Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a De Facto and Limited Recognized State: From Federal Solution to Two State Model*

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ABSTRACT

This study covers the history of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a de facto state, a status it has held since 1983 after having established its institutional structure in 1975 under the name of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). The TRNC has unique characteristics when compared with other de facto states. While it is home to EU citizens, it enjoys the support and influence of Turkey as its patron state, which is not member of the European Union. Although the TRNC has been declared an independent state, TRNC leaders pursued a federal solution to reunify the island until E. Tatar was elected president in 2020. The TRNC has another unique characteristic: its civil society tradition is more powerful than opposition political parties and non-governmental organizations, which sometimes clash with the government of Turkey concerning the latter's policies in the TRNC and the Cyprus question. As the TRNC's patron state, Turkey shapes its stance on the island in parallel with its relations with the European Union. The lack of any progress on Turkey's EU membership and uncompromising position of the Greek Cypriot leadership at negotiations in recent decades have pushed Turkey to shift its position on the Cyprus problem. Therefore, after coming to power, Tatar stated that a federal solution is not possible on the island and insisted that a two-state model be implemented with the support of Turkey.

KEYWORDS

de facto state, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkey, Greece, European Union (EU)

Introduction

In this study, we will focus on the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), sometimes called North(ern) Cyprus, by discussing the history of this de facto state and its relations with its patron state, Turkey. Here, we will also try to explain the changing policies (axis shifts) of Turkey as the TRNC's patron state regarding possible solutions to the Cyprus problem, which have evolved from a federal system to two sovereign state model. Before focusing on recent developments and discussions in the TRNC and its relations with Turkey and international community/*environment (both variants are suitable)*, we should consider with status of de facto states within the international relations system and their characteristics according to interpretations of some scholars and experts.

The system of international relations has become increasingly complicated in recent decades due to economic, social and political changes that have challenged the traditional characteristics of that system. These changes have brought about new discussions regarding sovereignty, international law and status of states. The traditional system of international relations was established on the basis of Peace of Westphalia and the Montevideo Convention, which defined the characteristics of sovereign states within the contemporary international relations system. However, the current system of international relations does not match up with the principles of the Peace of Westphalia and the Montevideo Convention, due to interventions in the internal affairs of states and the emergence of numerous new states that are not members of the United Nations.

The Montevideo Convention clarified the qualifications that states must satisfy within international law to be considered states: "a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with the other states."[1] Article 3 of the Convention sets forth the notion that the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states, and that they have the right to defend their integrity and independence. Article 6 of the Convention also deals with the issue of recognition, stating that recognition is unconditional and irrevocable. Additionally, Article 8 says that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."[2] The framework and content of the Montevideo Convention mirrors that of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state.[3] However, the provisions of the UN Charter and the Montevideo Convention have been breached in the international relations system, where conventions, charters and treaties are the sources of international law due to the emergence of de facto states within the system. Therefore, we may say that another system has been created within the system of international relations – one that includes de facto states that are not recognized by the majority of countries (limited recognition) and are bit members of the United Nations.

1   Конвенция Монтевидио о правах и обязанностях государств, принятая в 1933 г. // Университет Осло. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml (дата обращения: 22.12.2022).

2   Ibid.

3   Устав ООН // ООН. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.un.org/ru/about-us/un-charter/full-text (дата обращения: 22.12.2022).

Abkhazia, Kosovo, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), South Ossetia, Transnistria, the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic and Somaliland are some of these de facto states.

According to S. Pegg, the study of de facto states was marginalized until the end of 1990s.[1] However, the discipline is gaining popularity as the influence of these states in international relations system grows. Pegg also identified five factors in the nation-building process of de facto states: emphasis on history and victory in civil war; the lack of international recognition and continuing unsafe conditions; the creation of ethnic homogeneity by displacing the population; dependence on a patron state that supports and intervenes in that state's internal affairs; and openness to international normative pressure in order to be admitted into the international private club of sovereign states.[2] Pegg's arguments are seen in the case of the TRNC as well. Following Turkey's military intervention in 1974, Greek Cypriots were displaced from the northern part of the island to create ethnic homogeneity. Then, education and socialization process in the de facto country was based on the victory in the 1974 war, while the period 1963–1974 is seen as the tragic period in the country's history, referring to the guarantor position of Turkey by right wing political parties and institutions. Another of Pegg's argument regarding interventions in the internal affairs of de facto states by patron states is proven in this study by reference to the 2020 presidential elections in the TRNC.[3]

A. Florea stresses that sometimes de facto states disappear and are reintegrated into their parent states. Examples of this include Tamil Eelam, Katanga, etc. He adds that Northern Cyprus had survived for a long time.[4] Florea also pays attention to Turkey's support to Northern Cyprus, which has strengthened the governance apparatus and the separatist stance and made Turkish Cypriots less willing to accept agreements that would force them to lose their quasi-independence.[5] In addition, Florea recalls the rejection of the Annan Plan for the reunification of the island by Greek Cypriots,[6] which is another reason for survival of the TRNC as a de facto state. The Turkish Cypriot scholars Özyiğit and Eminer also note the TNRC's dependence on Turkey militarily and financially, agreeing with Florea's argument that "independence is far from being a reality."[7] Ayberk, Akşit and Dayıoğlu referred to Kochieva in their article and added that patron states support candidates, political parties or politicians so that they will serve their purposes and interests.[8] However, non-governmental organizations can play a crucial role in politics, as has been the case in the TRNC since lates of 1990s. Here Ayberk, Akşit and Dayıoğlu point to the significant role of non-governmental organizations (including trade unions) through a comparison of the structures of other de facto states, including instances where they even reacted against Turkey as the patron state.[9] The reason for this is evident: Turkish Cypriot non-governmental organizations have been supported by EU funds as EU Citizens. This is another unique feature of

