

The International Organization for Migration (IOM): “Competent Structure” and “Inevitable Choice” for Russia and China to Affect Global Migration Governance?

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on IOM and its place in global migration governance. China's and Russia's memberships were considered overdue, considering the relevance of both countries for the global migration system and their respective weight on the international stage. We aim to contribute to advancing research on IOM as an organization of increasing global relevance and on its engagement with member states, moving beyond the “usual” focus on the European Union (EU) member states, African, North American, and South American immigration and sending countries. Our analysis draws upon recent research, which conceptualizes intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as “world organizations” and which we find interesting and applicable to our empirical inquiry and discussion of IOM. We regard IOM as a “world organization” that could be examined along four interrelated components: (1) its “internal world” (e.g., establishment, relations with states, internal decisions); (2) its self-image and self-reference as an organization integrated into and referring to world society, hence as the “world of migration governance”; (3) its external relations, integration into wider environments, and responses to external events; and (4) its contribution to the world order, i.e., global migration governance.

Our analysis shows that due to its new status as a related organization of the UN, its leading role in the Global Compact on Migration, and China and Russia becoming its new members, IOM will likely play an increasingly significant role in global migration governance. The main reason for this is the need to reactivate the existing modes of migration governance and adapt them to a drastically changed global political and migration-related situation following the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to their memberships in IOM, China and Russia have already been able to benefit from the IOM assistance. Provided that both countries continue to engage with IOM and provide more substantial funding to it, IOM's assistance to both China and Russia could be expanded. Meanwhile, both countries may take a position, which would allow them to exert a more significant influence on IOM and global migration governance.

KEYWORDS

Migration Policymaking, Intergovernmental Organizations, International Organization for Migration (IOM), People's Republic of China, Russian Federation



The International Organization for Migration (IOM) had existed as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) outside the United Nations (UN) for 65 years. It was only in 2016, when IOM was about to join the UN as a related organization, that the People's Republic of China (PRC) became a member of IOM. Russia joined even later, becoming IOM's newest, 174th member state in April 2021. In this article, we focus on IOM and its role in global migration governance; we try to answer the question as to why China and Russia have joined IOM and what the implications of their memberships are. *Section I* briefly sets out theoretical basis for our analysis. We also examine IOM's origins and image (*Section II*), and its rapprochement with China and Russia, which is of interest due to both countries' migration-related and political relevance (*Section III*). Our aim is to advance research on IOM and to look beyond the "usual" focus of studies, which is the European Union (EU) and African countries. In *Section IV*, we focus on the years 2016–2021 and assess IOM's new role in the UN. *Section V* looks at China's and Russia's IOM memberships. The paper concludes by discussing IOM as a global lead organization in a post-COVID-19 world.

IOM as a "World Organization"

While states still hold on to their sovereignty over border controls, employment and naturalization of immigrants, as well as other aspects related and central to migration governance, IGOs and other international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become involved in many of the mentioned and other activities – in some cases to the extent that they have become factual co-implementers alongside or even in lieu of designated government authorities.¹ IOM and other organizations (e.g., UNHCR and ICMPD²) help states around the world not only with their reforms of relevant policies and laws, but also in taking specific measures, including those related to enhancing border controls, screening visa and asylum applicants, or apprehending and returning irregular migrants to their country of origin or departure. Research on IOM and other IGOs and NGOs working in the field of migration has been growing in recent years, and it has become focused on the increasing involvement of these actors in migration governance. However, particularly in terms of IOM, there are still considerable research gaps when it comes to studying IOM as an "organization" and exploring its organizational character, self-understanding, references, connections, and interactions with the world "outside" the organization, including its relations with specific member states, but also with other IGOs and NGOs, its "target" populations (e.g., specific migrant groups), and even global society at large. There is also a research gap concerning IOM and its activities, and its relations with the states outside the EU and, e.g., with certain African countries of origin and transit.

In the following, we do not seek to test specific theories, but rather to follow new specific theoretical ideas, which we find interesting and valuable for our analysis of IOM based on our existing understanding of IOM. We draw on the research of M. Koch

1 Georgi 2010; Garnier 2014; Koch 2014.

2 UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees); ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development).

and his colleagues,¹ who have worked on the conceptualization of IGOs as “world organizations” and suggested broadening the analysis of IGOs by moving beyond traditional state-centric perspectives. Our empirical insights on IOM strongly suggest that IOM as an organization indeed can be, and in most cases actually is, much more than a mere instrument/agent or a platform of states.² We align with the research on “world organizations” also by empirically recognizing IOM’s actorness, autonomy, and agency. We see IOM as a real “protagonist” on the world political scene. IOM has gained considerable global authority and posture as a result of the UN’s recent decision to make IOM the lead agency of the world’s first-ever global policy framework on migration – the Global Compact on Migration (*Section IV*).

The concept of “world organizations” implies that IGOs are embedded in “world society” – a global social context that contains not only states, but all social units, and provides these units with framing conditions, and thus, contributes to the social order.³ Understood as “open systems,”⁴ IGOs being the “world organizations” are not only embedded in a world of states, but form an equal part of and are integrated into world society. Furthermore, it is argued that IGOs as autonomous and independent organizations can interact in multiple and complex forms with world society, states, and other social units, and shape them.⁵ These theoretical suggestions closely align with our previous research on IOM⁶, and for these reasons, we are particularly stimulated by the recent studies on the “world organizations” and use them to contextualize our findings.

