Jan Klabbers is a Dutch Professor at the University of Helsinki. He is a Member of the Finnish Academy of Sciences and Letters, a member of the editorial board of the European Journal of International Law. Klabbers is the author of The Concept of Treaty in International Law (1996), An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002, 3rd edition 2015), co-editor of Towards Responsible Global Governance (2018). Professor Klabbers has also published around 200 book chapters and articles (in the European Journal of International Law, International Organizations Law Review etc.) He is famous for delivering lectures during visiting positions at NYU Law School (2009-10), the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (2008, 2013, 2015), and the University of Paris-II and Paris-I (2011, 2017).

This paper outlines the contours of a conceptual examination of the trends of UN change that have emerged in the post-bipolar era. The author seeks to understand what the results of the changes are and how they manifest themselves. Due to the complexity of the object under study, the duration of the analyzed period and its eventfulness, the paper takes into account only some typical fragments of the general picture, and some judgments and conclusions are expressed in a discussion manner. I analyze the following patterns of change have characterized the main UN bodies: new goals and activities of the bodies themselves and the organization as a whole, more topics under discussion, greater organizational autonomy, higher costs, greater involvement of civil society organizations and experts in agenda setting and various activities, structural reforms, summitization of the General Assembly and Security Council, the creation of high-level segments of ECOSOC, and strengthening of the coordinating role of the Committee of Senior Management. In methodological terms, the article is based on a multilevel model of an international organization developed in the framework of the sociological approach.

This article focuses on IOM and its place in global migration governance. China’s and Russia’s memberships were considered overdue, considering the relevance of both countries for the global migration system and their respective weight on the international stage. We aim to contribute to advancing research on IOM as an organization of increasing global relevance and on its engagement with member states, moving beyond the “usual” focus on the European Union (EU) member states, African, North American, and South American immigration and sending countries. Our analysis draws upon recent research, which conceptualizes intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as “world organizations” and which we fi nd interesting and applicable to our empirical inquiry and discussion of IOM. We regard IOM as a “world organization” that could be examined along four interrelated components: (1) its “internal world” (e.g., establishment, relations with states, internal decisions); (2) its self-image and self-reference as an organization integrated into and referring to world society, hence as the “world of migration governance”; (3) its external relations, integration into wider environments, and responses to external events; and (4) its contribution to the world order, i.e., global migration governance. Our analysis shows that due to its new status as a related organization of the UN, its leading role in the Global Compact on Migration, and China and Russia becoming its new members, IOM will likely play an increasingly signifi cant role in global migration governance. The main reason for this is the need to reactivate the existing modes of migration governance and adapt them to a drastically changed global political and migration-related situation following the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to their memberships in IOM, China and Russia have already been able to benefi t from the IOM assistance. Provided that both countries continue to engage with IOM and provide more substantial funding to it, IOM’s assistance to both China and Russia could be expanded. Meanwhile, both countries may take a position, which would allow them to exert a more signifi cant infl uence on IOM and global migration governance.

Since the beginning, BRICS has been viewed as an element of global governance system. Recently, however, it became necessary to adapt the BRICS format to the new challenges of the world system, not only at the global, but also at the regional levels, as a result of which not only global cooperation mechanisms, but also regional ones, were involved in the activities of the BRICS. BRICS-initiated regional outreach practices and “BRICS+” format are aimed at expanding partnerships, the socalled “circle of friends” of the BRICS, both within the BRICS subregions and beyond. These partners include as national states, as regional organizations. Both formats are focused on reforming the global fi nancial and economic system and the formation of a polycentric world order based on the principles of pluralism and diversity, involving not only developed but also developing countries of the “Global South” in the global governance system. The purpose of this article is to consider various approaches to the study of the BRICS from the standpoint of the theories of “new” and “comparative” regionalism and to assess the prospects for regional interaction of the BRICS countries at the level of subregional, interregional and transregional ties.