1 Pegg 2017.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Florea 2017.
5 Ibid., 12–13.
6 Ibid., 15.
7 Özyiğit, Eminer 2021, 6.
8 Ayberk et al. 2019, 130.
9 Ibid., 133.

the TRNC, as almost 100,000 citizens have Republic of Cyprus (i.e., EU) passports and the European Union has funded projects and non-governmental organizations since 2004.[1] The acquis communautaire is suspended in the TRNC, but the European Union is still attractive for some members of the community. The European Union is also involved in civil society organizations and provides donations for certain sectors as well. Therefore, a very unique situation is observed on the island, where Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the TRNC take donations and financial funds from Turkey as the patron state, and also as EU citizens benefit from the financial assistance of the European Union. For example, the European Union has given almost 520 Million Euros to projects in support of Turkish Cypriot community.[2]

The TRNC is quite different from other *de facto* states as it is better connected to international markets through Turkey, and is home to EU citizens, although the suspension of the *acquis Communautaire* restricts its relations with the European Union. These factors make the TRNC different and unique in international relations system.

In order to understand the current status and policies of TRNC, as well as those of Turkey, it is important to first acquaint oneself with the historical background of the TRNC and the island of Cyprus.

Historical Background of Cyprus Problem and the TRNC

The island of Cyprus has been home to various civilizations throughout its history, including the Byzantine Empire, the Arabs, the Lusignan, the Venetians, the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain until the country gained independence in 1960. The Lusignan and Venetians promoted Catholicism and oppressed the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Therefore, the millet system of the Ottoman Empire was an opportunity for the Orthodox Church of Cyprus to emancipate itself from the oppression of Catholic rule. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was interested in securing its presence in the Mediterranean and set about conquering Cyprus in 1571, thus ending the Venetian rule on the island. The Ottoman Empire introduced a resettlement that led to the majority of the Catholic population fleeing the island. Therefore, a Muslim population made up primarily of people of Turkic origin from Anatolia settled on the island. The Ottoman Empire ruled Cyprus for almost 300 years before leasing the island to Great Britain in 1878. The British rule lasted until 1960, when Cyprus gained independence during the decolonization process. The Republic of Cyprus was thus founded, although this did not stop the ethnic tension among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which started at the beginning of 1900s.[3]

The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established in 1960. It was founded by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Minority groups include Maronites, Latins and Armenians.

Despite the ethnic tension among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they had opportunity to establish independent republic during the decolonization process.[4]

1   De Waal 2019, 55–56.
2   Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community," European Commission, accessed December 22, 2022, https://commission. europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/support-turkish-cypriot-community/aid-programme-turkish-cypriot-community_en/.
3   For more detail, see Asmussen 2004.
4   Erkem 2016, 108.

Eventually, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established in 1960 and Greek and Turkish Cypriots became the founders of the republic, Maronites, Latins and Armenians have been identified as the minority groups in the constitution of the RoC.

The RoC was established on the basis of ethnic division, which means a kind of functional federal system similar to Lebanon, rather than a regional federation. However, the Greek Cypriot nationalist organization EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) continued its activities in secret, mostly supported by Greek junta in 1967 to 1974.[1]

Greek nationalism did not lose its popularity and continued its activities, mainly through violence. Meanwhile, President Makarios attempted to introduce an amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus which would ignore the rights of Turkish Cypriots and create a more unitary state structure. Makarios wanted to limit the power of Turkish Cypriots in governmental institutions and neglected their constitutional rights, including the right to elect a vice president from the Turkish Cypriot Community. Makarios stated his aims on November 30, 1963, which led to intercommunal conflict and violence in Cyprus. On December 21, 1963, the EOKA slaughtered a Turkish military officer's wife and children in Nicosia. Clashes broke between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the streets of Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots were later killed in Agios Vasileios (Türkeli-Ayvasil) by Greek Cypriot nationalists. In early 1964, intercommunal clashes expanded around the island, and the Turkish Cypriot leadership left the government and legislation institutions due to a lack of safety. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 186 on March 4, 1964 and deployed the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to prevent further clashes among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, the mission could not prevent further fighting, and in 1964, Cyprus witnessed intercommunal conflicts that led to most Turkish Cypriots being displaced due to low intensity warfare in the towns and villages.[2]

Intercommunal conflicts continued almost 11 years. Greek and Turkish Cypriots met several times to find a resolution to the problem, but were ultimately unable to due to their different ideas on governance of Cyprus. In spite of different perspectives, Archbishop President Makarios gave up on the ENOSIS idea (the union of Cyprus and Greece) when he came up against the resistance of Turkish Cypriots backed by Turkey. Calmer relations between the two communities were established in 1974. However, the Greek Cypriot nationalist N. Sampson organized a military coup against Makarios and replaced him on July 15, 1974. Following the coup, Sampson installed himself as de facto President of Cyprus, and declared to the press that he controlled all parts of the island. This rule would be short-lived, however, as Turkey organized a launched intervention on July 20, 1974, citing the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as its legitimate basis, to protect the constitutional order of the RoC. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe condemned the *coup d'état*, which had links to the Greek junta, and referred to Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee as proof of Turkey's right to intervene. The Assembly also called for a ceasefire and for the parties to reach an

1 Michael 2020, 89.
2 For more detail, see Документ ООН S59/50. Доклад Генерального секретаря ООН. Операция на Кипре // ООН. 10 сентября 1964. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S%205950.pdf (дата обращения: 22.12.2022).

agreement at meetings in Geneva.[1] Following the Turkish intervention, some 165,000 Greek Cypriots fled the northern part of the island and went south. Similarly, almost 45,000 Turkish Cypriots left the southern part of island and moved north.[2] The island was thus divided into two parts, North and South, which is what led to the Turkish Cypriot leadership declaring Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in 1975 in the north. Afterwards, the parties agreed on bi-zonal bicommunal federation by signing the High Level Agreements in 1977 and 1979. But Turkish Cypriot leader R. Denktaş declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), established under the shadow of military regime in Turkey, an independent state in 1983.[3]

The declaration of the TRNC was not intended to put a halt to the negotiations to find a solution on the basis of a UN resolution. However, the disputing parties could not agree on how exactly to resolve the Cyprus problem of the structure of the new state or how to implement the confidence-building measures offered by the UN and UN special envoys in Cyprus. Eventually, progress on reunification came to a halt. But Turkey–EU relations and Cyprus' membership in the European Union played crucial role in the rapprochement of disputing parties.

