This article explores the imagological foundations of the ongoing confrontation between the United States and Russia. Utilizing a historiographical review of US–Russia relations and the author’s extensive research, it employs a constructivist approach to examine the enduring patterns in their mutual representations. The analysis uncovers the cyclical nature of these perceptions, swinging between value-driven and pragmatic narratives. It suggests that throughout history, the US and Russia have consistently served as each other’s “constitutive Other” within their identity discourses. This involves the creation of meaning repertoires that align with their domestic and foreign policy goals. Moreover, the article argues that the current confrontation mirrors a clash between their respective value systems and messianic ambitions. This dynamic contributes to the development  of a new kind of imagined reality, reinforcing the enduring dichotomous worldview that defines the relationship between the two nations.

This paper examines the enduring influence of the Political West, a power structure that emerged during the Cold War era and continues to shape international relations nowadays. Contrary to expectations of its dissolution following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Political West expanded its influence, propelled by a belief in the ideological superiority of liberal democracy. This expansion, fuelled by notions of the “end of history,” has led to the perpetuation of Cold War dynamics, characterised by adversarial relations and ideological conflicts. The study contrasts the expectations of a post-Cold War era of positive peace with the reality of continued antagonism, exemplified by conflicts such as the Balkan wars and NATO’s interventions in Iraq and Libya. The exacerbation of tensions culminated in the onset of Cold War II in 2014, marked by proxy conflicts and, notably, the Ukrainian crisis of 2022. In response to the assertiveness of the Western political bloc, an alternative alignment led by Russia and China has emerged, challenging the unilateral dominance of Western powers. This Political East, while embodying anti-hegemonic sentiments, maintains a conservative stance within the framework of the international Charter system. The paper concludes by highlighting the fundamental transformation of international politics into a multipolar landscape. Although both the Political West and East continue to espouse the principles of the Charter, the intensification of hostilities risks destabilising the international order. In the context of the enduring Cold War dynamics and the challenges posed by global environmental change, the future of humanity is increasingly uncertain.

Since the beginning of the 21^st century, one of the central research questions for Chinese IR scholars has been the definition, justification and conceptualization of China’s international identity. This was due both to the discussions in the Chinese academic community about China’s peaceful rise, caused by the rapid growth of China’s material power, and to the “constructivist turn” in the development of IR as a discipline in China. Understanding China’s international identity is important not only for China itself as a way of understanding “itself” and “others”, but also for the world community, since the self-positioning of a state reveals its national interests, aspirations, foreign policy strategy and behavior. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the end of the 1990s, when analyzing its foreign policy self-positioning, it was always possible to identify a dominant international identity. In the 1950s it was a pronounced international identity of the PRC as a socialist country, in the 1960s–1980s as a third world country, since the 1990s as the largest developing country. However, since the second half of the 1990s, China has started to reveal its identity as a responsible great power while simultaneously maintaining its identity as a developing country. The use of two international identities by China for almost three decades and the intention repeatedly emphasized by the Chinese leadership to maintain self-positioning as a developing country for a long time allow us to conclude that China’s dual international identity is not a reflection of the transition period of China’s development, but represents a complex phenomenon that requires conceptualization. The purpose of this article is to reveal the phenomenon of contemporary China having a dual international identity or, in other words, simultaneously two dominant international identities that determine China’s actions on the global stage. The author intended to reveal, based on an analysis of Chinese academic publications, the Chinese vision of the phenomenon of dual international identity.

The Turkomans are considered to be the integral part of a political space often reflexively labeled as “Turkic World.” Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkoman communities in Syria and Iraq have undergone a complex evolution leading to their current status as politically organized distinct ethnic groups. This transformation has been predetermined by the policies of the colonial powers and the rise of Arab nationalism that was aimed to establish the united “Arab Homeland.” It was only with the decline of Baathist regimes that Turkomans started to gain political recognition. How have the Turkomans in Syria and Iraq evolved culturally and politically over time? Do they perceive their future as being closely linked to their Arab “host” countries, or do they harbor aspirations of coming back to their historical Turkic legacy? What support do they receive from Turkey, and what is offered by Syrian and Iraqi authorities? We have analyzed the Turkoman issue through a structural and identity-based lens, examining how these communities have navigated their relationships with the Arab states they reside in and their historical ties to Turkey. The framework proposed by R. Brubaker, which examines the interactions between marginalized ethnic minorities, nationalizing states, and external homelands, provides a valuable tool for understanding the complex dynamics involving Turkoman communities in Syria and Iraq. The research findings indicate that Turkoman identity remains robust, albeit with a notable shift towards a more inclusive national-state dimension. Despite constituting a minority group, Turkomans in both countries are actively advocating for recognition within society and asserting their cultural rights. The primary Turkoman political factions in both countries have garnered backing from Turkey, although the nature of this support is complex. In Iraq, Turkomans are inclined towards seeking Turkish patronage while also demonstrating a willingness to engage with the Iraqi government. Conversely, in Syria, Turkomans residing along the border have successfully established a self-governing region with the Turkey’s assistance. Furthermore, a segment of Turkomans place emphasis on their religious affiliations, such as identifying as Shiite or Alawite.

This article addresses the issue of neocolonialism and, in particular, the context in which this issue is addressed within the framework of Russian official foreign policy. The article gives an idea of the emergence and modern understanding of the concept of neocolonialism within the framework of political science. The authors use the method of content analysis of speeches, statements and articles by Russian officials that contain references to neo-colonialism and the fight against it on the African continent. It is shown that the narrative of neocolonialism occupies a fairly important place in the Russian Federation’s construction of its foreign policy identity as a form of building a discursive dialogue with Western countries. The peculiarities of the Russian discourse on neocolonialism are its focus on problems in the spheres of economics and security, as well as some abstractness in relation to specific forms and manifestations of neocolonialism in African countries.