We follow the concept of “world organizations” and adopt its new theoretical perspective in examining IOM as a world organization and looking at its four interrelated aspects: (1) its “internal world” (e.g., creation, relations with member states, internal decisions); (2) self-image and self-reference as an organization integrated into and referring to world society, hence as the “world of migration governance”; (3) its external relations, integration into wider environments, and its responses to external events; and (4) its contribution to the world order, i.e., global migration governance. In the following, our paper will explore selected aspects of these four closely interrelated dimensions. However, we will mainly focus on the latter three dimensions, while IOM’s complex “internal world” still requires further and more thorough examination.

IOM: Origins and Key Characteristics

Like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM is the result of the Cold War. UNHCR was founded by the UN in 1950 to assist UN member states, refugees around the globe, and the world community at large. IOM’s origins are markedly different: in 1951, it was set up by 16 states⁷, led by the United States (U.S.) and separately from the UN, to prevent the Communist states from exerting influence over IOM. Originally named “Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement

1 Koch 2015a/b; Koch et al. 2013; Koch 2017.

2 For other conceptualizations of IGOs. Karns et al. 2010.

3 Greve et al. 2005; Albert et al. 2004; Kessler 2012.

4 Scott 1992.

5 Tallberg et al. 2010.

6 Geiger et al. 2018.

7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and U.S.

of Migrants from Europe" (PICMME), it helped resettle refugees and other groups of people coming from Europe. Following the uprisings in Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968), PICMME assisted with relocating dissidents to Western countries. In the 1970s, the organization expanded beyond Europe and supported, e.g., the "boat people" and other refugees, including people of Chinese ethnic background leaving Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos¹; IOM also assisted in resettling Jews from the Soviet Union. In 1989, after repeated name change, PICMME became IOM.² In the 1990s and 2000s, IOM admitted many former colonies and post-communist states as its new members. In Europe, Poland and other former Soviet satellite states used IOM's help in adopting the Schengen Acquis to subsequently accede to the EU.

Today's IOM retains some of the features of the "U.S." and "Western" organization. Except for the two Western Europeans, Bastiaan Haveman (1961–1969), a Dutch, and António Vitorino, a Portuguese, current head of IOM and former EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, IOM has always had U.S.-citizens as its Directors General. IOM has long been criticized for primarily serving the U.S. and its "Global North" allies. In fact, 94% or more of IOM's budget is derived through "voluntary" contributions typically associated with the implementation of specific projects (Section IV). The number of its member states – 174 in 2021 (19 less than the UN) – suggests IOM is supported by and working for all its members; however, its 2021 budget saw 80% of its voluntary funds contributed by the U.S., Australia, Canada, the UK, and the EU (with Germany being IOM's biggest EU donor).³

In its reports, IOM fosters the image of a once small "operational logistics agency" which grew, "broadened its scope" and acquired expertise and maturity by being forced to flexibly and rapidly "respond to successive crises around the world."⁴ In 2020, IOM had 15,311 staff members spread across 590 worldwide offices outside its Geneva headquarters.⁵ IOM is present "everywhere" and especially "there" where the "operational challenges of migration"⁶ are occurring or looming. IOM's main page⁷ and "crisis response" website⁸ resemble "situation rooms," which feature press statements, appeals for help, and selected IOM activities. IOM promotes itself as the "the world organization for migration" that instantly ("as it happens") knows and "cares" about all challenges, migrant and other affected populations, and can deliver and "show" the world its solutions.

These images distance IOM from the longstanding assumption that IGOs are bureaucratic, slow, and irrelevant. IOM exercises agency and actively pursues its own interests. It observes its environment, including changing interests of states and emerging challenges, and further demonstrates its will by issuing appeals related to specific challenges and seeking funding from states and other donors to solve issues on their behalf. Before joining the UN, IOM often portrayed itself as an effective

1 While IOM had offices in Macao and Hong Kong (then Portuguese/British-controlled), there is no information on IOM activities aimed at assisting Chinese nationals in leaving the PRC or Taiwan in the 1970s or later.

2 Elie 2010; "IOM History," IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/iom-history>.

3 "Programme and Budget 2021," IOM, October 12, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 80–81, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/111/C-111-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202021.pdf>.

4 Ibid., 17–18; "IOM Snapshot 2020," IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 1–2, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/about-iom/iom_snapshot_a4_en.pdf.

5 Ibid., 2.

6 Ibid., 1.

7 International Organization for Migration, accessed March 10, 2022, <https://www.iom.int>.

8 Global Crisis Response Platform, accessed March 10, 2022, <https://www.crisisresponse.iom.int>.

alternative to the UN. To remain pragmatic and solution-oriented, IOM member states intentionally kept IOM as a “non-normative organization.” In contrast with the UNHCR’s mandate to protect refugees and safeguard the Geneva Convention, IOM’s references to the rights of migrants, refugees, and other groups, remain vague, e.g., IOM claims it “is committed” to “certain core values and principles,” including the “respect for the rights and well-being of migrants.”¹

Marketing itself as “the leading intergovernmental organization in the field of migration” that is “building capacity” and helping states “to manage all forms and impacts of mobility,”² IOM claims to be the sole leading organization in migration governance. IOM is highly self-assertive and endeavors to be more than a migration organization and a mere instrument of others, i.e., states. Being an IGO that only allows pre-approved non-state parties to observe its meetings, IOM presents itself as a (*quasi*) “world civil society organization” that is accessible and close to migrants and global citizenry – a clear affront to pro-refugee/migrant and diaspora groups that have long tried to participate in relevant intergovernmental organizations (i.e., IOM), discussions, and decision-making.³ IOM’s social media accounts encourage civic participation inviting individuals to nominate their “migrant heroes.”⁴ Despite its state-dominated funding, IOM accepts private donations just like humanitarian not-for-profit organizations do, receiving funding from genuine civil society entities. By stating that it works “in emergency situations across the world” and is “developing the resilience of all people on the move, and particularly those in situations of vulnerability,”⁵ IOM has given itself the image of an emergency response and relief organization. Meanwhile, by claiming it “encourage[s] social and economic development,”⁶ IOM positions itself as a development agency; while its health and climate-related activities suggest it is also a health and climate-focused organization. In summary, this demonstrates IOM’s endeavor to assume a leading position among other organizations, including in fields other than migration, and could be criticized for ignoring, contesting, or even undermining the mandates and expertise of other entities.

