The bulk of academic studies characterize the contemporary U.S. – China relations as asymmetrical ones, in which the relations' agenda − a course towards finding areas of cooperation or emphasizing contradictions/rivalry − was set by Washington's policy towards China, with the latter being more of a reacting party. In this paper, I argue that one needs a further and deeper reflection on the current confrontation between the U.S. and China, in particular the reasons and circumstances of how and why the “Chinese dream” of a remarkable renaissance of the Chinese nation became an American nightmare, forcing Washington to opt for a containment policy against China. In this regard, I show the importance of tracing the dynamics of the post-Cold War development of the U.S. – China relations to comprehend the patterns and logic of the shaping of American policy towards China. The article also explains the evolution of U.S. – China relations in the post-Cold War period as determined by the presence or absence of a strategic basis in the U.S. – China relations, which implies cooperation between the two countries in stopping the external existential threat to the U.S. So, I conclude that the uniqueness of the current stage lies in the fact that, because of China's emergence as a strong global power and Washington's disillusions about China, China itself is beginning to be perceived by Washington as an existential threat, to stop which the containment policy should be applied.

The article examines those factors that allowed the Kim family regime to stay in power in extremely unfavorable environment. In political science literature, it is generally accepted that an authoritarian regime faces three major threats: an elite conspiracy/coup, a mass protest, a foreign invasion. The article demonstrates that in the case of the DPRK, which is a much poorer part of a divided country, the potential threat of mass popular protests might be higher than in many other authoritarian regimes. However, the autocrat and his entourage successfully counter this threat by exercising an unusually thorough policy of informational self-isolation, further reinforced by strict administrative control and police surveillance. On the other hand, the ever present threat of Seoul-led “unification-by-absorption” strengthens the elites’ unity and reduces the likelihood of conspiracies. This is important since elite conspiracies and coups have constituted the major danger for post-1945 autocracies. North Korean elites understand that even a successful coup can eventually provoke the outbreak of popular discontent, followed by the collapse of North Korean statehood and German-style unification under Seoul’s control. Under this scenario, conspiracy’s winners and losers will perish alike, with all members of the current elite having little chance to retain their power and privileges. Hence, the elite has reasons not to “rock the boat.” Finally, the threat of a foreign invasion (or foreign intervention into a domestic crisis) is successfully neutralized by the existence of a nuclear deterrent. Since the North Korean faces a grave existential threat which is created by the existence of the South, it is ready to sacrifice the economic development for the sake of political stability. Hence, the elite is willing to invest large resources into military programs and overlook the difficulties the self-isolation and other survival-oriented policies create for the economic development of the country.

The discourse of “strategic autonomy,” which has gained popularity in the Republic of Korea in recent years, has yet to undergo serious theoretical revision. This article attempts to fill the gap by examining the South Korean discourse of “middle powers,” from which the discourse of “strategic autonomy” grew, and the socio-historical analysis of Korean perceptions of political subjectivity, which developed under the powerful influence of both Western ideas from the early 20th century and the political realities of the military alliance with the United States. In the first section the authors examine the specifics of South Korea’s use of the concept of “strategic autonomy” in relation to its foreign policy strategy. This concept is examined using a constructivist paradigm. In the second section, the authors examine the discourse of “middle power,” around which the concept of “strategic autonomy” is built. Compared to the former, this concept is quite elaborated in Western and Korean political discourses. Finally, the third section of the article examines the evolution of these concepts in South Korean discourse. The circumstances of the formation and development of the military-political alliance with the United States play an extremely important role in this evolution, and the discourse around its prospects largely determines the features of the country’s domestic policy. The authors conclude that from the academic point of view the concept of “strategic autonomy” can only be considered as a discursive category close to the concept of “hedging,” but it is an important element of South Korea’s political identity and an essential factor of internal political struggle.

The article analyzes the tools and mechanisms that Indian elites used to adapt the country’s foreign policy to the post-Cold War world order. We describe the internal political development of India over the past 30 years, noting that the general foreign and economic policies remained unchanged due to the political consensus. We analyze the desire of the Indian leadership to form a solid economic foundation, which is perceived in the framework of India’s strategic thought as a prerequisite for the country to claim the status of great power. Finally, we discuss the primary imperatives of the Indian external policy, i.e., building a sphere of influence necessary for the polycentric world. It is noted that India’s main external security challenges remain the same (China and Pakistan), although they have changed qualitatively: the PRC has become one of the superpowers, overtaking India in terms of economic development, and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons. We conclude that, on the whole, the Indian elites managed to relatively safely lead the country through the chaos of the post-Cold War world, turning it into one of the largest economies in the world and providing the necessary conditions for raising its status in world politics.

The idea of normative power Europe, pioneered by Ian J. Manners, is usually applied to the European Union’s foreign policy. It states that the EU promotes one’s norms and values among adjacent states, determining what is “normal” in international relations. This paper, along with the burgeoning literature that looks for normative power beyond Europe, argues that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another regional grouping that attempts to disseminate its norms and values worldwide, thus transforming itself into a nascent “normative power.” Structure-wise, this paper proceeds as follows. First, I will briefly overview the concept of Ian Manner’s normative power and its applicability to Europe and Asia. Second, I will determine the Asian values that may be the basis for ASEAN’s normative stance in the world. My comparison of ASEAN and the EU’s values are structured along with several topical issues: the role of a state in people’s quotidian life and the question of human rights promotion. I exemplify the latter with the Myanmar crisis that evoked harsh criticism of the international community. I conclude that the transformation of ASEAN into a “normative power” is rather dubious since there are limits in promoting the Asian norms and values. In ASEAN, there is a group of developing countries that reject Western universalism and struggle to find their own way in world politics.

