of patents registered in 1970, compared to 7th in 2016.[5] Technological development was named as one of the country's three main national priorities for the period 2016 to 2021.[6] Despite the international sanctions, research and development budgets are set to receive a 400% increase by 2030, reaching 4% of GDP,[7] even though this was expected to take place as a result of the nuclear deal signed in 2015.

There are, however, still a number of drawbacks to Iran's desire to speed up progress in the country. Iran's annual brain drain is estimated at 150,000 specialists,[8] while there are not enough resources to lure these people back to the country. There are also doubts about the quality and effectiveness of Iranian publications in recent decades. According to the Thomson Reuters database, Iranian papers make up just 2.9% of the top 1% of cited papers in 2016.[9]

1 Faghfoory 1993, 280.
2 Semati 2016, 328.
3 Goodarzi 2013, 420.
4 Heshmati 2019.
5 "Iran after the Islamic Revolution: Scientific backtrack or progress? What do the statistics say?" Tehran Times, February 10, 2019, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/432798/Iran-after-the-Islamic-Revolution-Scientific-backtrack-or-progress.
6 "Leader declares outlines of the 6th five-year plan with emphasis on resistance economy, scientific progress," Tehran Times, July 1, 2015, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/247790/Leader-declares-outlines-of-the-6th-five-year-plan-with-emphasis.
7 "S. Leader: Iran's scientific movement to continue non-stop," IRNA, July 3, 2014, accessed February 11, 2021, https://en.irna.ir/news/81223992.
8 "Iran loses $150 billion a year due to brain drain," Mehr News, January 8, 2014, accessed February 11, 2021, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/101558/Iran-loses-150-billion-a-year-due-to-brain-drain.
9 Heshmati 2019, 567.

The actual spending on R&D also remains unclear, and probably does not surpass 1%. UNCTAD also indicates that the share of private investment in R&D is relatively low in Iran (20% of R&D expenditure in 2010). Exports of hi- and medium-tech products accounted for 1% and 30.7%, respectively, of the country's total exports (S&T Vice-Presidency, 2016). According to the high level policy documents, the share of the knowledge-based economy, and thus of hi-tech exports should reach 50% by 2025.

The official rhetoric of the Islamic Republic maintains that Islam is a religion that promotes science and this explains why the country is moving up the rankings of science publications in aerospace, medicine and nuclear technology, despite even deliberate attacks against its nuclear scientists,[1] with the latest being undertaken in November 2020.

One might suggest that the difference in the Iranian discourse, even after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was pointed out by modernists of the Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (better known as al-Afghani) school, who claimed that Muslims could adopt Western science and technology while remaining true to their Muslim traditions and identities.[2] Ali Shariati, another thinker whose works laid grounds for the Islamic Revolution, echoed al-Afghani in the sense that even though one might criticize Western thought, the approach to science and technology must be pragmatic – a quality that the Islamic Republic later proved to have. According to Shariati, in Islam, "science and wisdom" are criteria of "finding truth" and "studying science is a necessary and *vajib* [mandated by religion] duty for all Muslim."[3]

Different pathways of intellectual development backed by a rather liberal attitude to ijtihad and the necessity to constantly apply reason, as well as the configuration of relations between society and the governing elites, brought a set of attitudes to existence in Iran that were different to those in the Arab or Sunni clusters of Islamic civilization. This difference persisted through the R. Pahlavi period into the Islamic Republic. However, the drawn-out war with Iraq and further sanctions against Iran's nuclear program and certain aspects of its foreign policy limit our ability to assess the technological heights it could have risen to, had the political limitations not been put in place.

Conclusion

Speaking of numbers, not a single university in the Muslim world is in the top 100 universities in the world.[4] OIC states contribute to less than 1% of all global academic publications in science, and the quality of that is questionable. Iran and Malaysia were in the top 20 in terms of the number of academic publications in science and technology in 2016, but this achievement is not stable from year to year.[5] According to the latest Coursera report conducted on various sets of skills among the millions of

1 "Iran after the Islamic Revolution: Scientific backtrack or progress? What do the statistics say?" Tehran Times, February 10, 2019, accessed February 17, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/432798/Iran-after-the-Islamic-Revolution-Scientific-backtrack-or-progress.
2 Semati et al., 2016.
3 Ibid., 334.
4 "The World University Rankings," The World University Rankings, accessed February 11, 2021, http://surl.li/lbdz.
5 "Scientific and technical journal articles – Country Ranking," Index Mundi, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC/rankings.