The Greek Cypriot Perspective on 1974 and the TRNC

The Greek Cypriot leadership and community has a totally different perspective on the status of the TRNC and the Turkish military intervention of 1974. Greek Cypriots see the events of 1974 as an invasion and a catastrophe that led to them losing their ancestral homes and territories and to the division of their island.[4] The partition of the island is a kind of nightmare for Greek Cypriot leadership and community, and some scholars see the British policy as responsible for the "Turkish Invasion" and the breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibits the partition of the island.[5] Officially, the Republic of Cyprus sees the TRNC as a "Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus."[6] In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus warns foreigners not to travel to the TRNC on its official website or even use the term "TRNC," as it is a secessionist entity unilaterally declared by occupation regime as stated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541.[7] The RoC reminds travellers that Larnaca and Paphos airports are legal entrance points to Cyprus, and that entering the RoC through any port of the Turkish-occupied area is perceived as illegal according to the official policy of the RoC.[8] However, the RoC accepts some TRNC-issued documents, such as driving licence and identity cards for crossing check points. S. Michael also points out that the TRNC is an unrecognized state, but there are signs that the West may start to accept the self-proclaimed state by recognizing TRNC law in family and property law cases.[9]

1   Резолюция Парламентской ассамблеи Совета Европы №573. Ситуация на Кипре и в Восточном Средиземноморье // ПАСЕ. 1974. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://pace.coe.int/en/files/15986/html (дата обращения: 22.12.2022).
2   "Cyprus profile – Timeline," BBC News, February 7, 2018, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17219505.
3   Özsağlam 2018, 317.
4   Attalides 2004, 140.
5   Michael 2020, 99.
6   "Important information concerning travel to the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, accessed December 22, 2022, https://mfa.gov.cy/important-information-concerning-travel-to-occupied-area.html.
7   Ibid.
8   Ibid.
9   Michael 2020, 87.

The Immoveable Property Commission was established in 2006 and has been seen as a domestic remedy for property issues by the European Court of Human Rights since 2010.[1] These facts may thus push scholars and some Greek Cypriot elites to think that Western institutions may accept more documents of the TRNC too.

Turkey's Support of the Annan Plan
for a United Federal Cyprus in 2004

The European Union and the Greek Cypriot leadership (RoC) agreed to start negotiations on EU membership in 1997. Further, the European Union declared its commitment to making Cyprus a member even if the Cyprus problem would remain unresolved at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Turkey was granted candidate status for EU membership at the same summit.[2]

In addition, Turkey and Greece entered into a rapprochement process, with the United Nations and Turkey encouraging negotiations among the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships. R. Denktaş and G. Clerides opened negotiations in January 2002 on the possibility of creating a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Following the negotiations, UN Secretary General K. Annan put forward the "Annan Plan," which contended the nature of the High Level Agreements in 1977 and 1979.[3] While the parties were in the negotiations, Clerides lost the presidential elections to his opponent, T. Papadopoulos in the southern part of the island (RoC). The negotiations thus continued between Denktas and Papadopoulos; however, Denktas believed that the interests of Turkish Cypriots were being ignored, and argued that the Annan Plan would put Turkish Cypriots in a minority position and erode their sovereignty on the island. Meanwhile, the left-wing Turkish Cypriot Republican Turkish Party (CTP, formerly a pro-Soviet Party) supported the Annan Plan and, under the leadership of M.A. Talat, mobilized people to demonstrations calling for the reunification of Cyprus alongside the "This Country is Ours Platform" (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu). It was around the same time these protests were taking place that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey, and its leader, R.T. Erdoğan, supported the Annan Plan and cooperated with CTP and other opposition groups to pursue the diplomatic process. Denktas organized meetings in Turkey in order to whip up support against Annan Plan. He also stated that he would not participate the summit in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. R.T. Erdoğan criticized this decision, stating "If you would like to say something regarding the Annan Plan, go to Cyprus with all marginal political groups and speak there."[4] Turkey was willing to reach a solution with Cyprus on the basis of the Annan Plan and was even prepared to recommend territorial adjustments as well, and R.T. Erdoğan underlined that the solution to the Cyprus problem may be more valuable than a piece of land.[5] R.T. Erdoğan's attitude was very pragmatic as a conservative who

1   "Taşınmaz Mal Komisyonu (The Immovable Property Commission)," accessed December 22, 2022, http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/english/index.html.
2   "EU enlargement policy. Türkiye," European Council, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/turkey/.
3   Özsağlam 2011.
4   "Git Ada'da anlat (Go tell it on the island)," Hurriyet Newspaper, April 12, 2004, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/git-ada-da-anlat-216930.
5   "Erdoğan: Kıbrıs'ta belli oranda toprak verebiliriz (Erdogan: We can give a piece of land in Cyprus)," YouTube: Politik Arşivler, October 12, 2020, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hgf4QerFWzY.

cooperated with the central left-wing party in the TRNC and challenged Denktas, the founder of the TRNC and representative of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus.[1]

