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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">imi</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международная аналитика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Journal of International Analytics</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2587-8476</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2541-9633</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MGIMO University</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.46272/2587-8476-2023-14-1-37-51</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">imi-467</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>RESEARCH ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Новые модальности глобальной санкционной политики</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>New Modalities of the Global Sanctions Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Арапова</surname><given-names>Е. Я.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Arapova</surname><given-names>E. Ya.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Екатерина Яковлевна Арапова, к. эк. н., директор</p><p>Центр экспертизы санкционной политики</p><p>119454</p><p>Проспект Вернадского 76</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ekaterina Ya. Arapova, PhD in Economic Sciences</p><p>119454</p><p>Prospect Vernadskogo 76</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">e.arapova@my.mgimo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">МГИМО МИД России<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Institute for International Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>14</day><month>04</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>37</fpage><lpage>51</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Арапова Е.Я., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Арапова Е.Я.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Arapova E.Y.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/467">https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/467</self-uri><abstract><p>   Актуальность и научная новизна исследования состоят в выявлении автором принципиально новых модальностей глобальной санкционной политики: постепенного расширения круга государств-инициаторов санкций, трансформации санкционного инструментария и тематических режимов санкций, тиражирования практики использования односторонних санкций в качестве инструментов достижения внешнеполитических целей в условиях кризиса системы одностороннего миропорядка и нарастания конкуренции и стратегического противостояния великих держав.</p><p>   Проведенный дискурс- и контент-анализ правовых документов, регламентирующих институционализацию санкционных режимов в государствах-инициаторах, позволил выявить ряд важных глобальных трендов последнего десятилетия в области санкционной политики. Во-первых, в условиях роста популярности финансовых ограничений в последнее десятилетие происходит их стремительное усложнение. Тиражируется практика введения санкций против Центральных банков и заморозки валютных резервов подсанкционных стран. От «заморозки» активов подсанкционных лиц (физических и юридических) инициаторы санкций все более активно переходят к практике их конфискации, формируя при этом соответствующие правовые механизмы. Во-вторых, происходят важные сдвиги в тематических режимах санкций: «коллективное» правовое оформление режимов киберсанкций, массовое внедрение в национальные законодательства ответственности за обход санкций и тиражирование опыта введения санкционных ограничений против операций с криптовалютой и альтернативных механизмов трансграничных расчетов. В-третьих, очевидно постепенное тиражирование инструментария вторичных санкций, которые начинают использоваться не только Соединенными Штатами, но и Великобританией и Китаем, что в долгосрочной перспективе (с учетом стратегического противостояния Китая и США) может создать принципиально новый феномен фактической конкуренции санкционной экстерриториальности.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>   The relevance and scientific novelty of the study lies in the author’s identifi cation of fundamentally new modalities of the global sanctions policy, including: the gradual expansion of the circle of countries initiating sanctions, the transformation of sanctions tools and thematic regimes of sanctions, the replication of the practice of using unilateral sanctions as tools to achieve foreign policy goals in a crisis of the unilateral world order and increasing competition and strategic confrontation between the great powers.</p><p>   The discourse and content analysis of legal documents regulating the institutionalization of sanctions regimes in the initiating countries made it possible to identify a number of important global trends in the last decade in the fi eld of sanctions policy. First, in the context of the growing popularity of fi nancial restrictions in the last decade, they are rapidly becoming more complex. The practice of imposing sanctions against Central banks and freezing the foreign exchange reserves of sanctioned countries is being replicated. From “freezing” the assets of sanctioned persons (individuals and legal entities), the initiators of sanctions are increasingly moving towards the practice of their confi scation, while forming appropriate legal mechanisms. Secondly, there are important shifts in the thematic regimes of sanctions: the “collective” legalization of cybersanctions regimes, the massive introduction of liability for circumvention of sanctions into national legislations and the replication of the experience of introducing sanctions restrictions against transactions with cryptocurrency and alternative mechanisms for cross-border settlements. Thirdly, the gradual replication of secondary sanctions tools is obvious, which are beginning to be used not only by the United States, but also by the United Kingdom and China, which in the long term (taking into account the strategic confrontation between China and the United States) might create a fundamentally new phenomenon of actual competition of sanctions extraterritoriality.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>финансовые санкции</kwd><kwd>вторичные санкции</kwd><kwd>право собственности</kwd><kwd>киберсанкции</kwd><kwd>криптовалюты</kwd><kwd>конфискация активов</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>financial sanctions</kwd><kwd>secondary sanctions</kwd><kwd>property rights</kwd><kwd>cybersanctions</kwd><kwd>crypto currencies</kwd><kwd>assets confi scation</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арапова, Е. Я. 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