learners it attracts, the only Muslim majority country marked as "emerging" in terms of technological skills is Malaysia (in 43rd place). The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are lagging behind in 50th, 54th and 55th, respectively.[1]

Technological progress hinges upon ability of a society to grow human capital. Research conducted by the World Bank has revealed that Muslim countries spend, on average, approximately 0.5% of their GDP on research and development, compared to the global average of 1.78% of GDP and the OECD average of above 2%. Meanwhile, the number of people working in scientific fields in the Muslim world is also well below the global average.[2]

The number of women working in science and technology is not great, as tradition affects the perception of women and their acceptance into the workforce. This raises questions not only about the education system and its methodologies and curricula, but also about the further integration of talent into the workforce. The education systems across the Muslim world have repeatedly been criticized for their lack of "inquiry-based" and "active-learning" approaches, as well as for the need to stimulating critical thinking.

A study conducted by C. Issawi into how the Islamic world was able to at least adopt advanced Western practices, like water and wind mills, in order to optimise the production of energy (and, in turn, production in general) could not offer a concrete answer as to why the technology, while being known, did not spread widely enough in Muslim lands up until the end of 19th century. Comparing 16th century Ottoman Empire, at the height of its prosperity, to 11th century England, he concludes that the former nevertheless had fewer water mills than the latter.[3] Today, a number of Islamic countries have moved to hydrocarbons, and many of the least developed countries (LDCs) have started to import technologies from the developed world, and life has become much easier. However, the Islamic world grapples with the more pressing problem of growing human capital catching up with the ever increasing technological advancement. While the institutionalization of certain disciplines and how they are taught is highly important, the underlying fundamentals stemming from culture and religion facilitated that process in the past and continue to affect the way education and science develop today.

The practical development of knowledge, science and the ability to innovate were tied to the existing traditions in Muslim societies, but the debate outlined above regarding the philosophical grounds was not always a major factor that defined success or failure in that regard. The cases of Iran and Turkey demonstrate that self-awareness about own backwardness came from the outside, especially when an encounter with military adversaries left Muslim armies at loss, because they were not technologically advanced. However, the influence or interference of external powers sometimes fortified the traditional resistance to change, partly because modernization and progress were seen as Westernization and the loss of identity or sovereignty.

1 "Global Skills Index," Coursera, 2020, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.coursera.org/gsi.
2 Nidhal Guesoum, "Why the Islamic world needs a new 'golden age'," World Economic Forum, January 14, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/why-the-islamic-world-needs-a-new-golden-age.
3 Issawi 1991, 284.

When it comes to the discussions about the ability of societies to progress, quantitative indicators are often used as a way to track changes and draw comparisons between developed and less developed states. Meanwhile, even with the emergence of technological marvels and globalization, the ability of innovative practices to travel did not lead to the creative potential of humanity spreading evenly around the globe. We argue that a variety of factors, some of which are related to the way that religious discourse evolved in the Islamic world, affected institutional structures, education, and ultimately the way human capital is cultivated, and predefined the state in which the Muslim *ummah* (community) finds itself at the moment. It must be acknowledged that in some cases, political factors, especially external, shaped the way Islamic communities perceived modernization, which may have been associated with Westernization and thus with a breach of sovereignty, exploitative intentions or the destruction of traditional identity. And the case of Turkey is a good example of this. We also saw that Islamic societies produced bright progressive minds even after the so-called "Golden Age" of Islam, but that effort could be disrupted by other factors, as the case of Iran has shown.

Depending on the cultural path taken by a particular country, the relation between Islam as the religious backbone of society and Islam as the cultural code of society could be conducive to at least adopting innovations. It could also be disruptive to the same process, not to mention the ability of people to innovate themselves. In some intellectual circles across the Islamic world, the debate on the fundamentals – such as the need for Islam to undergo a revival of its own (a "reopening of the gates of ijtihad") and return to the intellectual tradition that was cherished during the "Golden Age" and is still alive and in the minds of religious scholars, some of whom have a strong influence on believers – must serve as the basis of how policies on science and technology are formulated. For some reason, the inability to break out of this essentially theological debate on progress is precisely what prevents the unrestrained cultivation of human potential that is necessary for the Islamic world if it wants to catch up with its advanced civilizational adversaries of the past.

