This article examines the Anaklia port project as a pivotal element of Georgia’s maritime infrastructure and a potential component of transit in the Black Sea – Caspian arc. By the mid2020s, the project has been developing amid simultaneously deepening domestic political polarization and deteriorating relations with European institutions, including a publicly declared pause in advancing toward EU membership until 2028. Against this backdrop, the legal regime regulating “foreign influence” has acquired practical significance for the distribution of trust, the acceptable forms of public oversight, and the choice of external partners for strategic facilities. The aim of the article is to identify how changes in domestic legitimacy and in the rules governing state interaction with civil society and external sources of support affect decisions on strategic infrastructure and, through them, the configuration of regional connectivity around the Black Sea. The analysis is based on a qualitative comparison of political and infrastructure trajectories, including the dynamics of public mobilization and regulation of organizations, foreign-policy signals, and the parameters of relaunching the port project, as well as a scenario-based assessment of likely paths for the development of connectivity. The article shows that the choice of an external partner for Anaklia is driven not only by economic considerations, but also by the need to reduce political risks and enhance project manageability in a confrontational environment. As distrust of external conditionality grows and access to Western financial and legal frameworks becomes more complicated, cooperation with an actor willing to finance and build with minimal political requirements becomes more attractive. At the same time, entrenching the state’s controlling role reduces symbolic risks, but increases the project’s dependence on the quality of public administration, procedural transparency, and the level of public trust. The article concludes that sustainable connectivity around the Black Sea requires combining infrastructure development with predictable rules, measurable transparency, and reduced political volatility; otherwise, the advantages of transit geography will not translate into resilient cross-regional cooperation.

This article aims to reveal the potential of comparative regionalism to analyzing the effectiveness of regional associations to study and explain the functioning of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was established during a period of major international political transformations and is now one of the key elements of the Eurasian security architecture. Particular attention is paid to A. Acharya and A. Johnston’s institutional design theory, which facilitates studying the role and place of institutions in structuring the regional space regardless of the region under consideration, and also highlighting the differences between the highly specialized state-centered integration groupings that emerged in Europe in the second half of the 20th century, and regional initiatives that took shape in accordance with the logic of “new regionalism” – an international phenomenon that emerged during the collapse of the bipolar system. This theory’s take on the SCO suggests that its institutional design (i.e. structure, ideological basis, decision-making and membership procedures) meets the interests and needs of the member states and is the result of the influence of both exogenous and endogenous factors. Proceeding from this, and in terms of its effectiveness in establishing multilateral regional cooperation between states with fundamentally different historical and cultural backgrounds, and sometimes even bilateral conflicts, one can conclude that the organization meets its objectives and is therefore successful.

The article analyzes the integration of the Republic of Korea into the emerging US-led “latticework” security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on the institutionalization of the “Camp David Triangle” (US–South Korea–Japan) as a key element within a network of minilateral partnerships designed to supplement the traditional “hub-and-spokes” system of bilateral alliances. The article’s objectives include: identifying the reasons for the rapprochement between South Korea and Japan despite persistent historical tensions; assessing Seoul’s role and motives within the new structure; analyzing the potential sustainability of the “latticework” architecture; and forecasting the next steps for the US and its regional partners. The methodological framework of the study relies on the “prospect – threat” alliance model, which explains a state’s willingness to accept greater risks and concessions in response to heightened perceived threats. Bence Nemeth’s hypothesis on the synergy of structural and situational factors is also applied to analyze the dynamics of cooperation. As a result, the author concludes that the sustainability of the “Camp David Triangle” remains questionable due to unresolved historical contradictions and its dependence on situational factors. However, a distinctive feature of the new “latticework” security architecture is its flexibility, which allows it to adapt and weather periods of reduced activity.

Despite their long history of interaction, India and Latin American countries have not attached much importance to their relations for a long time. Over the past two decades, India’s bilateral and multilateral ties with Brazil and Argentina have become significantly more active. This shift can be explained by changes in the international political architecture, as well as reforms within the countries and changes in their political elites. This study aims to identify similarities and differences in India’s approaches to interaction with these countries. The analysis shows that India differentiates its strategy: with Brazil, cooperation is more broad-based and institutionalized, covering trade, investment, defense, space, and participation in international associations, while with Argentina, interaction focuses on the agricultural and raw materials sector, pharmaceuticals, IT, and specific strategic projects. Methodologically, the work is based on comparative analysis using secondary sources: official documents, statistical databases, expert commentary, and academic publications. The results show that India is successfully adapting its approaches to the economic and geopolitical potential of its partners, which strengthens its position within the Global South strategy.

