William С. Wohlforth is an American political scientist. Since 2000 he has been a Member of the Government Department’s faculty at Dartmouth College. William С. Wohlforth graduated with a degree in international relations from Beloit College, worked as a legislative aid in the U.S. House of Representatives, and did his graduate work at Yale University, earning an M.A. in international relations and PhD in Political Science. He taught at Princeton and Georgetown. William С. Wohlforth's expertise covers international security and foreign policy. His most recent books are “America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century” (Oxford, 2018), with co-author Stephen G. Brooks, and “The Oxford Handbook of International Security” (Oxford 2018) co-edited with Alexandra Gheciu. He is currently working on a book on subversion among great powers.

This article seeks to fi ll the gap between well theorized upon constants of the U.S. strategic thinking and the divergent approaches of various administrations to practical actions on the international arena. Grounded in the concept developed by Christopher Hammer, the analysis presents the U.S. foreign policy as the product of a never-ending internal debate about the most optimal ways of promoting values, dealing with international institutions and prioritizing threats within a security perimeter. Taking stock of the choices made by consecutive presidents in each of the three areas the authors study the roots of foreign policy inertia of the sole superpower that resulted in unforced mistakes undermining its own political cohesion as well as hindering the emergence of lasting international architecture to replace the cold-war order. Thus, the article argues that the key feature of the last thirty years – the absence of an enemy as an organizing principle for the U.S. foreign policy – prompted the American public to pay less attention to global events which became the area of opportunistic decisions. Overall, the authors conclude that the mistakes were made precisely when the domestic debates in the U.S. about international relations were absent and note that the current divisions in the American society as an impetus for self-scrutiny and the emergence of China as a focal point for the American elites may result in a more coherent foreign policy and make the U.S. a more responsible international actor.

The article analyzes the features of German foreign policy on the eve of the September (2021) elections to the Bundestag and the gradual overcoming of the crisis consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. The priorities of the foreign policy based on the value approach remain the European and transatlantic vectors, as well as relations with the main system-forming international organizations. The postulates of value are prompting Berlin to increasingly intensify criticism of Russia and China, incl. due to the signifi cantly increased, from his point of view, threats in relation to Germany and other states of the collective West. Germany still relies on France in European politics. Their tandem continues to determine the political and economic processes in the European Union, as well as to infl uence the formation of the EU mechanisms for overcoming the coronavirus crisis. Despite the rapid restoration of constructive relations with the new American administration, a number of controversial issues remain in bilateral relations, including defense spending and the economy. In recent years, Germany has been able to strengthen its positions in Europe and the world and expects to strengthen its role as a global actor, especially in international organizations. Nevertheless, the German expert community critically refers to its current foreign policy status quo. The author explores the latest trends in German foreign policy, gives an assessment of its development after elections to the Bundestag, pays special attention to the prospects for relations with the Russian Federation.

Having been in the 2000s far from the spotlight of the news, European separatism is gradually returning to the information fi eld, which is partly due to the alerting reports from Scotland and Catalonia. The paper attempts to answer the following questions: what is the nature of the ethnoregional separatism in the EU, how does disintegrational agenda cohabit with the European integration dynamics, and what are the prospects for European separatism. The review of the theoretical framework within which ethnic and regionalist separatism exists is followed by the analysis of the empirics gained from diff erent European regions claiming independence or autonomy, such as Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, Brittany, and many others, in 2000–2021. The author attempts to demythologize the widespread misconception about separatism as a potentially deadly threat to the EU nation-states or the European unity. The research is situated within the constructivist view towards ethnicity and the symbolic practices employed by the separatists; this paradigm is complemented by the institutional approach to the EU governing bodies and practices. The author comes to the following conclusions: currently, disintegrative projects within the EU nation-states cannot be successful, because of the position of the EU and the member states, and due to the uncertainties in the ethnic regions themselves (however, Scotland makes for an important exception, because of Brexit). Most separatist cases in the EU are either of instrumental or of a pure autonomist nature and do not enjoy any support from the integrational grouping that is not ready for the troubles the “internal extension” might cause. Moreover, if in the late 20th century, a discernible trend for decentralization and devolution was present, now the pendulum took the reversed direction, or at least remains unmoving; the author observes the trend for recentralization or at least for the freezing of the current fragile balance.

This paper maintains that Historical Institutionalism – with its emphasis on such concepts as path dependency, time, continuity and change, critical junctures, and unintended consequences – serves as a valuable theoretical tool in explaining the why and how of the European Union developing from a strictly economic union during the first forty years of its existence towards a political union with a global foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War period. Discussing the EU’s post-1989 foreign policy development and zooming in on the EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe to illustrate its argument, the paper argues that Brussels’ participation in global politics has for long been in the making. More specifically, four elements that have determined – and continue to do so – the EU’s foreign policy portfolio are first, the successful economic integration in the first forty years of the European Union’s existence; second, the logic of integration through institutionalization driving EU integration since 1952; third, the – at first – informal European Political Cooperation witnessing the emergence of tacit norms and rules of conducting foreign policy coordination; and fourth, the rhetoric commitment to the region of Central and Eastern Europe pre-1989.