Despite all the research into these matters and our daily engagement with these issues, we have to conclude that practice has not dispelled the seemingly superficial idea that progress and innovation require a secular approach, while calls for revival of reason within Muslim thinking and the Muslim way of life do not yield anything feasible. This justifies our choice to observe the relatively successful examples of Turkey and Iran. Even though the latter is currently governed by a somewhat hybrid theocratic regime, its approaches to science, technology, and academic advancement are rather pragmatic and aimed at cultivating national pride and the nationalist part, rather than the religious part, of the country's identity. This is why the quest for knowledge and discovery is less hindered by the theological debate in these countries.

СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ / REFERENCES

История Востока в шести томах. Т. 3. Восток на рубеже Средневековья и Нового времени. XVI—XVIII вв. / Под редакцией Р.Б. Рыбакова. – М.: Издательская фирма «Восточная литература» РАН, 2000. – 696 с. [*The History of the East. Vol. III. The East at the Turn of the Middle Ages and the Modern Age. The 16th–18th centuries* [Istoriya Vostoka v shesti tomah. T. 3. Vostok na rubezhe Srednevekov'ya i Novogo vremeni. XVI—XVIII vv], edited by R.B. Rybakov. Moscow: "Oriental Literature" Publishing Company RAS, 2000] [In Russian].

AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid. *Crisis in the Muslim Mind*, translated by Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo. Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993. https://iiit.org/wp-content/uploads/Crisis-in-The-Mind-Complete.pdf.

Ahmad, Feroz. "Politics and Islam in modern Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (1991): 3–21.

Ahmad, Feroz. *İttihat ve Terakki 1908–1914* [Union and Progress 1908–1914]. Kaynak, 1986 [In Turkish].

Akyıldız, Ali. "Sened-i İttifak'ın ilk tam metni." [First full text of the Sened-i Alliance] *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2 (1998): 209–222 [In Turkish].

Akyıldız, Ali. "Sened-i İttifak'ın ilk tam metni." [First Full Text of The Sened-i Alliance]. *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2 (1998): 209–222 [In Turkish].

Al-Alwani, Shaykh Taha Jabir. *Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought*. London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005. https://iiit.org/wp-content/uploads/IssuesinContemporarIslamicThought_Combined.pdf.

Al-Ghazali, Abu Khamid. *Tahafut Al-Falasifah* [Incoherence of the Philosophers]. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963 [In Turkish].

Aytekin, Attila E. "Tax Revolts during the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire." *Journal of Policy History* 25, no. 3 (2013): 308–333.

Berkez, Niyazi. *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey]. İstanbul: YKY, 2019 [In Turkish].

Can, İslam. "Merkez-çevre düalizmi bağlamında taşranın onto-politik doğası üzerine çıkarımlar." [Inferences on the Onto-political Nature of the Province in the Context of Center-Environmental Dualism] *Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 36 (December 23, 2016): 531–531. https://doi.org/10.21497/sefad.285501. [In Turkish].

Chapra, Muhammad Umer. *The Islamic Vision of Development in the Light of Maqāsid al-Sharīah.* London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008. http://surl.li/lbcp.

Emecen, Feridun M. "Matruşka'nın Küçük Parçası: Nevşehirli Damat İbrahim Paşa Dönemi Ve 'Lale Devri' Meselesi Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." [A Small Part of Matrushka: an Assessment of the Era of Nevşehirli Damat Ibrahim Pasha And the 'Tulip Era' Issue] *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 52 (2018): 79–98 [In Turkish].

Faghfoory, Mohammad H. "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925–1941." *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3–4 (September 1993): 277–312. doi:10.1080/00210869308701803.

Goodarzi, Mehdi, and Soroush Ghazinoori. "From Developing a Higher Education System to Moving toward a Knowledge-Based Economy: A Short History of Three Decades of STI Policy in Iran in Science and Innovations." In *Iran: Development, Progress, and Challenges,* edited by Abdol S. Soofi, and Sepehr Ghazinoory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Gunce, Suheda. "Osmanlı Devleti'nde İlk Daimi Elçilikler ve Diplomasiye Olan Etkileri." [The first permanent embassies in the Ottoman Empire and their influence on diplomacy] *Osmanlı Medeniyeti Araştırmaları Dergis*i 6, no. 10 (April 15, 2020): 101–14. doi:10.21021/osmed.668921 [In Turkish].

Hallaq, Wael B. "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 1 (March 1984): 3–41.