This study examines how the escalating polarization of the international system shapes great power competition in the Middle East and influences regional outcomes. It argues that the U.S. hegemonic position in the region and its superior power projection, reinforced by regional factors such as established alliance systems and U.S. clients’ reliance on Washington for internal and external security, enable the United States to pursue an offensive dominance strategy aimed at establishing a regional order to contain China and Russia. Through this strategy, Washington seeks to transform its alliances with client regimes into a competitive alliance against Beijing’s and Moscow’s influence, while these regimes’ high dependence on U.S. protection often compels compliance with U.S. global interests even when such compliance conflicts with their national interests. However, global systemic constraints, including China’s and Russia’s non-regional hegemonic status and their limited power projection relative to the United States, prevent them from pursuing similar offensive strategies. Traditional wedge approaches are insufficient, given the high dependence of U.S. regional clients on U.S. protection. In response, Beijing and Moscow are employing a novel form of threatreduction wedging designed to lower clients’ threat perceptions, facilitate conflict resolution, and foster a more independent regional order. This strategy seeks to rebalance U.S. alliances and their ability to cooperate with China and Russia. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement illustrates the potential of threat-reduction wedging, while the Israeli case highlights its limits. Overall, the effectiveness of China’s and Russia’s strategy remains extremely constrained relative to that of the United States. 

The aim of this article is to examine the formation and evolution of the “Global Britain” foreign policy concept, its practical application, and its correlation with the model of relations between the UK and the European Union, including the formation of a European security system. The authors examine the place and role of the UK in the world after Brexit. They conclude that the country faces challenges in its positioning both in relations with the United States, where “the Trump phenomenon” must be taken into account, and in the UK–EU relations, where, following the signing of the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Great Britain occupies a disadvantageous position. At the same time, the authors also consider the prospects for Britain‘s strengthening on the global stage. Furthermore, they conclude that there is a lack of full cross-party consensus between the Conservatives and the Labour on “Global Britain” due to their different foreign policy attitudes. The final section of the article offers predictions about British foreign policy, particularly the dynamics of relations with the EU after the Labour’s coming to power in 2024, as well as the United Kingdom‘s role in the European security system. The methods used include content analysis, forecasting, and synthesis. The study‘s novelty lies in its examination of the cross-party consensus on the concept of “Global Britain,” its correlation with the emerging model of the UK-EU relations.

The article examines the specifics of negotiation processes in Latin American countries, which are currently of interest from both an academic and practical perspective, particularly for Russian diplomacy and business involved in cooperation with Latin American countries. Using the example of negotiations in Latin America, the article analyzes the potential for conducting negotiations from a bargaining perspective and finding compromise solutions. The study draws on the structuralfunctional approach to negotiations developed by M.M. Lebedeva, which identifies key elements in the negotiation process – strategies and tactics. This approach is applied to the analysis of negotiation processes in Latin America. It is shown that, despite the prevalence of a rather hardbargaining strategy and its characteristic tactics, the region has managed to avoid large-scale armed conflicts for decades. The effectiveness of this negotiation model is explained by a complex set of historical and cultural factors, including the role of the army as a guarantor of stability, the influence of the Catholic Church on mediation, and the colonial legacy that shaped a heightened sense of sovereignty and the primacy of legal mechanisms. An analysis of the evolution of Latin American diplomacy demonstrates the uniqueness of negotiation practices, calling into question the universality of the strategy proposed by R. Fischer and W. Ury, which involves “principled negotiations” for long-term problem resolution. However, it is noted that the findings relate only to Latin America and cannot be automatically generalized to other regions of the world. 