Eventually, the Turkish Cypriot leader and founder of the TRNC stated that he would not negotiate the Annan Plan at the Bürgenstock summit. Thus, Prime Minister M.A. Talat, who favoured a federalist solution, participated in the summit under auspices of the UN Secretary General. At the summit, all the parties, including the guarantor states – Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – agreed to organize referendums on both sides at the same time. Prime Minister Talat was ready to unite with South Cyprus (RoC) in the form of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. A unique situation thus emerged in which the de facto state and its new leadership was campaigning for reunification, rather than for the status of an independent recognized state within the international system. However, the Greek Cypriot leader T. Papadopoulos campaigned against the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of the Annan Plan alongside his coalition partner AKEL (the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People).[2]

Eventually, referendums were held in the two parts of Cyprus in April, 2004. And the results were dramatic: 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted "For" for the Annan Plan, while 75.38% of Greek Cypriots voted "Against" it. Despite these negative results, the Turkish Cypriot community continued to back the federalist movements that supported the Annan Plan and reunification of the island. This explains why Talat won the presidential elections in 2005, while Denktas left politics.

Talat's Failed Efforts for a Federation

Talat became the second President of the TRNC. His victory in the presidential elections was a turning point for Turkish Cypriot politics, as he was someone who pursued reunification of the island from the moment he took up office. However, Talat would face a serious challenge, as he would have to continue negotiations with Papadopoulos and spend efforts trying to convince him that the best solution would be unification on the basis of bizonal and bicommunal federation. Talat could not even persuade Papadopoulos on confidence-building measures for reconciliation of the communities on the island, such as opening Ledra Street. Papadopoulos and his political team were not psychologically ready to share governmental power with Turkish Cypriots. He did not support federalism as an idea, which was evident before the Annan Plan referendum. Papadopoulos even appeared on television, stating that he could not give his people a province instead of the State. [3]

General Secretary of AKEL D. Christofias was elected President of Cyprus in 2008, and he pursued meetings with Talat. What was interesting about this situation was that two leaders who were pro-Soviet Union in the past were in power at the same time. The two leaders agreed on several substantive issues regarding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem. However, Talat was not able to develop a joint statement

1 Gill Tudor, "Rauf Denktash 'Relieved' at Retirement," Ekathimerini, April 4, 2005, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/30953/rauf-denktash-relieved-at-retirement/.

2 George Wright, "Greek Cypriot leaders reject Annan Plan," The Guardian, April 22, 2004, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus.

3 "Διάγγελμα του Τάσσου Παπαδόπουλου για το Δημοψήφισμα της 24ης Απριλίου (Tasos Papadopulos. Speech for Annan Plan. April 2004)," YouTube: Sigmalive, January 14, 2014, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5LMTyi9kso.

with Christofias regarding the agreed substantive issues, which was a big challenge for Talat before the presidential elections in the TRNC because the Turkish Cypriot Community expected him to have a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem by cooperating with Christofias. Therefore, this created a desperate atmosphere, and some conservative Turkish officials cooperated with D. Eroğlu, who supported the secessionist movement in the TRNC and would go on to win the elections. Before the elections, Eroğlu maintained that negotiations would be on the basis of state-to-state rather than leader-to-leader diplomacy. However, when Eroğlu won the presidential elections in April 2010, he sent a letter to B. Ki-Moon stating that he was ready to begin negotiations with Christofias.[1]

Eroğlu's letter indicated that he wished to continue the negotiation framework determined by the United Nations and supported by Turkey. Eroğlu and Christofias continued the negotiations on this basis, but were unable to reach any agreements. Afterwards, Eroğlu continued negotiations with N. Anastasiadis from 2013 to 2015.

Impact of Turkey on the TRNC Leadership and Tensions Caused

Initially, Eroğlu's stance on the Cyprus problem was different from that of Turkey, as he campaigned "Against" the Annan Plan. Eroğlu once stated that "the deadlock of the problem is actually a solution,"[2] where he pursued his secessionist political line until he took up office as president. However, Eroğlu changed his stance after becoming President of the TRNC in 2010, and he followed the main foreign policy orientation of Turkey regarding the Cyprus problem – a unified country on the basis of bi-communal, bi-zonal federation according to the parameters set out by the United Nations. This was the background for the joint declaration delivered by Anastasiadis and Eroğlu on February 11, 2014, in which they underscored the fact that the status quo could not be an acceptable solution. The sides also reiterated that the solution of the Cyprus problem would be on the basis of bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and referred to the high level agreements too.[3] Before the joint declaration, Turkish Foreign Minister A. Davutoğlu stated that it was time to resolve the Cyprus problem and end the division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.[4] Davutoglu also exchanged views with his Greek counterpart E. Venizelos, expressing his pleasure with the progress made in the Cyprus peace talk.[5] This obviously indicates the impact of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey over Eroğlu's political stance. Eroğlu had given up his old attitudes and was talking positively about a solution to the Cyprus problem and stated that one could be found in 2014 by organizing a separate referendum.[6] As a result, the disputing parties discussed the substantive issues of the problem, but did not cover

1 "2008 Negotiation Process," Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 22, 2022, https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/cyprus-negotiation-process/cyprus-negotiations/2008-negotiation-process/.

2 "Derviş Eroğlu cumhurbaşkanı seçildi (Derviş Eroğlu is elected president)," BBC News Türkçe, April 19, 2010, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2010/04/100418_eroglu_result.

3 "Anastasiades–Eroglu Joint Declaration," Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2014, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/pdf-files/Joint-Declaration.pdf.

4 "Cyprus Peace Talks Relaunch," Daily Sabah, February 10, 2014, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2014/02/10/cyprus-peace-talks-relaunch.