Hanioğlu, Şükrü. *A brief history of the late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Heshmati, Ata, and Seyed Mehran Dibaji. "Science, Technology, and Innovation Status in Iran: Main Challenges." *Science, Technology and Society* 24, no. 3 (November 11, 2019): 545–78. doi:10.1177/0971721819873192.

Hoodbhoy, Pervez. *Islam and Science.* London: Zed Books Ltd., 1991.

Hussein, Taha. *The Days: His Autobiography in Three Parts.* Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1997.

İnalcık, Halil. *Osmanlı Tarihinde İslamiyet ve Devlet* [Islam and the State in Ottoman History]. Istambul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019 [In Turkish].

Inglehart, Ronald, and Baker Wayne E. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values." *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 1 (February 2000): 19–51.

Islamic Perspectives on Science and Technology, edited by Mohammad Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Osman Bakar, Daud Abdul-Fattah Batchelor, and Rugayah Hashim. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. doi:10.1007/978-981-287-778-9.

Issawi, Charles. "Technology, Energy, and Civilization: Some Historical Observations." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (August 29, 1991): 281–89. doi:10.1017/S0020743800056300.

Kalayci, Murat. "Şeyhülislam Mehmed Esad Efendi ve Eşarîlik-Maturidîlik İhtilafına İlişkin Risalesi." [Şeyhülislam Mehmed Asad Efendi and his treatise on the Asharilik-Maturidilik conflict] *Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 11, no. 21 (2012): 99–134 [In Turkish].

Kara, İsmail. *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 1* [Islam as a Matter In Republican Turkey 1]. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019 [In Turkish].

Kara, İsmail. *Din İle Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri* [Issues of Contemporary Turkish Thought Between Religion and Modernization]. İstanbul: Dergah Yayinlari, 2020 [In Turkish].

Kuzucu, Serhat. "Katerina Donemi Osmanlı-Rus İlişkilerinde Kırım." [Katerina Donemi Crimea in Ottoman-Russian Relations] *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 185, 2010 [In Turkish].

Mardin, Şerif. *Yeni Osmanlı düşüncesinin doğuşu* [Birth of New Ottoman Thought]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015 [In Turkish].

Mardin, Şerif. *Yeni Osmanlı düşüncesinin doğuşu* [Birth of new Ottoman thought] İletişim Yayınları, 2015 [In Turkish].

Mazanec, Jakub. "The Ottoman Empire At The Beginning Of Tanzimat Reforms." *Prague Papers On The History Of International Relations* 2 (2016): 21–45.

Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Syed. *Islam and Secularism.* Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1978.

Ortaylı, İlber. *Mekanlar ve Olaylarıyla Topkapı Sarayı* [Venues and events, Topkapi Palace]. İstanbul: Kaynak Kitapliği, 2007 [In Turkish].

Ortaylı, İlber. *Türkiye İdare Tarihi* [Administrative History of Turkey]. Ankara: Cedit Neşriyatı, 1979 [In Turkish].

Peters, Francis Edward. *Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: The Classical Texts and Their Interpretation, Volume III: The Works of the Spirit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. "Response to Renan." In *Modernist Islam,* 1840-1940: *A Sourcebook,* edited by Charles Kurzman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Semati, Mehdi, Mehdi Faraji, and Yalda N. Hamidi. "Elite Discourse on Technology in Iran."

Sociology of Islam 4, no. 4 (October 21, 2016): 323–44. doi:10.1163/22131418-00404002.

Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Publishing, 2000.

Sezgin, Fuat. *İslam'da Bilim ve Teknik* [Science and Technology in Islam]. Ankara: Türkiye Bilim Akademisi, 2015 [In Turkish].

Tanpınar, Ahmet H. *On Dokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* [History of Nineteenth Century Turkish Literature]. İstanbul: Dergah Yayinlari, 2012 [In Turkish].

Tezcan, Ercüment, and Aras Ilhan. "Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partısı'nde Euroseptısızm: Avrupa Bırlıgı Desteginin Elestırıye Dönüsümü." [Euroscepticism in The Justice and Development Party: From Support to Criticism of the European Union] *Uluslararasi Hukuk Ve Politika* 11, no. 41 (2015): 1–35 [In Turkish].

Türköne, Mümtazer. *Türk Modernleşmesi* [Turkish Modernization]. İstanbul: Lotus Yayinevi, 2003 [In Turkish].

Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* [History Of Contemporary Thought In Turkey]. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2019 [In Turkish].

