The U.S. and Allies’ Forward-Based BMD Systems: An Emerging Threat to Strategic Stability
https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2017-0-2-43-51
Abstract
The subject of this expert study is an evaluation of risks and potential threats of globalization of the U.S. and the allied BMD systems as well as of their sea-based deployments as the most important component of integrated forward-based BMD systems. Negative consequences of the large-scale deployments of these systems for negotiating strategic arms limitations as well as for reversibility of the existing treaties are evident in the midterm perspective.
The versions of “moderate” qualitative and quantitative estimations of these plans and programs promoted by the U.S. and allied countries allow to become firmly convinced about intentions to create the phenomena of “a window of vulnerability” for the Russia’s SLBM and ICBM retaliation potential. This temporal interval tends to widen, owing to a lower limit by a deployment closer to seashore of defense installations and objects in the depth of territory, as well as, by a shorter time-reaction to launches of the strategic retaliation forces by sea-based BMD’s.
The most possible scenarios of the deployment of ships equipped with BMD’s and organized in groups that are engaged in “active-offensive” missions show the unavoidable necessity to include “a less favorable scenario” in the Russia’s strategic planning. The calculations adduced by the author give serious grounds to suggest that realization of corresponding plans of shipbuilding and deployments in the mid-term perspective will create conditions for reversibility of the existing strategic balance and totally undermine negotiating processes on arms control.
About the Author
I. KuznetsovRussian Federation
Igor Kuznetsov, PhD in Law, Senior Research Fellow Global Problems Center, Institute for International Studies
119454 Moscow, 76 Vernadsky Ave.
References
1. M. V. Aleksandrov. Russian Air Defense as a Reliable Counteraction against the U. S. «Prompt Glabal Strike» / Rossiiskie PVO – nadezhnoe sredstvo otrazheniya “mgnovennogo globalnogo udara” SSHA – URL: http://malexandrov.livejournal.com/63215.html (Дата обращения: 25.10. 2017).
2. A. Arbatov. Nuclear Arms Control: The End of History? // MEMO Journal, 2015, No. 5, pp. 5–18 / Kontrol nad yadernym oruzhiem: konets istorii? // Miroaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheiya № 5, 2015
3. Petrova I. A. Implementation of the U. S. Policy of Building the Sea-Based Component of Anti-Missile Defense / Realizatsiya politiki SSHA v oblasti postroeniya morskogo komponenta PRO. Elektronnyi Zhurnal, No. 1, 2017 – URL: http://www.rusus.ru/?act&id=545 (Дата обращения: 29.06.2017).
4. Elleman M., Zagurek M. J., Jr. THAAD: What It Can Do and Can’t Do. 38NORTH Organization. March 10, 2016, pp. 6, 8, 10. – URL: https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-andCant-Do.pdf (Дата обращения: 21.05. 2017).
5. Montague K. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense Policies // George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook.. June 2014, p.
6. – URL: http://www.marchall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Japan-BMD-PO-June14.pdf (Дата обращения: 25.10.2017).
Review
For citations:
Kuznetsov I. The U.S. and Allies’ Forward-Based BMD Systems: An Emerging Threat to Strategic Stability. Journal of International Analytics. 2017;(2):43-51. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2017-0-2-43-51