The format of international cooperation of the Conference of the Countries Participating in the UN Convention against Corruption, on the one hand, continues the traditions of international intergovernmental organizations, and on the other hand, represents a new format of interaction between states in the fi eld of anti-corruption activities, which has distinctive features. The Conference has a pivotal role in international cooperation on the prevention and combating of corruption due to the wide area of activities and the number of participants. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the features of the functioning of the Conference of the Countries Participating in the UN Convention against Corruption and the results of its activities since 2006. Using the analysis of documents and scientifi c publications, the author concludes that despite the importance of the Conference as a platform for multilateral dialogue, the countries participating in the United Nations Convention against Corruption failed to achieve signifi cant progress in the declared areas of activity. The author highlights the main diffi culties faced by states in implementing anti-corruption measures based on the norms of international law.

Having evolved since the 1990s into a political and ideological concept, global governance has become one of the priorities of the program documents of EU states and institutions, today formulated as “rules-based order”. A distinctive feature of this concept is the “blurring” of interstate interaction on the world stage in favor of non-state and supranational interaction. Under global governance, there is allegedly no hierarchy between state actors and nonstate or supra-state actors. This article critically examines this thesis with the help of the sociological theory of diff erentiation. According to diff erentiation theory, the state does not remain on the sidelines of global governance but takes the lead in the hierarchy of levels of world politics. The fi nal part of the article deals with the principles of EU coordination in the UN system. To promote ideas of global governance, the EU aims at major reform of the UN through intertwining intergovernmental interaction with nongovernmental interaction. This model is used especially often when non-core issues (e.g., human rights or climate in the Security Council) are considered in a UN body, allowing for broader participation in negotiations and, from a strategic perspective, a revision of the UN Charter. The main conclusion of the article is that the EU’s actions in the UN system refute the position of global governance that there is no hierarchy between the interstate and supranational levels of world politics. Despite the active promotion of global governance by the EU states, the EU itself is based on interstate coordination and a rigid hierarchy among states, as well as between states and nongovernmental actors.

The paper examines Russia’s and the EU’s approaches to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as instruments of public diplomacy (PD). As the EU and Russia increasingly instrumentalize NGOs in their foreign policy, which seems to erode trust in their already burdened relations, the topic presents an opportunity to compare the mechanisms of government–NGO interaction in Russia and EU. The specifi c forms, roots, and aims of this phenomenon have often been overlooked in academic research. To these ends, the author looks into diff erent views and practices of Brussels and Moscow in terms of supporting and fi nancing NGOs in the sphere of public diplomacy. The study demonstrates that the EU’s approach is characterized by signifi cant funding of NGOs abroad as part of governmental public diplomacy eff orts. On the other hand, the Russian approach is mostly characterized by funding of national NGOs, which then implement public diplomacy projects aligned with government policies abroad.

The article discusses the use of diff erent languages in the development of documents in the institutions of the European Union. It is explored by measuring various aspects of competition between languages. Measuring instruments are the polylingualism coeffi cient, the language integration index and the index of language monopolization. The purpose of the article is to determine the impact of integration processes in the European Union on the competition of languages and to assess the using of languages in the production of original documents in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, as well as in the proceedings of the Court of Justice of the EU. The linguistic capital of the population of the Union is also assessed on the basis of the proposed author’s original methodology. The results of the research show that there is a strong trend towards an increase in language monopolization in all of the above mentioned EU institutions. The diff erence is that EU judges favor the French language, while the European bureaucracy prefers English. The author thinks that the EU member states that joined European integration after 2005 is a serious factor. They hastened the monopolization of the English language. The EU population aged 15 and over shows the opposite trend. Their level of linguistic competition was growing. The reasons for this were the recent waves of expansion of the Union and migration. Based on the analysis, it is concluded that the conditions for the growth of language competition have changed in the EU. If by 2000 it took place in the environment of stable bilingualism of the population of the Union, then in 2005 and 2012 it is characterized by the dominance of monolingualism with trends of its further growth. The European bureaucracy can continue to strengthen the economic motivation for learning English and position it as “minimally ethnized” and the only intercultural communication medium in the EU. In this sense, Brexit is more likely to be a factor not so much weakening as a further strengthening of the competitive position of the English language in the Union.