China’s and Russia’s Rapprochement with IOM

For decades, IOM had been drawn into crises, often operating in difficult terrain. While formally it was a non-normative and pragmatic organization, IOM ultimately remained a U.S.-dominated “Western” agency willfully kept outside of the UN system even after the East-West conflict ended. However, China’s and Russia’s non-participation in IOM became an increasingly “stigmatic” issue for the self-declared lead organization for migration as it lacked two permanent UN Security Council members and, more importantly, two major actors of the global migration system.

1 “Programme and Budget 2021,” IOM, October 12, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, p. 17, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/111/C-111-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202021.pdf>; “IOM Snapshot 2020,” IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 1–2, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd486/files/about-iom/iom_snapshot_a4_en.pdf.

2 Ibid.; “Programme and Budget 2021,” IOM, October 12, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 17–18, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/111/C-111-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202021.pdf>.

3 Grugel et al. 2007; Rother 2013.

4 “#MigrantHeroes,” IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://weblog.iom.int/migrantheroes>.

5 “Programme and Budget 2021,” IOM, October 12, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 17–18, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/111/C-111-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202021.pdf>.

6 Ibid.

Owing to their location and numerous international borders, China and Russia serve as major gateways for transit migration, including irregular migration and asylum-seekers. Moreover, both countries are among the most important migrant receiving and/or sending countries, and sources or recipients of major remittance flows. Before China's accession to IOM, the Chinese diaspora accounted for 10 million – the fourth largest in the world, following Russian diaspora (11 mil.), Mexican diaspora (12 mil.) and Indian diaspora (16 mil.).¹ Meanwhile, it only had 700,000 immigrants, mainly from Asia and Latin America. By contrast, Russia, with 11.6 million immigrants (primarily Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks), was ranked third among destination countries after the U.S. (46.6 mil.) and Germany (12 mil.). Meanwhile, China was the 2nd largest recipient of migrant remittances (U.S.\$ 64 bn.) after India (U.S.\$ 96 bn.), while Russia was the 5th most important source of remittances with U.S.\$ 20 billion sent abroad after Switzerland (U.S.\$ 26 bn.), Saudi Arabia (U.S.\$ 39 bn.), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (U.S.\$ 61 bn.), and the U.S. (U.S.\$ 61 bn.).²

Following India's decision to join IOM in 2008, China, Indonesia, and Russia (the remaining three most populous countries in the world) were anticipated to join next.³ Having been admitted as an observer in 1992, Russia was the most promising candidate. Little is known about IOM's activities during the 1990s and the First Chechen war (1994–1996) when IOM assisted in resettling 50,000 people to Ingushetia and Dagestan.⁴ By 2005, IOM had acquired almost all former Soviet republics as member states, except for Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.⁵ It was only in 2006, when IOM's collaboration with Russia expanded: IOM signed an extensive agreement with Russia to cooperate on the emigration of Russians and measures to encourage the return of Russian "compatriots," on management of persons internally displaced within Russia, regulation of immigration, and enhanced international cooperation.⁶ During the period of 2006–2015, IOM supported Russia with the EU-provided funding in reforming its laws on foreign citizens, in modernizing its border management, detention and deportation centers, and in fighting against human trafficking.⁷ IOM also launched migration-related regional discussions, involving Russia and other former Soviet republics. Particular attention was paid to the return of irregular migrants to or stranded in Russia or other countries due to the readmission agreements that the EU was to implement with Russia and other countries in the region.⁸ IOM also started to support the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty

1 "International Migration 2015: Highlights," UN, accessed November 1, 2021, pp. 18, 30–32, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf.

2 "Remittances Data," KNOMAD, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances>.

3 Indonesia limited status as IOM observer (acquired in 1991) remains unchanged.

4 "Russia has Expanded its Obligations to Protect Refugees," Kommersant, November 24, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4584964>; "IOM History".

5 Turkmenistan became a member of IOM in 2013, Uzbekistan in 2018. Armenia and Tajikistan joined IOM in 1993 and 1994 respectively, followed by Lithuania (1998), Latvia (1999), Kyrgyzstan (2000), Ukraine (2001), Azerbaijan (2001), Georgia (2001), Kazakhstan (2002), Moldova (2003), Estonia (2004) and Belarus (2005).

6 "On Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the IOM" («О сотрудничестве между Российской Федерацией и Международной организацией по миграции»), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10, 2006, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/ru/rossia-mezhdunarodnoe-gumanitarnoe-sotrudnicestvo/-/asset_publisher/Z02tOD8Nkusz/content/id/404534.

7 "Activities," IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://moscow.iom.int/en/activities>.

8 Korneev 2014. He offers a detailed insight into IOM's role in EU-Russia discussions on a bilateral readmission agreement.

Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).¹ IOM was invited to these fora, it organized round tables, e.g., on illegal, forced, and labor migration, and provided EAEU states with the analysis of their migration legislation.²

IOM-China relations started in 1996, when IOM invited the PRC to take part in the “Manila Process,” a new regional consultative forum.³ In 1999, its participants, including China, signed the Bangkok Declaration to cooperate on the prevention of irregular migration. Two years later, the PRC became an observer in IOM. Relations expanded in 2007 when IOM’s office opened in Beijing, and China’s government requested IOM to teach its officials the “essentials of migration management.” China was included in several IOM regional projects, focusing, e.g., on the Mekong delta and human trafficking. In China, IOM supported shelters for trafficking victims and helped authorities address the exploitation of internal migrant workers. In 2012, China reformed its migration laws and adopted a new “Entry and Exit Law” with the support from IOM who was later also instrumental in assisting China to draft a “National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking.”⁴ Additionally, China became involved with ILO⁵ that started a multi-year “Capacity Building for Migration Management” in partnership with IOM and the EU, which included trainings for migrant recruiters to ensure their lawful conduct.⁶

2016–2021: IOM – the UN’s Lead Agency in Global Migration Governance

In September 2016, following the European migration crisis, the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted the “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” (NYD).⁷ While UNHCR was helping states to negotiate a “Global Compact on Refugees,” the GA also decided to develop a “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (GCM) supported by IOM. This was a swift promotion of IOM, which had been accepted by the UN with the status of a “related organization” only a few months before. The UN member states granted IOM this status instead of making IOM a “specialized organization” (like ILO) or “system organization” (like UNHCR) – a decision that brought IOM into the UN without compromising its independence, autonomy, and other key features.

IOM’s status largely shields it from any thorough monitoring by the UN, exempting it from the obligation to receive instructions from the General Secretariate, the GA, or Economic and Social Council. IOM gets to keep its member states and budgetary

1 “Preparatory Meeting Ahead of the 2013 UN General Assembly High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development” («Подготовительная встреча в преддверии Диалога на высоком уровне по вопросу о международной миграции и развитии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН 2013 года»), May 6, 2013, IOM, accessed February 10, 2022, <https://moscow.iom.int/ru/news/podgotovitel'naya-vstrecha-v-predverii-dialoga-na-vysokom-urovne-po-voprosu-o-mezhdunarodnoy>; “Meeting of the Director of the IOM Bureau in Moscow with the Secretary General of the CSTO” («Встреча Директора Бюро МОМ в Москве с Генеральным секретарем ОДКБ»), February 3, 2015, IOM, accessed February 10, 2022, <https://moscow.iom.int/ru/news/vstrecha-direktora-byuro-mom-v-moskve-s-generalnym-sekretarem-odkb>.

2 “Consultations on IRIS in the EEC” («Консультации по IRIS в ЕЭК»), March 9, 2019, IOM, accessed February 10, 2022, <https://moscow.iom.int/ru/news/konsultacii-po-iris-v-EEK>.

3 “Manila Process,” IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/manila-process>. IOM had offices in Hong Kong and Macao which, however, were under British/Portuguese control until 1997 and 1999, respectively. Taiwan is neither a member nor an observer of IOM, and there has been no IOM representation in Taiwan to this day.

4 “China,” IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/countries/china>; Zhang et al. 2020.

5 International Labor Organization.

6 “Capacity Building for Migration Management,” ILO, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.ilo.org/beijing/what-we-do/projects/WCMS_195963/lang-en/index.htm.

7 “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” UNHCR, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html>.

independence, and what's important, it can retain its non-normative character. The UN member states in the GA (most of them are also members of IOM¹) probably assumed that such arrangement would preserve and maintain the role of IOM as a highly flexible and pragmatic service-provider for the UN. By tasking IOM with the GCM, the GA explicitly favored IOM over ILO, a longstanding rights-centered UN organization.

The GCM's two-year negotiation process was hit by an unparalleled degree of opposition. An increasing number of states raised objections, triggered by U.S. President D. Trump's claims that the GCM would dictate future U.S. policies, and by the subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. from the GCM.² The GCM was ultimately endorsed by the GA on December 19, with 152 votes in favor. Five states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, U.S.) voted against, while twelve states, including Australia, five EU states, and Switzerland, abstained, and 24 states opted not to participate.³ Meanwhile, it is important to note that China and Russia voted in favor of the GCM.

Endorsed as a non-binding document, the GCM serves as a new global policy framework on migration, emphasizing the need to keep migration under control, enhance border security, and prevent unauthorized migration.⁴ At the same time, the GCM calls for new development-oriented labor migration partnerships between sending and destination countries – these aspects are of particular importance to China and Russia as important sending and receiving countries of migrant workers and remittances (*Section III*). While the GCM is strongly focused on security, which is probably welcomed by Russia and China, its sections on migrant rights and safety and the need to facilitate migration are vague, which may negatively affect Russian and Chinese labor and other migrants, students, and both countries' significant expat communities abroad.

IOM has long lobbied for its "global migration management" and continuously claims it can "manage migration for the benefit of all."⁵ It offers a vast portfolio of "package solutions," which states and other donors can choose and purchase via "voluntary contributions" (*Section II*). IOM implements hundreds of projects each year, some of which were beneficial to China and Russia even prior to their membership in IOM (*Section III*). IOM offers "information campaigns" to prevent irregular migration and trafficking, projects for employment of temporary workers and their pre-departure training. IOM also implements activities to spur development using remittances. Alongside UNHCR, IOM is involved in the "refugee resettlement" process, while it also helps states with "border management" (e.g., providing consultations on e-border technologies); it also has "assisted voluntary returns" of irregular migrants and rejected asylum-seekers.⁶ During the pandemic, IOM has assisted states around the world with COVID-19 testing, provision of protective equipment and health kits,

1 On July 25, 2016, the UN had 193 member states, only 14 of them were not at the same time members or observers of IOM: Andorra, Barbados, Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Oman, Singapore, Syria, and UAE.

2 "Donald Trump Pulls U.S. out of UN Global Compact on Migration," The Guardian, December 3, 2017, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-global-compact-on-migration>.