The recent years saw the most turbulent period of transformation of the liberal world order since the end of the Cold War. This directly aff ects transatlantic relations, historically serving as a beacon of the Washington’s foreign policy. This notwithstanding, while the U.S. foreign policy priorities have been changing, the members of the transatlantic community have seemed to be drifting further apart, which causes the development of alternative projects to maintain European security. This article aims to compare the current state of aff airs in the transatlantic and the European security systems, relying on the parameters, developed within the framework of the security communities theory, so as to access their feasibility and prospects. The author proceeds from the assumption that the relevant collective identity serves as a key factor for NATO’s and EU’s CFSP success and analyzes its ideational, institutional and practical components. New discourse is perceived as a starting point for transforming the identity of communities through formulating and justifying their main tasks. NATO is currently developing its new narrative while working on the alliance’s new strategic concept, with the EU elaborating on the idea of its “strategic autonomy”, creating a more vibrant and well-grounded story than NATO. However, to be translated into common practices the discourse should be rooted into a well-developed system of institutional communication channels, which is a distinctive feature of NATO, but not the EU. As a result, NATO’s experience in common practices, though not always successful and mutually complementing, creates an inertia within the community, providing for its stability and allowing for timely resolving inner confl icts. In this regard, the EU “strategic autonomy” is a matter of continuous systemic eff ort, rather than that of time.

Many in the West, especially in the human rights community, saw the end of the Cold War as a great opportunity for a normative transformation in international relations. They argued that the concept of sovereignty was an anachronism and that a new international regime should be created allowing for easier intervention against states that subject their citizens to violence. It seemed like a relatively straightforward issue of clashing normative principles at fi rst. As the conversation about interventions has evolved, however, it has become increasingly clear that the problem is much more complex. This article examines the set of complex trade-off s between various values and norms related to humanitarian intervention and demonstrates that no interventionist doctrine that balances these values and norms is possible. It empirically examines these tensions in the context of interventions in Kosovo and Libya.

“Strategic stability” as a characteristic of military and political relations with a low possibility of large-scale armed confl ict between great powers remains one of the basic notions of international security, especially in its nuclear missile dimension. At the same time, this notion also sets forth tangible state of strategic forces of two (or potentially more) nations and the framework of risk reduction and arms control measures preventing a nuclear war. The purpose of this study is to identify the main trends in this area and how strategic stability can be maintained and enhanced. To this end, I review the main offi cial doctrinal documents and statements in this area, international arms control treaties, trends in the development of the armed forces, and academic and expert publications. It is concluded that strategic stability can be preserved under increasing infl uence of a growing number of new factors, both political (including degradation of arms control regimes) and technological. Among the latter are modernization and development of means for delivery of nuclear warheads, growth of long-range precision-guided non-nuclear weapons potential, increase of antagonism in new environments. The experts point out the need for active work of the academic community and diplomats to fi nd new solutions ensuring maintenance of strategic stability in the future. Negative scenarios are outlined in the absence of such solutions.

Although the Cold War ended thirty years ago, the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, which characterized Finland’s foreign and domestic politics in the Cold War era, remains an essential element of various competing discourses in the country. This article is based on a study of the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line” concept as a fl oating signifi er frequently used in competing Finnish discourses, including those on the Finnish–Russian relations, on the Finnish foreign policy strategy, and on Finnish domestic politics. The discourse on the relations with Russia involves the proponents of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line aiming at transforming Russia’s geographical proximity into an opportunity for Finland, and those who oppose this line on the grounds that in the Cold War era it resulted in a shameful “Finlandization” of the country. The Finnish discourse on the country’s foreign policy strategy involves those who argue in favor of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, of which the core was neutrality in the Cold War era and is non-alignment today, and those in favor of giving up with non-alignment to choose the NATO option. The article discovers that Sweden plays a critical role in this discourse than Russia. Finally, the Finnish discourse on the country’s domestic politics involves those in favor of continuing with the Paasikivi–Kekkonen’s line, of which the core is consensual politics, and those who support the transition to more transparent, albeit inevitably partisan politics.

The 33 countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean and the 11 countries of the former Soviet Union (not counting the Russian Federation and the three Baltic nations) conform 44 states which are, with a few exceptions, on the periphery of global geopolitical aff airs, with limited international infl uence or at the mercy of confl icts that have disrupted their internal balance and international image in the past decade. While the topic of how peripheral nations and regions interact with each other has been analyzed in academia, in-depth studies about relations between these specifi c regions are very limited and scarce. This paper seeks to fi ll in that gap by providing recent examples on issues like trade and high-profi le diplomatic visits between Latin American and Caribbean governments with their post-Soviet counterparts. Moreover, I will discuss the issue of the location (or lack thereof) of embassies, a topic not discussed in the consulted literature, as an example of how governments from peripheral states and limited budgets decide where to open an embassy. It is proposed here that the 44 states that make up Latin America, the Caribbean, and the post-Soviet world will remain cordial and friendly strangers for the foreseeable future. A lack of grand-strategy vision, with a few exceptions, is a major hindrance to stronger relations between these states. The most plausible scenario is bloc-to-bloc trade agreements; however, the COVID-19 pandemic and more pressing issues that these countries face mean that treaties with geographically distant states that are not trading partners or potential sources of fi nancial aid are not regarded as priorities.

Cooley, Alexander, and Daniel Nexon. Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling
of American Global Order. Oxford University Press, 2020.