5   Ibid.

6 "Eroğlu: 'Kıbrıs'ta Anlaşma 2014 İçinde Olabilir' (Eroğlu: 'A settlement in Cyprus may be possible in 2014')," Voa Turkish, April 22, 2014, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.voaturkce.com/a/ero%C4%9Flu-k%C4%B1br%C4%B1sta-anla%C5%9Fma-2014-i%C3%A7inde-olabilir/1898791.html.

territorial adjustments and security and guarantees.[1] However, there was no more time to discuss two more crucial substantive issues due to the presidential elections in TRNC.

Complicated Relations and Tension with Turkey under the leadership of Akinci

Eroğlu lost the next elections to M. Akinci, a politically pro-Western, social democratic leader who enjoyed the support of left-wing and federalists. Akinci focused on confidence-building measures with a view to developing a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem and promised voters during his election campaign that he had a different vision for its solution. Akinci's political adventure on the island is actually an interesting one. He was the Mayor of North Nicosia in the 1980s and then he became the president of TKP (Communal Liberation Party). Akinci dismissed the radical left-wing elements from the party, focused on gaining international recognition for the TRNC, and pursued the economic development of the northern part of the island. Akinci became Deputy Prime Minister in 1998, with his party gaining two seats in parliament out of the 50 that were up for grabs. He pursued a "neo-liberal policy" with his coalition partner that faced harsh criticism from the CTP and trade unions. On the other hand, Akinci also faced problems with Denktas' policies regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem and membership in the European Union. In 2001, the government was dissolved, and Akinci believed that Denktas was primarily to blame for this.[2]

Akinci became one of the founders and leaders of the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), an alliance of social democratic groups and political parties, including the radical left, which emerged during the Annan Plan era. Akinci had changed his political orientation on the Cyprus Issue, focusing on a federal solution rather than recognition of the TRNC in the international arena. His political adventure is worth taking into consideration as it affected the political atmosphere in the TRNC and its relations with Turkey. His presidency of BDH was mostly unsuccessful, which caused Akinci to give up politics in 2010 and move to the United States. However, he was nominated as a presidential candidate in 2015 and ended up winning the elections. Hence, the TRNC entered a new process with a complicated political atmosphere. Although Akinci had placed an emphasis on "confidence-building measures" during his election campaign, he did not do enough to see these promises through when he was in office. Akinci followed the diplomatic means of previous leaders of the TRNC and worked with his special envoy and technical committees to find a comprehensive solution. Eventually, Akinci came to an agreement with Anastasiadis on a united-federal Cyprus, and high level summits with the participation of the guarantor states under the auspices of the United Nations were slated to be held.[3]

1 "Latest Developments," Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 22, 2022, https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/cyprus-negotiation-process/recent-developments/?ysclid=l7wbpp8zuy651029221.

2 Sami Özuslu, "Akinci: Hükümet Bozulmadı Bozduruldu (Akıncı: The Government Is Not Corrupted, It Has Been Overturned)," BIA-NET, May 28, 2001, accessed December 22, 2022, https://bianet.org/bianet/print/2462-akinci-hukumet-bozulmadi-bozduruldu.

3 "Anastasiades, Akinci agree to relaunch Cyprus peace talks," Ekathimerini, June 6, 2016, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/209269/anastasiades-akinci-agree-to-relaunch-cyprus-peace-talks/.

The first round of the summits was held in Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland on November 7–11, 2016, where some agreements were achieved. However, the disputing parties could not come to a solution in the second round of the summit, which was held on November 20–21, 2016. After the Mont Pèlerin summits, M. Akinci criticized the Greek Cypriot leadership for focusing on territory issues rather than political equality and issues pertaining to presidential rotation.[1] Akinci also said that the Greek Cypriot side had agreed for Turkey and Greece to hold their own meeting on security guarantees, but had later rejected such an idea.[2] Eventually, the disputing parties could not reach any solution; however, the negotiation process to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem continued.

Crans-Montana Summit: A Milestone Towards "Two State Model" Proposal

The Crans-Montana Summit was another significant milestone after the Annan Plan referendum was rejected by the Greek Cypriot Community in 2004. The Summit had been understood as a turning point and the Turkish Cypriot leadership made it clear that it would be the last chance for this generation to reach a comprehensive solution for the island. During the Summit, the Turkish Cypriot leadership worked with Turkey, while the Greek Cypriot worked together with Greece. The Crans-Montana Summit began on June 28, 2017. The first thing that Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey M. Çavuşoğlu did there was to make it clear to the Greek Cypriots and Greece that they had to abandon their ideas for scrapping guarantees and the withdrawal of Turkish Troops from the island.[3] This attitude clearly indicated that Turkey would be vulnerable on security issues during the negotiation process. UN Secretary General A. Guterres appeared at the Summit on June 30 and stated that it represented a historical opportunity for reunification of the island.[4] However, the parties could not reach a compromise on security issues and the Summit resulted in a kind of "blame game." Çavuşoğlu tweeted that "zero guarantees, zero army" was not acceptable, while Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece N. Kotzias tweeted that "Turkey's intervention rights on the island could not be acceptable," and Greek Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Mail noted the bad behaviour of Anastasiades at a dinner, per a UN source.[5] The security issue became the main stumbling block among the parties. This was interesting, as the issue of security guarantees was present in the Annan Plan that Anastasiades and his party had campaigned for.

A. Kyprianou, leader of the main opposition party, AKEL, criticized the way the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders carried themselves in Crans-Montana. Kyprianou said that Anastasiades did not go to Crans Montana to solve the Cyprus problem, and that he had not persuaded anyone that he wanted to solve the problem and desired

1   "Cyprus Negotiations – Discussions collapsed because of Greek Cypriot's Approach on Territory," Cyprus Scene, November 23, 2016, accessed December 22, 2022, https://cyprusscene.com/2016/11/23/cyprus-negotiations-discussions-collapsed-because-of-greek-cypriots-approach-on-territory/.
2   Ibid.
3   Jean Christou, "The Peace Processes: 2017 Crans-Montana," Cyprus Mail, June 10, 2019, accessed December 22, 2022, https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/06/10/an-historic-opportunity-missed-in-crans-montana/.
4   Ibid.
5   Ibid.

something in there. Kyprianou also noted that Akinci's behaviour was not clear and that he had contradicted himself during the summit.[1]

As a result, the sides came to an impasse on the security system guarantees, the main point of contention among the parties: Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership insisted that "zero" guarantees be given in the area of security, which went completely against what Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were looking for. Even minor changes could not be agreed upon (the Treaty of Guarantee already serves as the founding treaty of the RoC and, as such, protects the territorial integrity of the republic).