3 "General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering," UN, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.un.org/sw/desa/general-assembly-officially-adopts-roadmap-migrants-improve-safety-ease-suffering>.

4 "Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration," UN, January 11, 2019, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195.

5 "Programme and Budget 2021," IOM, October 12, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, p. 17, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/111/C-111-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202021.pdf>; Georgi 2010.

6 "Our Work," IOM, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/our-work>.

and launching vaccination campaigns. It has also helped expats and people stranded in other countries due to pandemic-related border closures to return home. In 2021, following the Taliban government takeover, IOM assisted with the evacuation of people from Afghanistan. During the winter of 2021–22, IOM has provided winter emergency kits, health care (including COVID-19 prevention measures), and other needs-based assistance to families divided by the recent events and to almost 700,000 internally displaced persons and other at-risk groups.¹

China's and Russia's IOM Memberships: Circumstances, Timing, and Motivations

Data from 2020 confirms China's and Russia's continued relevance for global migration. The Russian and the Chinese diasporas abroad kept their third (Russia: 11 mil.) and fourth (China: 10 mil.) positions respectively, after the Mexican (12 mil.) and the Indian (18 mil.) diasporas.² Russia is now the fourth biggest host country with around 12 million immigrants, after Saudi Arabia (13 mil.), Germany (16 mil.) and the U.S. (51 mil.). Despite the pandemic and departure of many expats, China's 2020 census counted 846,000 foreign residents.³ In 2020, remittances from Russia declined sharply (U.S.\$ 17 bn.), which could likely be attributed to the lockdowns and the return of migrant workers. Kuwait and Russia (both with U.S.\$ 17 bn.) now come after China (U.S.\$ 18 bn.) and Germany (U.S.\$ 22 bn.), while the world's top four remittances source countries maintained their positions.⁴ Despite the return of many Chinese to their country due to the pandemic, the PRC maintained its 2nd position in terms of the remittances received (U.S. \$60 bn.), coming after India (U.S.\$ 83 bn.).⁵

Meanwhile, China and Russia have joined IOM. Presumably, the main reason for their long absence from IOM was IOM's persistent image as a U.S./"Western" agency. IOM's support for the former Eastern Bloc countries in forging close partnerships with the EU could also explain Russia's absenteeism, particularly given its opposition to the EU's continued expansionism. In the case of China, which had been self-isolating from other countries and international institutions for decades, it should be noted that the level of immigration to China was negligible, and thus it long failed to attract greater attention. For years, there was probably no ultimate reason for China to become an IOM member. This changed in 2015 when discussions on establishing a new relationship between IOM and the UN substantiated. IOM's new status in the UN system would distance it from the U.S., thus making it more acceptable for China to join. The year of 2016 was also of symbolic value: China would not become just some ordinary member, but the 165th member of IOM in its 65th year of existence. Its membership would contribute to the strengthening of China's global posture, increase

1 "IOM Afghanistan Report," IOM, accessed February 15, 2022, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/situation_reports/file/SitRep_Afghan_28_10-3_11_2021.pdf.

2 "International Migration 2020: Highlights," UN, accessed November 1, 2021, p. 16, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2020_international_migration_highlights.pdf.

3 "International Migrant Stock 2019," UN, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/countryprofiles.asp>; "Bulletin of the Seventh National Census," National Bureau of Statistics, accessed November 1, 2021, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/202106/t20210628_1818827.html.

4 Switzerland (U.S.\$ 29 bn.), Saudi Arabia (U.S.\$ 35 bn.), UAE (U.S.\$ 43 bn.) and U.S. (U.S.\$ 70 bn.). "Remittances Data," KNOMAD, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances>.

5 Ibid.

its willingness to join other international organizations and its interest in influencing, as an actor of equal standing, the UN and other international discussions on global governance.¹

IOM saw China's membership as "crucial towards growing the organization's global significance"² – with China as its member, IOM could join the UN as a truly global organization, even without Russia and other countries relevant to migration issues.³ In June 2016, IOM allowed China to present their membership bid at its "1st Special Council" meeting held to discuss IOM's new status in the UN system. China's application for membership was announced at the start of the meeting to the effect that IOM would first accept China as a new member and then, having endorsed IOM's accession to the UN, would directly bring China into its new relationship with the UN.⁴ Following China's accession, China's representative to the UN historically contextualized this achievement directly linking it to the country's "Opening-Up" process and its "rapid economic and social development," which has led "to an increasingly frequent exchange with people from other countries" and triggered China's transition "from a country of origin to the combination of country of origin, transit and destination."⁵ China's influential "People's Daily" newspaper also celebrated China's membership in IOM.⁶

While China's membership was arguably well-planned and took place at a carefully chosen moment in the IOM and UN history, Russia's bid was discussed at the IOM's 111th Council Session – it was an ordinary meeting held online in November 2020, which was overshadowed by several attempts of the Ukrainian representative to prevent or postpone Russia's IOM membership.⁷ Ukraine successfully insisted on a formal vote, which was not a usual procedure in IOM's history of previous membership approvals, and in the end it resulted in two objections (Georgia and Ukraine) and two abstentions (Honduras and the U.S.), while all other 112 states present – including China and all of the EU states, notably including the Baltic states and Poland – voted in favor of Russia joining IOM. Although Russia was admitted, IOM's Council made its decision conditional upon Russia ratifying IOM's Constitution. It took Russia's State Duma and Russian President several months to take this mandated step. The respective note making Russia IOM's 174th member was finally received by IOM on April 19, 2021.