Amidst the overarching imperative for a common foreign policy within the European Union, the long-term challenge to its implementation regarding the People’s Republic of China is the level of intra-Union unity. Special attention in this context is drawn to the case of Hungary, which not only contests the fundamental parameters of the EU foreign policy but also actively develops multifaceted relations with China, formulating its own strategy towards the Middle Kingdom. Furthermore, this strategy of Budapest is implemented within the institutional framework of the European integration project. The aim of this article is to analyze the role and strategy of Hungary within the framework of the EU’s foreign policy towards China. Utilizing the classification of strategies employed by the small member-states within the EU’s institutional environment to maximize their influence, as proposed by K. Grøn and A. Wivel, we conclude that Budapest chooses a strategy of “normative entrepreneurship” when dealing with issues related to Beijing. This strategy addresses two primary objectives: 1) it opposes the dominant understanding of Strategic Autonomy within the European Union; and 2) represents an attempt to establish a foothold for transitioning to a “mediator” strategy between Brussels and Beijing, consequently elevating its status within the European integration project. 

The article examines features of great power competition between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA1). The study reviews China’s MENA policy documents as well as how this policy is implemented. China’s cooperation with MENA states can be divided into three main groups: 1) energy cooperation; 2) trade, infrastructure and investment cooperation; 3) cooperation in the fields of high-tech and nuclear technologies. The economic rise of China in the post-bipolar period led to a dramatic increase of China’s presence in the region and the development of mutually beneficial ties with all regional states. However, the increased presence of China in the region raises concerns in the United States. The author claims that Washington’s efforts to contain China in the region can be divided into two groups: 1) bilateral dialogues with regional states to limit China’s presence; 2) regional initiatives (I2U2 and IMEC) designed as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative, with India having special role in them. Moreover, the article notes the continuity of the U.S. policy aimed at containing China’s influence in MENA. The implementation of these projects faces difficulties due to rising tensions in the region and the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite successful examples of the U.S. pressure on the Israeli-Chinese and Emirati-Chinese tracks, MENA states mostly opt for a balanced approach, as they do not take sides in the great power competition and continue their cooperation with both great powers. 

The article analyzes certain aspects of Japan’s defense policy in the Indo-Pacific region under the Kishida and Ishiba Administrations from October 2021 to October 2025. The author examines the key trends in the impact of Japan’s defense modernization on the development of the IndoPacific security system and also focuses on Tokyo’s evolving role within the U.S. – Japan alliance as a key factor in Japan’s increasing participation in regional diplomacy. It is noted that the U.S. gradual transition to “strategic autonomy” from the USA has contributed to Japan’s expanding foreign policy engagement in the region, which is taking place amid an unprecedented increase in Japan’s defense budget. Furthermore, as part of the revision of Japan’s foreign policy strategy, the study of the modernized Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, presented in March 2023 to adapt Japan’s strategic priorities to new geopolitical realities and contemporary global challenges, has acquired particular significance. Following an analysis of the implementation of the plans reflected in the updated concept, it is concluded that Japan faces certain challenges in harmonizing its foreign policy approaches with India, one of its most important regional partners. New Delhi’s reluctance to compromise its sovereignty for the sake of deepening relations with Tokyo is noted, but Narendra Modi’s willingness to accommodate on issues of mutual interest is also emphasized. The article also examines Tokyo’s approach to building networked relations with Japan’s key partners in the IndoPacific region: the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. The significant role of the United States in shaping such ties, as well as their increasingly military focus, is highlighted. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the Japanese authorities’ plans to revise its foreign policy approaches, which could lead to an escalation of the already tense situation in the region, are particularly concerning. 

In recent years several ASEAN countries have expressed interest in cooperation with BRICS. On January 1, 2025 Malaysia and Thailand officially became BRICS partner states. Furthermore, on January 6, 2025 Indonesia became the tenth full member of BRICS. What attracts the ASEAN countries in the BRICS format? And how will it factor the further BRICS development? Economic considerations are often cited as one of the main reasons for Indonesia’s interest in the BRICS format. Yet the analysis shows that Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS has political rather than economic reasons. BRICS is attractive due to the collective resources, technological, and demographic potential of its member-states. It can be argued that BRICS member-states try to “monetize” their considerable combined potential and transform it into tangible reputational and political dividends in order to play a more significant role in global governance. Flexible cooperation formats are more in demand among middle powers in the turbulent conditions of modern international relations. It can be assumed that after its expansion BRICS will evolve towards a hybrid of minilateral and umbrella formats of multilateral institutions both of which are characterized by flexibility and ad hoc participation of a few members in specific projects they are interested in.