This article analyzes why, during the post-Cold War period, Tokyo became aware of the need to reconsider its hard-line relations with Moscow, which had been developed in previous decades. Even in the period preceding the collapse of the USSR, Tokyo did not conceal its intentions to use the difficult socio-economic situation in the USSR and then in Russia to obtain territorial concessions. Even then, however, the Russian side mostly determined the agenda of the Russian-Japanese dialogue, which was largely due to serious mistakes made by Japanese politicians. After Russia emerged from the economic and political turbulence that began unexpectedly for the West and Japan in the 2000s, Tokyo’s new hopes were connected with concessions on the “territorial case” because of Russia’s interest in Japanese investments and technological cooperation, especially for the development of the Far East and adjacent areas. Nevertheless, even here Tokyo faced a fiasco. Before the arrival of the Abe era in late 2012, Japan’s foreign policy toward Russia became increasingly “reactive,” and even later Tokyo’s high-profile initiatives related to the Russian-Japanese agenda often turned out to be old proposals from Moscow that had been made during the time of Michael Gorbachev, and favorable moments for their implementation were largely missed.

Turkey's foreign policy in the first decade after the collapse of the bipolar system retained features of its continuity in comparison with the Cold War: the Kemalist principles of laicism and the choice in favor of further Westernization, with its orientation towards cooperation with the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures remained firmly in place. However, the post-bipolar period demonstrated a significant change in Turkey's foreign policy. The existing explanations for this phenomenon often start either from the appeal to the Islamic identity of the Justice and Development Party as the main reason for the changes, or from the approaches that prioritize Turkey's economic interests and emphasize Turkey's attempts to strengthen economic interdependence with neighbors in the region. Given the increasing complexity of the domestic and foreign policy nexus and the increasingly fluid characteristics of the international environment, it seems that an analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the post-bipolar period requires an alternative conceptual and methodological approach that allows the changes in Turkey's foreign policy to be viewed along three dimensions. In this article, the author resorts to just such an approach. It includes the study of domestic policy, the international context and the transformation of the ideological and institutional support of foreign policy. This approach makes it possible to explain the logic of Turkey's «sudden» reorientation from cooperation with the EU and Western countries in general to attempts to consolidate its leading role in the Middle East and establish itself as a regional hegemon in relation to situational alliances with various state and non-state actors in the broader international context.

The foreign policy of states is often viewed through the prism of the geopolitical, geostrategic or geoeconomic determinants. It is forgotten that in addition to these factors, foreign policy also has a strong human, or personal, factor. This factor is especially evident in authoritarian regimes of the personalist type, in which decisions, including on foreign policy issues, are made by the leader or a narrow stratum of the elite alone. In this case, the personal factor and personal interests of the leader are not limited to other regulators (institutions, elections, etc.). A foreign policy centered on the interests of the first person in this case may differ significantly from what one would assume when analyzing state policy and the national interests of the country. Since power in Turkmenistan is in the nature of a personalist regime, the article attempts to explore, within the framework of the available (very limited) information, the foreign policy of this country from the perspective of the personal interests of the head of state and the Turkmen elite rather than those of the state. In addition to the theoretical framework of the study and a brief personal profile of both presidents, the article also provides examples relating to the two main factors of interest to the leader of the nation and his elite - economic profit and regime security. Comparing the regimes of the first and second president in foreign policy also demonstrates the continuity of the political culture and system in the country. The study shows that the Turkmen regime combines all features of the theoretical conceptions of personalist foreign policy if we look at them as an interrelated complex. The personal characteristic of the president, his almost unshakable position in decision-making, as well as the interests of his entourage, including his family, play a key role in it. On the other hand, the singularity of decision-making makes it easier for those foreign players who have the necessary information about the country’s leader and know how to lead him to the decision they want without regard to other interest groups or institutions in the country.

The article gives a general overview of the main factors influencing the formation of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, as well as analyzes how these factors have changed since Azerbaijan’s independence until 2021. The conclusion is made that the existence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been a key factor in the formation of the political and economic system of the country, as well as the consciousness and perception of the world by its citizens. Since independence, Azerbaijan’s main objective has been to change the regional status quo, as well as to regain military and political control over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the theoretical part of the article, the author considers two categories of statehood: small and medium power. The established definition of small and medium power says that the main criteria of their difference lies in the size of the economy, the number of armed forces, as well as in the criterion of the “will” of the peoples to solve extraordinary foreign policy tasks. The author believes that the consolidation of the country’s available capabilities made it possible not only to achieve the goal of territorial integrity, but also to move Azerbaijan from the category of a small to a medium power. Azerbaijan deliberately moved to the rank of a medium power: through the development of regional ties and energy diplomacy, as well as through the isolation of Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan’s seizure of seven districts and part of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Shusha, was a significant event that allowed the country to fundamentally change the unfavorable status quo that had prevailed for years.

This article examines the position of Kyrgyzstan in the international system and its foreign policy in the context of the social fabric established after the collapse of the USSR, the dynamics of socio-economic development, as well as electoral processes and delimitation. The evolution of international relations in Kyrgyzstan is seen as a derivative of the socio-economic macro process that has been developing over the past three decades. In this article, the author attempts to combine the most common research optics that rarely intersect in one work: the study of the domestic political process and its role in setting foreign policy priorities. Due to the existence of an extensive clan system and the fragility of the central government, it is impossible to conduct internally consistent foreign policy. The foreign policy activity of Kyrgyzstan is aimed at maintaining a certain balance in relations with major actors in the region to create the most favourable conditions for labour migration, obtaining financial assistance and transit trade.