The conversation was conducted by S. M. Markedonov, editor-in-chief of the journal "International Analytics"

   Scholars worldwide have amassed a wealth of knowledge on the use of economic sanctions, relying on either the analysis of large datasets or the examination of particular cases. The extensive sanctions levied against Russia have spurred research into their implementation and impact among Russian scholars, necessitating impartial empirical research. This demand raises a number of epistemological questions, such as what the strategy for understanding sanctions empirically should be, how to handle data and its processing, and what implications the existing literature, both domestically and abroad, has for approaching empirical research on sanctions. The crux of the matter is the generation of quantitative datasets of multiple sanctions events and cases, which serves as an essential starting point for empirical research. This approach helps to differentiate between “normal” and “deviant” cases, thereby justifying further sampling of cases for in-depth qualitative analysis. The article vividly illustrates this point by relying on the author’s databases on sanctions events, U. S. government enforcement actions, and U.S. Congress legislation processes on sanctions.

   The relevance and scientific novelty of the study lies in the author’s identifi cation of fundamentally new modalities of the global sanctions policy, including: the gradual expansion of the circle of countries initiating sanctions, the transformation of sanctions tools and thematic regimes of sanctions, the replication of the practice of using unilateral sanctions as tools to achieve foreign policy goals in a crisis of the unilateral world order and increasing competition and strategic confrontation between the great powers.

   The discourse and content analysis of legal documents regulating the institutionalization of sanctions regimes in the initiating countries made it possible to identify a number of important global trends in the last decade in the fi eld of sanctions policy. First, in the context of the growing popularity of fi nancial restrictions in the last decade, they are rapidly becoming more complex. The practice of imposing sanctions against Central banks and freezing the foreign exchange reserves of sanctioned countries is being replicated. From “freezing” the assets of sanctioned persons (individuals and legal entities), the initiators of sanctions are increasingly moving towards the practice of their confi scation, while forming appropriate legal mechanisms. Secondly, there are important shifts in the thematic regimes of sanctions: the “collective” legalization of cybersanctions regimes, the massive introduction of liability for circumvention of sanctions into national legislations and the replication of the experience of introducing sanctions restrictions against transactions with cryptocurrency and alternative mechanisms for cross-border settlements. Thirdly, the gradual replication of secondary sanctions tools is obvious, which are beginning to be used not only by the United States, but also by the United Kingdom and China, which in the long term (taking into account the strategic confrontation between China and the United States) might create a fundamentally new phenomenon of actual competition of sanctions extraterritoriality.

   This paper delves into the issue of cyber sanctions as a novel tool in the context of the transforming global order and the fierce competition amongst great powers, which is gradually extending into cyberspace due to the growing role of information and communication technologies. The contours of geopolitical rivalry are refl ected in cyberspace, creating the potential for a quick transition from cyberspace to reality. The article investigates the risks posed by cyber-attacks, studies the nature of the contradictions between the norms of international law and cyber sanctions, carries out an analysis of the legal frameworks of the main initiating countries, and reviews the practice of imposing cyber sanctions. Following these eff orts, the conclusion was reached that cyber sanctions are traditional measures used to deter, limit, and punish malicious actions in cyberspace. An analysis of the legal bases of the main initiating countries revealed that the United States pursues its national interests, while the EU rather uses the tool to project its normative power. The cybersphere, amid this process of transforming the world order, creates opportunities for asymmetric wars and is used by states to compensate for geopolitical inequalities in the absence of rules governing behavior. The damage from a cyber-attack can be signifi cant both politically and economically. However, the consensus of the great powers on the development of common norms governing behavior in cyberspace is not possible in the short and medium term. This is due to the fact that the key initiating countries (the U.S. and the EU) are increasingly resorting to unilateral measures, while the main target states (Russia and China) appeal to the norms of international law. As the foundations of the neoliberal world order are being eroded, the antagonism of states will increase. Cyber sanctions do not oblige the initiator to provide evidence, give an accurate assessment of the damage, and do not entail the opposite eff ect per se, increasing only the image costs for opponents. Therefore, cyber sanctions are expected to become more widespread in the future.