The article is devoted to the study of political identity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The author pays particular attention to the modern interpretation of the concept of ‘Congolité’ – Congolese identity, which is in many ways identical to the idea of national citizenship. The concept of ‘Congolité’ itself is considered in the article as a set of legal norms, as an instrument of electoral struggle and as a symbolic construct. The concept has acquired a new meaning in the context of the 2021 draft law, and its return to domestic politics is significant for understanding the mood of Congolese society. The author also tries to identify the main lines of the identity debate and concludes that one of its constants is the problem of the political-legal status of the Rwandafon minority (Banyarwanda / Banyamulenge), and another is regional-linguistic fragmentation, which is reinforced by economic-demographic specificity. Both of these factors have a significant impact on internal voting patterns. The discourse of autochthonous ‘purity’ is seen as exacerbating this fragmentation and as generating conflict in Congo’s relations with states in the region, particularly Rwanda.

The article explores the phenomenon of the foreign policy identity of the UAE, an oil-producing nation in the Persian Gulf that has managed to overcome the constraints of its smallness and assert its prestige on a global scale. The study aims to identify historic and cultural basis of the shaping of this identity, the monarchy’s perception of threats and challenges and its ways of dealing with them, the role of political leadership and how their personal views and ambitions shape the contours of the country’s self-positioning as well as the use of the foreign policy identity in implementing national interests. The author discovers that the core of UAE foreign policy identity was contoured by the founding fathers of the small monarchy and then later developed and adapted by the new generation of ambitious, charismatic, and visionary leaders. The key factor was the fusion of visions of rulers of the two emirates with most economic and political weight in the federation, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, that defined the regional and international status of the UAE as an influential and powerful actor. The paper concludes that the main components of UAE foreign policy identity are pragmatism, prioritization of socioeconomic development and prosperity, perfect combination of conservative governance and cosmopolitism, the principles of connectivity and integration in global financial and logistic networks and flows, as well as agility in the currently changing balance of power and skillful interpretation of international norms and discourses in promoting its own image and agenda.

The article focuses on the foreign policy identity of the de facto state, citing Abkhazia, which gained partial recognition from Russia and a number of other states, as an example. Using comparative analysis of the Abkhazian Intellectuals’ Adresses (1977 and 1988) and content analysis of the annual Presidential Addresses as basic research methods, the study attempts to answer the question: what is the foreign policy identity of the de facto state (from 2008 – partially recognized state) under issue. The conducted research concludes that the conceptual foundations of Abkhazian foreign policy identity, formulated in the Intellectuals’ Addresses, are reflected in the official discourse and reproduced at the level of everyday perception, still they are not static. The main implication to be made is that although today Abkhazia is increasingly positioned as a sovereign state, the opposite – Abkhazia’s identity as a de facto state – is still evident enough in official speeches and everyday communication.

The article analyzes the influence of the current international situation on the concept of German identity. The main elements that form the basis of contemporary German self-consciousness are identified. The author explores the relationship between the regional, national, and supranational components of German self-identification, examining the persistent mental “divide” between the new (former GDR) and the old lands (West Germany). Special attention is paid to the challenges posed for the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of historical discourse and memorial practices by the influx of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The role of the 2023 Palestine-Israel escalation in the transformation of the national narrative is separately examined. The article also evaluated the conflict around Ukraine as a factor in strengthening the European dimension of German identity.

Among the key methods used by the author are content analysis of speeches by German officials, analysis of legislation and media. In addition, logical, chronological, and comparative-historical methods were applied. All this in aggregate led to the following conclusions. The Federal Republic of Germany is undergoing a systemic and multidimensional identity crisis. The main challenge is finding a balance between historical responsibility, transatlantic commitments, and national interests. The goal of the German establishment is to formulate a new national idea, which includes defining the role and place of Germany in the world, forming a value consensus regarding migrants, and overcoming the alienation between the east and west of the country. However, in the post-1990 world order, such a large-scale task remains rather impossible for the current elites.

The article examines the changes in the formulation, prioritisation and implementation of India’s foreign policy objectives as a result of a significant renewal of its political elite, triggered by the economic reforms that began in the 1990s. It is argued that India’s ruling elite is now largely identical to its political elite, whose mindset, although considerably younger and better educated, is more than ever defined by its self-identification with traditional values, which are religious and, for the vast Hindu majority, caste-based. At the same time, the composition of India’s elite has broadened during the reform years, mainly through the inclusion of middle and even lower castes in the traditional hierarchy. Many of its representatives tend to associate the strengthening of the country with a return to the “correct” cultural and civilisational basis which, in the centuries before foreign conquest, gave India what the y saw as its natural primacy in the world. The main change is the emergence of a sense of self-confidence among the elite, on which the so-called “new nationalism” of the “man of the people”, the current Prime Minister N. Modi, is based. Drawing on his statements, speeches by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, and articles by Indian and Russian scholars, the author shows the innovations introduced by the Prime Minister in promoting India’s core national interests in a changing world. The article examines the creation of India’s own sphere of influence within the framework of the new Indo-Pacific strategy, the combination of cooperation and competition in relations with China, the reasons for the dynamic expansion of interaction with the United States and the “red lines” involved, the motives for developing a particularly privileged strategic partnership with Russia and for using multilateral formats, and the return to India’s agenda of the task of gaining the status of the main voice of the Global South. It is concluded that approaches to the imperative of building a multipolar world order “in which India would be a strong pole”, based on the priority goal of establishing for it the status of a great power and a global actor in world politics, create historic opportunities for increasing Russian-Indian interaction.