From Federal Solution to Two State Model

After the summit, Akinci stated "We share the same geography and we would not like to have tensions […] negotiations were taking time and we will focus on internal issues more and put more effort into improving relations with the other countries around the world." He also said "it was the last trial of pursuing a solution for our generation, and we see that the process will be more difficult for future generations."[2] Another statement by Akinci made it to the front page of *Yeniduzen* newspaper: "two states under the umbrella of the European Union."[3] Çavuşoğlu would later claim that it was Anastasiades who had put forward the "two state model" solution in Crans-Montana, and that is why the Turkish side put it on its own agenda as well. Çavuşoğlu repeated that we knew Anastasiades wanted two states on the island.[4] However, Akinci faced criticism from his federalist supporters and then he returned to his discourse for a federal solution model in Cyprus. Even though that created a dilemma for Akinci and Turkish government, as well as for the TRNC government. Akinci and Çavuşoğlu met at the Presidential Office in Nicosia on April 20, 2018, where Çavuşoğlu reminded his counterpart of Anastasiades' "two state model." However, Akinci insisted on a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, and this marked the beginnings of the tension between Akinci and Turkey.[5]

Second President of the TRNC M.A. Talat, known for his federalist ideas on the Cyprus issue, heavily criticized Akinci, stating, "Akinci made the mistake of insisting on a summit, and he did nothing to prevent the collapse of the talks. Now, the Tatar government and Turkey articulate the two-state model and Akinci has to persuade Turkey to return to the federal solution, because we are part of this problem…"[6]

Tensions Between Akinci and Turkey

Akinci focused on presidential elections in the TRNC. However, he was in a complicated position as far as the Cyprus issue and relations with Turkey go. In the

1   "Kiprianu: 'Crans-Montana'ya çözüm arzusuyla gitmedik' (Kyprianou: 'We did not go to Crans-Montana with the desire for a solution')," Kıbrıs Postası, July 16, 2017, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.kibrispostasi.com/c58-GUNEY_KIBRIS/n225798-kiprianu-cransmontanaya-cozum-arzusuyla-gitmedik.

2   "Akıncı: Çatışma kültürünün olmaması tercihimizdir (Akinci: We prefer not to have a culture of conflict)," Kıbrıs Gazetesi, July 7, 2017, accessed December 16, 2022, https://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/kibris/akinci-catisma-kulturunun-olmamasi-tercihimizdir-h22041.html.

3   Levent Kutay, "AB çatısı altında iki ayrı devletin perde arkası… (1) (Behind the scenes of two separate states under the EU umbrella… (1))," Kıbrıs Postası, June 3, 2019, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.kibrispostasi.com/c1-KIBRIS_POSTASI_GAZETESI/j236/a34711-ab-catisi-altinda-iki-ayri-devletin-perde-arkasi-1.

4   "Çavuşoğlu: Biliyorum Anastasiades de iki devlet istiyor (Çavuşoğlu: I know Anastasiades also wants two states)," BRTK, February 2, 2021, accessed December 22, 2022, https://brtk.net/cavusoglubiliyorum-anastasiadis-de-2-devlet-istiyor/.

5   Levent Kutay, "AB çatısı altında iki ayrı devletin perde arkası."

6   "Talat: Crans Montana zirvesi yanlış hesapla yapıldı (Talat: Crans Montana summit miscalculated)," Haber Kıbrıs, November 22, 2019, accessed December 22, 2022, https://haberkibris.com/3a10b8d1-2019_11_22.html.

2017 and 2020 presidential elections, Akinci did not initiate any kind of reconciliation with the Greek Cypriot leadership or the international community (certainly Anastasiades was not interested in reconciliation either). Akinci did not make a single official visit to the European Union during his five-year term as president. On the one hand, Akinci insisted on a federal solution in Cyprus. On the other hand, the government (executive power) insisted on the partition of the island on the basis of a two sovereign state model. Even given these disagreements, the Turkish government cooperated with the TRNC government and opened some public areas of the "ghost city" of Varosha, a move that was condemned by the Greek Cypriot leadership and European officials.[1]

This was a unique example in world politics where the leader of a de facto state, in this case the TRNC, was giving statements about the foreign policy and domestic issues of the "patron" state, Turkey. Akinci criticized the military interventions of Turkey in the northern part of Syria on his social media, and called on Turkey to initiate diplomatic relations with Syria rather than become involved in the Syrian war militarily, as well as to establish a dialogue among Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. Akinci also stated that Turkey's intervention in Syria is a repeat of the country's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, pointing out the similarities. But Akinci faced harsh rebuttals from Turkish officials. Turkish Vice President F. Oktay stated, "I regretfully condemn Akinci's words."[2] Akinci played on these tensions, believing that he would be able to consolidate his power in the presidential elections. He continued ramp up tensions with Turkey by giving an interview to The Guardian newspaper in which he compared the TRNC with Hatay State, noting, "I will not be Tayfur Sökmen," (the first and last president of Hatay State, which was annexed to Turkey in 1939 at the decision of Hatay Parliament). Akinci explained that he was against annexation of the TRNC to Turkey, but the point about the Hatay issue and his harsh comments against the Turkish government brought criticism from Turkey – not only on the part of government officials, but also on the part of members of the main opposition party, and the family members of (descendants) of Sökmen.[3]