   In recent years, conservative forces in Iran have lambasted their moderate and pragmatic rivals for their inability to solve the country’s economic issues and improve the living standards of its populace. However, since Ebrahim Raisi won the presidential election in 2021, Iranian conservatives have had their own chance to tackle the country’s internal challenges, being the last of the political forces without direct influence on the economic decision-making system for a long time. Nevertheless, their failed attempts to foster economic growth under sanctions pressure may prove critical to the Islamic Republic. Not only the conservative part of the establishment but the entire political system may risk losing what remains of its credibility with the Iranian people, who could perceive it as incapable of eff ectively managing the economy. Furthermore, the government’s success in resolving the current socio-economic development issues is also pivotal to the political future of E. Raisi. His failure would deprive him of any opportunity to claim the post of the next supreme leader of Iran. Meanwhile, the accumulated structural problems of the Iranian economy and the external sanctions pressure can render achieving economic progress a daunting, if not insurmountable, task. This paper seeks to elucidate why there is signifi cant social tension in Iran, resulting in periodic outbursts of protest, and why the economic situation is deemed a crisis, despite the relative resilience of the Iranian economy to external and internal challenges, as well as the macroeconomic performance dynamics, which are not necessarily inferior to those of Iran’s regional neighbors. To answer this question, the paper analyzes the main economic challenges facing the country’s leadership and the extent to which the goals and priorities of the implemented “resistance economy” doctrine provide an adequate response to them. As a theoretical tool, the author employs the ideas of M. Todaro, A. Sen, S. Smith, J. Foster, and C. Handy, justifying the need for any state to transcend the simple parameters of economic growth in formulating its development strategy and think more comprehensively, focusing primarily on creating a social and economic environment that is comfortable for its citizens. As a result, the author concludes that the model of the Iranian economy that has been formed in an aggressive environment prioritizes the survival of the existing political system, approaching the issue of economic growth as secondary and failing to satisfy some popular needs beyond the basic ones. It is incapable of ensuring comprehensive sustainable socio-economic development, which over time leads to the accumulation of internal tension in Iranian society.

   Throughout a 35-year period, the Armenian economy has withstood numerous crises and political shocks, including the Spitak earthquake, the fi rst Karabakh war, a decline in GDP by over 50 %, transport blockades, and the 2008 economic crisis. The aftermath of the 2020 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh introduced new risks and drastically altered the country’s development and economic conditions. Despite the broader context of international confrontation, which has spilled over into military conflict in Ukraine, the Armenian economy has created possibilities for growth under geopolitical uncertainty. In the short-term perspective, these developments have had a positive impact on economic growth in 2022. However, the continuity of such impact on the Armenian economy depends on the government’s concrete approaches and further existence of current conditions. The article aims to explore the interrelationship between Armenia’s foreign policy and economy in the context of global and regional changes. The policy of the Armenian government is considered through the prism of the main features of the notion “small state,” with particular attention paid to the logic of changes in foreign policy throughout the entire period of independence. By utilizing large-scale statistical data, the article presents the causes of the radical growth of Armenia’s GDP in 2022 while simultaneously analyzing its structure. The development of the country’s energetic system is presented as an illustration of the establishment of a separate field that combines export possibilities, investment potential, and risk formation. The article also covers the reasons for the relative stability of the Armenian economy under the background threat of military escalation.

   The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of unilateral coercive measures on sustainable development processes in the Republic of Belarus, as well as their influence on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Belarus and the Union State.

   Divided into three sections, the article begins by examining how Belarus has adapted its legal framework and state policy to conform to the 2030 Agenda. However, the use of unilateral coercive measures by the collective West to pressure and incentivize “appropriate” behavior, in contradiction of the decisions of the UN Security Council, diverts the country’s resources toward safeguarding its sovereignty and non-intervention in the aff airs of other states. The second section delves into the role of integration associations and the Union State in overcoming coercive restrictive measures. Finally, the third section sheds light on the impact of such measures on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Specifi cally, the sectoral sanctions imposed by the US and EU on Belarus in 2021 hinder the development of a common agricultural policy, as well as gas, oil, and petroleum markets of the Union State, while simultaneously creating a fi nancial rift between Belarus and Russia. This underscores the negative eff ects of these measures in the short term.

   The issue of sanctions, which has acquired a new dimension in the contemporary era, has transformed from a subject area in International Law into an interdisciplinary one, and has been widely analyzed in political science, sociology, and other fi elds. The case of Yugoslavia, which represents one of the earliest examples of the application of sanctions as a means to modify not only international actions, but also a political regime, has formed, among other things in modern history, the increasingly popular phenomenon of “cancelling” a nation. Given the external similarity of the processes that took place in the former Yugoslavia, in which Belgrade was involved, and in the post-Soviet space, it is of undisputed interest. This article delves into the situation of the Yugoslav economy, its reaction to the regime of comprehensive restrictions, as well as the eff ects of the sanctions policy in a comparative relation to the situation in modern Russia and the anti-Russian sanctions regime.

   The global economy is currently experiencing unprecedented changes as the BRICS nations establish themselves as a signifi cant power center and a crucial factor in the transformation of the international economic framework. Following China’s chairmanship of BRICS, which culminated in the BRICS+ meetings with a diverse range of emerging market economies, these and other countries have expressed their desire to join the BRICS group. The expansion process was largely catalyzed by the openness exhibited by BRICS through the BRICS+ format. The main question at this juncture is how the BRICS+ format will develop and whether it can enhance the position of BRICS in the global arena and among the Global South. This paper explores some of the opportunities presented by the BRICS+ concept in the creation of new global governance, particularly through the establishment of platforms – including those in the real sector and fi nancial platforms aimed at promoting greater cooperation among the sovereign wealth funds and regional development banks of the Global South. Another critical area is the launch of a new reserve currency that could serve as the foundation for greater economic integration across the broad platform of the developing world.