While the media did report on Russia's membership in IOM⁸, there has been no "congratulatory" statement from IOM compared to the one published upon China's membership.⁹ Russia's membership was only briefly "celebrated" in an interview with a major Russian newspaper wherein IOM's head of mission in Moscow explained that

1 Weng et al. 2017.

2 "International Organization for Migration Welcomes China Application for IOM Membership," IOM, June 13, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/news/international-organization-migration-welcomes-china-application-iom-membership>.

3 Saudi Arabia and UAE as countries of destination; Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria as countries of origin.

4 "1st Special Council," IOM, June 30, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/1st-special-council-2016>.

5 "China Joins International Organization for Migration," Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, June 30, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/dbtzyhd/t1379246.htm>.

6 "Why does China join IOM?" ("中国为何要加入国际移民组织"), People's Daily, July 8, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0708/c1001-28536218.html>.

7 "Draft Report on the 111th Session of the Council," IOM, January 26, 2021, <https://governingbodies.iom.int/111th-session-council-2020>.

8 "Council Approves Russian Request to Join International Organization for Migration," TASS, November 24, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://tass.com/politics/1227471>.

9 International Organization for Migration Welcomes China Application for IOM Membership," IOM, June 13, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/news/international-organization-migration-welcomes-china-application-iom-membership>.

Russia's importance as a new IOM member, given its migration-related and political relevance, cannot be overstated.¹ Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised Russia's IOM membership as a major accomplishment.² However, it seems like Russian membership in IOM was never regarded as an urgent priority, and it remains unclear why exactly Russia changed its position in 2020. Turkmenistan's (2013) and Uzbekistan's (2018) successful membership bids had left Russia as the last remaining former Soviet Union republic outside IOM. Meanwhile, the EU had significantly expanded its funding, and thus its influence on Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asian republics. With the help of IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR, ILO and OSCE³, the EU Commission and individual member states, as well as the U.S., started numerous projects aimed at modernizing border security, updating and harmonizing these countries' migration legislation and administrative practices with the EU Schengen model and other international (i.e., non-Russian) standards and best practices.⁴ While Russia had been able to maintain its own migration-related contacts and foothold in most of the other former Soviet republics, it certainly felt sidelined by these continued foreign-controlled activities taking place in its "Near Abroad" and excluded due to its limited or non-existent participation in these IOM-led and foreign-financed operations. Over time, Russia's decision to join IOM may have been shaped and stimulated by these circumstances and developments, and probably also by China's membership followed by the UN's steps toward a new global framework on migration (the GCM) affecting Russian vital interests, given the country's considerable diaspora abroad, its interests in encouraging the return of Russian "compatriots," its demographic challenges, and dependence on labor migration.

While the circumstances and timing of their memberships still warrant further research and arguably could not have been more different, China's and Russia's political statements concerning their motivation to join IOM show commonalities. Both countries share similar viewpoints on immigration. While Russia and China have significant diaspora groups abroad and have taken an increasing interest in utilizing and instrumentalizing them (e.g., facilitating their return, using their skills, knowledge and investments for development and innovation in Russia/China), both countries are strictly opposed to uncontrolled immigration or refugee flows and favor a security-focused and restrictive management of migration. IOM's "toolbox" for migration management and the GCM (*Section III*) cater to both countries' concerns and interests. IOM has longstanding expertise in, e.g., assisting the EU in apprehending and returning irregular migrants. Russian and Chinese representatives referred to IOM's longstanding expertise ("competence") and their countries' familiarity and previous involvement with IOM (*Section III*). Official arguments justifying the need to join IOM, which circulated in China and Russia prior to their accession to IOM, presented IOM

1 "Window to Tomorrow. When Migration Stops Being 'Gray'" («Окно в завтра. Когда миграция перестанет быть «серой»», Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 26, 2021, accessed November 11, 2021, <https://rg.ru/2021/05/26/kogda-migraciia-perestanet-byt-seroj.html>.

2 "On Russia's Accession to the International Organization for Migration" («О вступлении России в Международную организацию по миграции»), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2021, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/kommentarii_predstaviteley/-/asset_publisher/7gVir6Z7ElX8/content/id/4698265?novelty-display-dynamic=novelty#8.

3 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe.

4 Geiger 2018.

to lawmakers and the public as “a competent structure” that can provide the required timely support “in dealing with various issues on the migration agenda.”¹

While China has benefited from the emigration and subsequent return of many of its nationals, the recent increase in immigration and the PRC’s eventual transformation from an emigration country to a transit gateway and migrant destination have raised significant public opposition. Chinese officials openly admit to a “management problem” and a lack of expertise in effectively addressing migration, restricting migration flows, and preventing irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling, at the same time they are also concerned about the long-term presence and (insufficient) integration of foreign expats.² Chinese and Russian officials and commentators have likewise recognized in their public statements the need to respond to increasing migration flows and saw the benefits of IOM’s assistance in enhancing their legislation and procedures.

In early 2020, IOM issued an urgent appeal seeking funding to assist thousands of Central Asian migrants stranded and left without employment and income in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey, and to help the affected home communities whose remittance flows were disrupted.³ IOM’s offer to help these people return, find employment and housing, and receive reintegration assistance in their home countries, was likely one of the contributions that Russia’s representative to the UN was referring to following its successful IOM bid, when he said that he would expect IOM’s immediate support in dealing with problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁴

Picturing IOM as a “helper” in new unforeseeable migration-related challenges was in both cases often related to another issue – the fact that in addition to being “a competent structure” (or a “highly effective organization”⁵), IOM is now (since 2016) also “associated with the UN,”⁶ fostering the idea that IOM had long been considered unacceptable by China and Russia due to its independence from the UN and its legacy as being a U.S.-controlled and “Western-controlled” IGO. While IOM was repeatedly praised, the criteria upon which IOM was deemed “effective” or “competent,” e.g., by Russian authorities, were not clarified. Regarding Russia’s motivation to join IOM, there are some indications that following the accessions of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (and perhaps China), Russia may have felt a stronger need to become a member state.

1 “On Russia’s Accession to the International Organization for Migration” («О вступлении России в Международную организацию по миграции»), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2021, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/kommentarii_predstaviteley/-/asset_publisher/7gVir6Z7ElX8/content/id/4698265?novelty-display-dynamic=novelty#8; similar statements can be found from the Chinese side. See also Weng et al. 2017.

2 “China Joins International Organization for Migration,” Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, June 30, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/dbtzyhd/t1379246.htm>; “International Organization for Migration Welcomes China Application for IOM Membership,” IOM, June 13, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/news/international-organization-migration-welcomes-china-application-iom-membership>; “Why does China join IOM?”, People’s Daily, July 8, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0708/c1001-28536218.html>; Weng et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2021.

3 “‘Clear and Present Crisis’ in Russian Federation and Central Asia,” IOM, May 15, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://www.iom.int/news/clear-and-present-crisis-russian-federation-and-central-asia-iom-launches-urgent-appeal>; see also “Migrants from the Countries of Central Asia, Left Destitute, Urgently Need Help” («Мигрантам из стран Центральной Азии, оставшимся без средств к существованию, срочно требуется помощь»), UN, May 2020, accessed February 10, 2022, <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/05/1378202>.

4 “Council Approves Russian Request to Join International Organization for Migration,” TASS, November 24, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://tass.com/politics/1227471>.

5 “On Russia’s Accession to the International Organization for Migration” («О вступлении России в Международную организацию по миграции»), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2021, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/kommentarii_predstaviteley/-/asset_publisher/7gVir6Z7ElX8/content/id/4698265?novelty-display-dynamic=novelty#8.

6 “Council Approves Russian Request to Join International Organization for Migration,” TASS, November 24, 2020, accessed November 1, 2021, <https://tass.com/politics/1227471>.

The protocols of the “502th Sitting of the Federation Council” of Russia convened in early 2020 – just prior the ratification of IOM’s constitution by the State Duma and the signing of the relevant decree by President V. Putin – show that the Council members were clearly reminded that 173 other states had already become members of IOM and that Russia could not hope to influence global migration governance without becoming a member state.¹ A similar statement had been given by one of the China’s representatives in 2016 who called membership in IOM an “inevitable choice” for China “to become further engaged in global governance.”² This and other similar statements indicate that China also presumably felt encouraged to join IOM following, e.g., the accession of the neighboring India to IOM eight years before and the continued discussions on the need of enhanced governance of global migration.

Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representative to the UN expressed a strong determination to use IOM as a platform for Russia to expand “constructive” dialogue on migration³ and overcome international dissension. While Russia has been increasingly finding itself “circled” by former Soviet republics and satellite states that had become the members of IOM before Russia did and a majority of which had signed far-reaching cooperation agreements with the EU, Russia itself – up to this day – remains under international sanctions, which include the continued suspension of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia. Russia’s decision to join IOM could be an attempt to overcome this stalemate and open a new venue for dialogue with states, including, e.g., China, that share similar objectives, namely keeping migration flows under control and approaching refugee and other flows from a security-focused perspective. Indeed, the tumultuous IOM Council meeting concerning Russia’s membership showed that even the notorious critics of Russia, such as the Baltic States, Poland, or Canada, ultimately did not join Ukraine but instead supported Russia’s membership. This clearly indicates that there are IOM member countries that seek to renew and possibly expand relations with Russia, and they may potentially seek to use IOM as a platform to work together with Russia pragmatically to address issues of joint concern and interest.

Likewise, China arguably had stronger geopolitical motivation when joining IOM. It understands the strategic value of IOM for China as an IGO with global relevance and posture going well beyond a narrowly focused “organization for migration.” China, like Russia, sees IOM as a “platform,” which it eventually intends to use for pursuing its own interests. It was probably no coincidence that China’s representative to the UN attached an extraordinarily strong historical meaning to his country’s membership in IOM and directly referred to China’s biggest geopolitical project – “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR).⁴ On its own, it has successfully negotiated easier access for its workers with most of the countries participating in OBOR, while it has simultaneously started to

1 “The 502th Sitting of the Federation Council” («502 заседание Совета Федерации»), Federation Council, March 31, 2021, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/125114/transcript/>.

2 “China Joins International Organization for Migration,” Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, June 30, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/dbtzyhd/t1379246.htm>.

3 “On Russia’s Accession to the International Organization for Migration” («О вступлении России в Международную организацию по миграции»), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2021, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/kommentarii_predstaviteley/-/asset_publisher/7gVir6Z7EIX8/content/id/4698265?novelty-display-dynamic=novelty#8.

4 “China Joins International Organization for Migration,” Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, June 30, 2016, accessed November 1, 2021, <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/dbtzyhd/t1379246.htm>.

encourage more students from OBOR countries to pursue education in China. Despite these steps, China may potentially expect IOM's support in this and other projects, given its need to open up again following the pandemic and its continued or even growing tensions and differences with other countries, including OBOR partner states.

IOM as a Global Leader in the Post-COVID-19 World

When joining IOM, China and Russia stated that they expected IOM would serve them in enhancing their management of migration and promoting their interests in relevant regional and global discussions. In early 2021, representatives of Russia and other CIS countries met with IOM's Moscow officials, reportedly to discuss the need to enhance management of labor migration between Central Asia and Russia with the help of IOM through creating, e.g., improved workforce mobility programs involving the pre-departure training of labor migrants, i.e., their training in the countries of origin.¹ In such case, Russia and the CIS would closely follow some of the recommendations laid out in the GCM before the pandemic. However, at this point, there is no information as to whether such joint projects with IOM are underway or will receive political "buy-in" and financing from Russia and/or other CIS states.