Presidential Elections: Between a Federal Solution and a Two-State Model

Akinci's policies were perceived as a kind of security threat by Turkey, and Akinci was thus securitized by the Turkish government. Therefore, the northern part of the island entered a period of tension and the *de facto* republic was suffering economic and political difficulties while combating the COVID-19 pandemic. Akinci was getting ready for the presidential elections. However, he had two serious opponents. One was E. Tatar, the Prime Minister of the TRNC, who used nationalist discourses during the election campaign and enjoyed the support of Turkey. Another was T. Erhürman,

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1 "EU slams Turkey's illegal actions in Varosha that violate relevant UNSC resolutions and calls for their immediate reversal," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, July 27, 2021, accessed December 22, 2022, https://mfa.gov.cy/press-releases/2021/07/27/eu-declaration-on-illegal-actions-of-turkey-in-varosha/.
2 "Barış Pınarı Harekatı – Ankara'dan Kuzey Kıbrıs lideri Akıncı'ya tepki: 'Bu açıklamalar kara lekedir' (Operation Peace Spring - Ankara's reaction to Northern Cyprus leader Akıncı: 'These statements are a disgrace')," BBC NEWS Türkçe, October 13, 2019, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-50032041.
3 "Cumhurbaşkanı Akıncı'nın Hatay sözlerine Sökmenoğlu ailesinden sert yanıt (Harsh response from Sökmenoğlu family to President Akıncı's Hatay remarks)," Kıbrıs Postası, February 8, 2020, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.kibrispostasi.com/c36-TURKIYE/n311227-cumhurbaskani-akincinin-hatay-sozlerine-sokmenoglu-ailesinden-sert-yanit.

former Prime Minister of the TRNC and leader of left-wing CTP, who focused on a federal solution to the Cyprus issue and tolerance within society, rather than tension.

The Cyprus problem and possible solutions were front and centre of the election campaigns of the candidates. Akinci and Erhürman supported the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of a federal structure, citing the UN resolutions. On the other hand, Tatar focused on separatist policies and defended the two sovereign state model during his election campaign.[1]

Tatar used the advantages of the government and managed state television channel BRT for his propaganda purposes. For example, the opening ceremony for the dam in Kyrenia region, which supplies water via a pipeline from Turkey, was broadcast by BRT. After the elections, the head of the BRT, M. Özkurt, was sentenced to two months in jail by the Supreme Court for breaching election law.[2]

In the first round of the presidential election, Tatar received 32.3% of the votes, while Akinci got 29.8% and Erhürman 21.67%.[3] Akinci and Tatar would go head-to-head in the second round of the elections. Although Erhürman and his political party, CTP supported Akinci in the second round, Tatar eventually won with the support of the Turkish government in Turkey. In the second round, the opposition claimed that the Erdoğan government was supporting Tatar, which was reported by the opposition and researchers in the TRNC. Additionally, Akinci claimed that he had been threatened during the election period.[4] According to a 2020 Freedom House report, Turkey has influence over the electorate, although this does not mean direct control over voter preferences. Additionally, Freedom House also pointed out that the TRNC depends on Turkey on diplomacy, military and financial issues as well. This naturally increases Turkey's influence on TRNC politics.[5] However, the 2021 Freedom House report was quite different from previous editions. It mentions the strong engagement of Turkey in the presidential elections in 2020, adding that Tatar enjoyed great support from Turkey, intimidation tactics had been used against Akinci, and a patronage system had been used to help Tatar.[6] Freedom House downgraded the TNRC's score from 4 to 2 on the Political Rights: Electoral Process indicator (concerning the influence of external actors on elections) due to Turkey's intervention in the election process.[7] A unique process is observed when we compare relations of de facto states with their "patrons." There are no instances when officials of de facto states (presidents or prime ministers) have publicly commented on or criticized the domestic or foreign affairs of their "patron" states. This process can thus be evaluated as one of retaliation in the TRNC, in which Akinci made comments and suggestions on the domestic and foreign

1   "KKTC Cumhurbşkanı adayı Ersin Tatar ilkelerini açıkladı: İki devletli çözüme hazırız (TRNC Presidential candidate Ersin Tatar explained his principles: We are ready for a two-state solution)," Aydinlik, September 16, 2020, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/kktc-cumhurbaskani-adayi-ersin-tatar-ilkelerini-acikladi-iki-devletli-cozume-haziriz-218471.

2   "BRTK Müdürü Meryem Özkurt'a 2 ay hapis cezası! (BRTK Director Meryem Özkurt sentenced to 2 months in prison!)," Kıbrıs Postasi, June 7, 2022, accessed December 16, 2022, https://www.kibrispostasi.com/c57-Adli_Haberler/n425660-brtk-muduru-meryem-ozkurta-2-ay-hapis-cezasi.

3   "Cumhurbaşkanliği Seçimleri (Presidential elections)," Supreme Election Council of TRNC, accessed December 22, 2022, http://ysk.mahkemeler.net/index.php/cumhurbaskanligi-secimleri/.

4   "Ankara'nın KKTC cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerine müdahale iddiaları raporlaştırıldı (Ankara's alleged interference in the TRNC presidential elections reported)," Euronews, June 6, 2021, accessed December 22, 2022, https://tr.euronews.com/2021/06/10/ankara-n-n-kktc-cumhurbaskanl-g-secimlerine-mudahale-iddialar-raporlast-r-ld.

5   "Northern Cyprus," Freedom House, 2020, accessed December 22, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/northern-cyprus/freedom-world/2020.

6   Ibid.

7   Ibid.

affairs of Turkey, and then Turkish officials securitized his stance and retaliated in the presidential elections 2020.