Watt, Montgomery. *The Faith And Practice Of Al-Ghazali*. London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1953.

Yıldız, Hasan. "Osmanlı Medreselerini Islah Çabaları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." [An Assessment of Efforts to Reform Ottoman Madrasas] *Vakanüvis-Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 4(1), 2019: 407–445 [In Turkish].

Authors

Julia Roknifard,

PhD in the History of International Relations, Assistant Professor, School of Politics, History and International Relations (PHIR), University of Nottingham Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Jalan Broga, 43500 Semenyih Selangor Darul Ehsan Malaysia.

e-mail: julia.roknifard@nottingham.edu.my

Orhan Gafarli,

PhD in International Relations, Postdoctoral Researcher, Research Center for International Political and Economic Relations (IPER), Ankara University, Siyasal Bilgiler Facultesi, Cemal Gursel Cad., Cebeci, 06590, Ankara, Turkey.

e-mail: orxan.qafarli@gmail.com

Leslie Terebessy,

Academic, former Research Fellow at the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), P.O. Box 12303, Pejabat Pos Besar, 50774 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

e-mail: ljterebessy@gmail.com

Additional Information

Received: November 5, 2020. Accepted: November 29, 2020.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

For citation

Roknifard, Julia, Orhan Gafarli, and Leslie Terebessy. "Islam and Progress: Between Tradition and Modernity." *Journal of International Analytics* 11, no. 4 (2020): 104–121. https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2020-11-4-104-121

Ислам и прогресс: между традицией и современностью

АННОТАЦИЯ

В ходе переосмысления того, как мусульманские общины исторически реагировали на прогресс и интегрировали его достижения в свою жизнь, авторы статьи попытались вернуться к причинам, по которым исламский мир сохранил глубокий разрыв между традицией и современностью. Анализируя дискуссии мусульманских мыслителей и теоретиков прошлого в богословских и околобогословских кругах, сделан вывод о том, что одним из главных, с философской точки зрения, вопросов для обсуждения является то, что религия стала ассоциироваться больше не с богооткровением, а с традицией. Религия учит непереходящим принципам, в то время как традиции связаны с практиками прошлого, которые привязаны к времени. Значительной части мусульман сложно адаптироваться к новой реальности, и это связано с тем, что религиозность стала ассоциироваться с феодализмом и традиционными ритуалами. Следовательно, мусульмане зачастую связывают сохранение верности своему наследию с внешними признаками, например, с манерой одеваться или совершением ритуалов, при этом не осознавая своей духовной цели или не относясь к ней со всей честностью. Хотя можно было бы дискурсивно отделить религию от области политики, в данной статье тем не менее исследуется, как мусульманский мир переживал застой из-за слияния традиции и богооткровения и как данное слияние парализовало развитие, наряду с другими факторами, такими как конфигурация систем, отвечающих за развитие человеческого капитала, наличие политических интересов и влияние внешних сил. На основе анализа специфики модернизации в Турции и Иране в статье выделяются тенденции, которые препятствуют технологическому прогрессу в странах исламского мира.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА

ислам, исламский мир, технический прогресс, иджтихад, инновации, Иран, Турция

Сведения об авторах

Юлия Рокнифард,
доктор философии в области международных отношений,
доцент Школы политики, истории и международных отношений Ноттингемского университета Малайзии (Куала-Лумпур), Джалан Брога, 43500 Семеных Селангор Дарул Эхсан Малайзия.
e-mail: julia.roknifard@nottingham.edu.my

Орхан Гафарлы,
доктор философии в области международных отношений,
преподаватель факультета коммуникаций, Университет Анкары, факультет политологии,
шоссе Джамал Гюрсел, квартал Джебечи, 06590, Анкара, Турция.
e-mail: orxan.qafarli@gmail.com

Лесли Теребесси,
исследователь, бывший научный сотрудник Международного института передовых исламских исследований, 12303, Главное почтовое отделение, 50774 Куала-Лумпур, Малайзия.
e-mail: ljterebessy@gmail.com

Дополнительная информация

Поступила в редакцию: 5 ноября 2020. Принята к публикации: 29 ноября 2020.

Конфликт интересов

Авторы заявляют об отсутствии потенциального конфликта интересов.

Цитирование

Рокнифард, Ю., Гафарлы О., Теребесси, Л. Ислам и прогресс: между традицией и современностью // Международная аналитика. – 2020. – Том 11 (4). – С. 104–121.
https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2020-11-4-104-121