While Russia and China set equally high expectations on receiving support from IOM at the time of their accession, current impressions are rather different. IOM currently has very few projects focused on China or Russia; most of the existing projects are research projects and fact-gathering workshops rather than operational activities.² IOM remains heavily dependent on the contributions provided by its traditional main donors, the U.S. and the EU. According to the IOM's budgetary forecast for 2022, China's and Russia's IOM membership fees will be U.S.\$ 7.3 million and U.S.\$ 1.5 million respectively. Meanwhile, China's and Russia's voluntary contributions to IOM stand at U.S.\$ 204,000 and U.S.\$ 0 respectively³ – raising suspicion that China and Russia see no immediate need in funding IOM initiatives to their benefit or concern. At this point, there is no involvement or funding provided by China or Russia to address pressing challenges located closely to both countries, such as the support of Afghan refugees or the management of labor migration from Central Asia.

This suggests that China and Russia perceive IOM merely as a discussion platform rather than an actual support and (co-)implementing agency. Both countries' memberships seem purely symbolic. In future years, both countries might decide to use IOM to advance certain migration-related or relevant geopolitical projects (e.g., China's OBOR) and finance certain IOM activities and interventions. However, despite its new status in the UN, IOM is set to remain a financially-driven organization. This means that substantial funding would be required from China and Russia in order to receive tailored projects and other support from IOM, to become genuinely involved

1 "Representatives of the CIS Executive Committee Took Part in the Presentation of the IOM Office in Moscow to Promote Safe and Skilled Migration in the Central Asia-Russian Federation Corridor" («Представители Исполкома СНГ приняли участие в презентации проекта Бюро МОМ в Москве по содействию безопасной и квалифицированной миграции в коридоре Центральная Азия – Российская Федерация»), CIS, March 23, 2021, accessed February 13, 2022, https://cis.minsk.by/news/18374/predstaviteli_ispolkoma_sng_prinjali_uchastie_v_prezentacii_proekta_bjuro_mom_v_moskve_po_sodejstviju_bezopasnoj_i_kvalificirovannoj_migracii_v_koridore_centralnaja_azija_-_rossijskaja_federacija.

2 IOM 2021; Zhang et al. 2021.

3 "Programme and Budget for 2022," IOM, accessed: 15.02.2022, 59-60; 83, https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/112/C-112-6%20-%20Programme%20and%20Budget%20for%202022_0.pdf.

and to actually influence IOM-led regional or global initiatives, or global migration governance more generally.

Despite all its shortcomings, IOM, with China and Russia as members, can now rightfully claim to be a global organization. Likewise, as a related organization of the UN and the lead agency in the GCM, IOM's position in relation to other UN and other international organizations and NGOs is reinforced. By providing tailored "migration management" projects to the states around the world, including to Russia and China since the mid-2000s, IOM has been an active force in gradual global harmonization and standardization of laws and practices. The unprecedented circumstances of the pandemic have arguably provided IOM with more influence and authority. At the beginning of 2022, as the pandemic slowly nears to an end, and migration flows gradually resume, states around the world start searching for new approaches to relaunch and better manage migration. IOM, as the UN's lead agency on migration, will likely be in higher demand and will help relaunch and implement the GCM. The hope is that, taking into account IOM's new authority and political power, it will also deliver upon its promises to manage migration for the benefit of all, including for the benefit of migrants and other populations, and that IOM will not exclusively cater to states security-oriented and restrictive objectives, but – as a genuine "world organization" – will help enhance migration governance on the basis of a more effective rights-based approach and approaches that equally benefit receiving and origin communities and serve the common global interest.

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Международная организация по миграции (МОМ): «компетентная структура» и «неизбежный выбор» России и Китая для влияния на глобальное управление миграцией?

АННОТАЦИЯ

Данная статья посвящена МОМ и исследует ее роль в глобальном управлении миграцией.

Членство Китая и России в организации рассматривалось как давно назревшее в силу того значения, которое имели обе страны для глобальной миграционной системы из-за политического веса обеих стран на международной арене и представленности во многих других организациях. Хотя МОМ в последние годы начала привлекать все больше научного внимания, по-прежнему недостаточно исследований, посвященных взаимодействию МОМ с незападными государствами, в частности с Россией и Китаем. Помимо этого нам все еще не хватает более глубокого понимания МОМ как организации, приобретающей сегодня все большее глобальное значение. В нашей работе мы стремимся устранить некоторые существующие пробелы, одновременно расширяя исследования, посвященные МОМ, за пределы «привычного» фокуса, принятого в большинстве существующих научных работ (т.е. в направлении других «принимающих» и «отдающих» стран Европы, Африки, Северной и Южной Америки). Наш анализ сближения Китая и России с Международной организацией по миграции основывается на недавних исследованиях, в рамках которых межправительственные организации концептуализируются как «всемирные организации». Мы рассматриваем МОМ как пример такой «всемирной организации» на основе четырех взаимосвязанных аспектов: (1) «внутренние миры» МОМ (например, формирование, отношения с государствами-членами, внутренние решения); (2) представление о себе и оценка себя в качестве организации, встроенной и относящейся к мировому обществу, то есть к «миру управления миграцией»; (3) внешние связи, интегрированность в более широкую среду и реакция на внешние события; (4) вклад в мировой порядок, т.е. в глобальное управление миграцией. Хотя данная работа коснется всех четырех аспектов, тесно между собой взаимосвязанных и взаимозависимых, основное внимание все же будет уделено последним трем, так как «внутренние миры» МОМ пока еще требуют дополнительных исследований.

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