A Two-State Solution in Cyprus Designed by Tatar and Turkey

Tatar was elected president of the TRNC in October 2020. Not only did this mean a change of Turkish Cypriot leader, but it also meant a change of policies in the country's leadership, and in Turkey regarding the solution model of the Cyprus problem. It was a turning point for the position of Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish foreign policy, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish foreign policymakers had never rejected a federal solution and attempted to negotiate on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi communal federal state. However, following the 2020 presidential elections, Tatar and Turkey drew a new road map that involves raising the status of the TRNC in the international arena, instead of holding negotiations on the basis of federation. The two-state model was rejected by CTP, the main opposition party. Additionally, CTP and TDP did not take part in the special session in the TRNC parliament to mark the anniversary the Turkish military intervention of July 20, 1974, where T. Erdoğan gave a speech. This move by the opposition was seen as a betrayal by President Tatar.[1] The boycott also caused the Turkish government to cut ties with the opposition parties in the TRNC.

Historical Speech of R.T. Erdoğan at the 77th Session of UN General Assembly

President of Turkey R.T. Erdoğan addressed the 77th session of the UN General Assembly on September 20, 2022 with a historical speech regarding the Cyprus Problem, as this was the first time that Turkey had called on UN members to recognize the TRNC. Erdoğan also touched on regional problems affecting Turkey, stating:

> … The reaffirmation of the rights of equal sovereignty and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people is the key to a settlement on the Island. We hereby call on the international community to put an end to the oppression towards the Turkish Cypriots and to the efforts to isolate them from the world through embargoes, contrary to the principles of the United Nations, and to officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as soon as possible.[2]

Erdoğan's speech at the UN General Assembly indicated an axis shift on the Cyprus issue, in which Turkey as a guarantor state of Cyprus wants to change the de jure status of the island in the international system. Following Erdoğan's speech, Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Ertuğruloğlu stated:

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1 Engin Karaman, "Erdoğan'ın ziyaretini Kuzey Kıbrıs muhalefeti neden boykot ediyor, Ersin Tatar ne tepki gösterdi? (Why is the opposition of Northern Cyprus boycotting Erdogan's visit, how did Ersin Tatar react?)," BBC Türkçe, July 17, 2021, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-57874592.

2 "The vision of Turkey in Foreign Policy Has Always Been Focused on Peace," Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, September 20, 2022, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/139746/-the-vision-of-turkiye-in-foreign-policy-has-always-been-focused-on-peace-.

We invite the international community to heed the calls of President Erdoğan. The time has come and passed for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to take its rightful place in the international community. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[1]

Additionally, Ertuğruloğlu stated that the "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mission will be renewed if they sign an agreement with the TRNC or they leave the island."[2] This obviously indicates the changing position of the TRNC and Turkey on the island, in which they demand recognition of the sovereignty of the territories of the TRNC by the United Nations. However, nobody can predict whether these policies will continue to be in place or what kind of developments we will witness in Cyprus as a result of the recent rapid changes in international politics.

Conclusion

The TRNC is a unique case in the international relations system. Established in 1983, the state is thus far only recognized by Turkey. However, it does have limited relations with the world through its institutions, non-governmental organizations and local governments. Although the TRNC was declared an independent state in 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey continued to negotiate with the Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation under the auspices of the United Nations. However, after the collapse of Crans-Montana Summit in 2017, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey changed their foreign policy course. This much can be discerned from their respective discourses. However, this change not voiced at international high level summits until the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Therefore, the TRNC has embarked upon a new path, demanding recognition from the international community. Recognition of TRNC is related to the position of the international community and United Nations. However, nobody can say that the TRNC will or will not receive official recognition under current global circumstances. The changing global dynamics and functioning of the United Nations are points of contention due to the emergence of multipolar and conflicting processes in world affairs.

Certainly, Turkey's foreign policy leanings and the position of the TRNC depend on their relations with the European Union and the results of the 2023 elections in Turkey.

1   "Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu regarding the speech of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the 77th General Assembly of the UN," Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 22, 2022, accessed December 22, 2022, https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-of-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-tahsin-ertugruloglu-regarding-the-speech-of-turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-at-the-77th-general-assembly-of-the-un/.
2   "KKTC'den BM'ye 'tanıma' resti! ('Recognition' from TRNC to UN!)," CNN Türk, October 5, 2022, accessed December 22, 2022, https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/kktcden-bmye-tanima-resti.

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Турецкая Республика Северного Кипра как де-факто и частично признанное государство: от федерального решения к модели двух государств

АННОТАЦИЯ

В статье анализируется история Турецкой Республики Северного Кипра (ТРСК) как де-факто государства с 1983 года. ТРСК обладает рядом особенностей, отличающих ее от других де-факто государств. Так, при наличии граждан ЕС в составе населения, ТРСК пользуется поддержкой и влиянием Турции – государства-патрона, не являющегося членом Европейского Союза. Несмотря на провозглашение ТРСК независимым государством, ее лидеры вплоть до момента избрания Э. Татара президентом в 2020 году прилагали усилия, направленные на воссоединение острова на базе федеративной модели. Еще одна уникальная особенность ТРСК заключается в более сильной традиции гражданского общества по сравнению с оппозицией, представленной политическими партиями и неправительственными организациями, которые периодически вступают в конфликт с правительством Турции по поводу его политики по кипрскому вопросу и в отношении ТРСК. На позицию Турции как государства-патрона ТРСК влияет динамика ее отношений с Европейским Союзом. Отсутствие какого-либо прогресса в вопросе членства Турции в ЕС и бескомпромиссная позиция руководства греков-киприотов на переговорах в последние десятилетия способствовали изменению позиции Турции по кипрской проблеме. После прихода к власти Э. Татар заявил, что федерализм как решение проблемы на острове невозможен, и настоял на реализации модели двух государств при поддержке Турции.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА