This study examines how the escalating polarization of the international system shapes great power competition in the Middle East and influences regional outcomes. It argues that the U.S. hegemonic position in the region and its superior power projection, reinforced by regional factors such as established alliance systems and U.S. clients’ reliance on Washington for internal and external security, enable the United States to pursue an offensive dominance strategy aimed at establishing a regional order to contain China and Russia. Through this strategy, Washington seeks to transform its alliances with client regimes into a competitive alliance against Beijing’s and Moscow’s influence, while these regimes’ high dependence on U.S. protection often compels compliance with U.S. global interests even when such compliance conflicts with their national interests. However, global systemic constraints, including China’s and Russia’s non-regional hegemonic status and their limited power projection relative to the United States, prevent them from pursuing similar offensive strategies. Traditional wedge approaches are insufficient, given the high dependence of U.S. regional clients on U.S. protection. In response, Beijing and Moscow are employing a novel form of threatreduction wedging designed to lower clients’ threat perceptions, facilitate conflict resolution, and foster a more independent regional order. This strategy seeks to rebalance U.S. alliances and their ability to cooperate with China and Russia. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement illustrates the potential of threat-reduction wedging, while the Israeli case highlights its limits. Overall, the effectiveness of China’s and Russia’s strategy remains extremely constrained relative to that of the United States.