Interview with Michael A. Reynolds, Director of the Program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies of Princeton University, USA

Michael A. Reynolds is an American historian and political analyst. His teaching and research range over the geography of the Middle East and Eurasia and covers the themes of empire, international relations, nationalism, geopolitics, ethnic confl ict, and religion and culture. He is the author of Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918 (Cambridge University Press, 2011), co-winner of the 2011 American Historical Association’s George Louis Beer Prize, a Financial Times book of the summer, and a Choice outstanding academic title. He is the editor of Constellations of the Caucasus: Empires, Peoples, and Faiths (Markus Weiner, 2016). Reynolds also writes on contemporary issues related to Turkey, Russia, the Caucasus region and U.S. foreign policy. His writings have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, The National Interest, and War on the Rocks, among other venues. He holds a PhD in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton and an MA in Political Science from Columbia.

The article examines the trends in international relations that have emerged in recent years, including during the pandemic. According to the author, a clear international space structure in the vein of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system, with equally clear rules of the game in such space is associated with the presence of an enforcer. The enforcer here is a country or group of countries that impose certain forms of communication on the international space, making the behavior of agents of the international political space predictable. Such a position for the enforcer, among other things, makes it possible to obtain benefi ts (material and status ones) that exceed its costs. This situation was not least determined by the relative homogeneity of the international space actors (States). However, in reality, as shown in the article, there are many more variants of polities in the world, which, under certain conditions, were convenient to imitate state political institutions. The conditions change is leading to actualization of such polities. The actualization of diversity results in a sharp escalation of the enforcer’s costs, a drop in their eff ectiveness and the attractiveness of the enforcer’s position itself. The leader bears more and more signifi cant costs ceases to perform its functions. Here, in place of the institutional system set by the enforcer, comes a diff erent way of organizing international relations – interpersonal trust, which arises and is strengthened by personal communication. Until recently, such “decisionmakers’ clubs” were not as bright as the enforcer, but they connected the global world. However, the pandemic also disrupts this type of communication or rather complicates it. As a result, the hierarchy of problems changes. The problems of domestic politics and the international problems that aff ect them come to the fore. Global politics is being replaced by “neighborhood” politics. In the age of the world without a global leader and regional players rivalry, tomorrows “weight” of one country depends on how eff ectively it will be able to fi t in the new type of political structure.

In the article, the author analyzes the transformation of the dichotomy “Europe – Russia” in contemporary Georgian intellectual discourse as well as strategies and forms of positive and negative ideologization of the West and Russia. We state that the hypertrophied role of European and Russian images in the Georgian discourse has resulted from the belief of elites in the collective West as an alternative to Russian infl uence. We analyze the main strategies of forming a positive image of Europe in Georgian intellectual discourse, believing that the development of European motifs and images by several generations of Georgian intellectuals led to the emergence of a unique Georgian Europeanism and the concept of the “Non Typical European” Georgian nation. The development of European images depends on the formation and promotion of the image of Russia as a universal Other. It is assumed that the negative mythologization of Russia resulted from the historical trauma of the loss of statehood, Georgia’s forced history in the Russian Empire and the USSR, as well as the failures in the Russian-Georgian relations in the post-Soviet period. Overall, the author believes that Russian and European narratives have become invented traditions of Georgian identity that infl uence the strategies of elites in Georgian foreign policy.

Using the “path-dependence” concept and D. Slater’s thesis on the consolidation of elites around national threats, the author examines the factors infl uencing the formation of diff erent authoritarian political systems in the Central Asian states. A critical aspect of the formation of political systems in this region was the events from the mid-1980s to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of the structure of the study, the article consistently examines how interethnic and other political confl icts demonstrated the (un)ability of leaders to cope with crises. In particular, it shows that the inability to cope with political challenges in Kyrgyzstan marked the beginning of “pluralism by default.” Moscow’s involvement in the personnel issues in the republics, especially in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, undermined local elites and increased the overall sense of threat to political stability, which eventually rallied elites and gave rise to expectations of a strong leader. We also note that a notably fortifi ed power hierarchy was established where the new national leader perceived threats from his political rivals (in Uzbekistan). Conversely, the existence of a strong opposition prevented the rapid establishment of authoritarianism. In Tajikistan, for example, a split of the elite led to a civil war, but due to the greater stability of its governmental wing, the president subsequently managed to establish a hard authoritarian regime. In Turkmenistan, the country’s leader took advantage of the lack of threats to establish a dictatorship. Thus, external challenges contribute to the consolidation of elites, while the risks of internal competition contribute to the concentration of power in the hands of an authoritarian leader. On the contrary, prolonged threats divide elites, lead to mass confl icts or the formation of a relatively democratic but unstable system of state power.

The article examines the dynamics and prospects of resolving the main confl icts in the Western Balkans three decades after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The most important factors infl uencing the confl ict dynamics in the region are ethnonationalism, ethnic homogenization and external interference. Western intervention made it possible to stop hostilities, but at the same time it actually consolidated the results of ethnic homogenization. The Serbo-Croatian confl ict is close to its exhaustion due to the actual support of the West for Operation “Storm” (1995), the exodus of more than 200 thousand Serbs from Croatia, the integration of Croatia into NATO and the European Union. Despite the negative burden of historical memory, both Zagreb and Belgrade in bilateral relations are increasingly guided by political pragmatism and balanced assessments of the qualitatively changed situation. Against this background, the Dayton model of state structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, built on the basis of institutional transactions of actors representing competing ethnocultural communities, demonstrates its dysfunctionality. The interaction and cooperation of these actors remain largely limited, carried out under external control and pressure. Regarding the structure of the article, the author, fi rst, discusses some general issues contributing to the enduring confl ict in the Western Balkans; second, the article examines the prospects of antagonism between the Serbs and Croats; third, I analyze the impact of the Dayton Accords on the post-Yugoslav space. I conclude that scenarios for the future of the Western Balkans, to which the European Union and the United States are oriented, do not lead to the elimination of the causes of major confl icts in the post-Yugoslav space and obviously diverge in essential points from the images of the desired future that correspond to the aspirations of a signifi cant part of the population in the region.

The article is timed to coincide with two anniversaries: centenary of the Communist Party of China, and thirty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to the author’s idea, these two anniversaries correlate: analysis of the reasons and consequences of the USSR dissolution became one of the factors of current policy of Chinese communists. The article brings light to this coherence. A wide range of Chinese sources and literature regarding 1991 events in the USSR was used for the article. Another feature is the attention to historical context of the late 1980s – early 1990s, analysis of which helps to understand domination of conservative view to the USSR dissolution. The article shows how the Chinese state and party interest in the Soviet experience led to creation of a large bulk of works regarding historical, sociological and culturological aspects of the USSR dissolution. The analysis of the most impactful of these works shows a wide range of views regarding certain aspects (fi rst of all, the role of reforms in the fi nal dissolution of the state) and consensus regarding other aspects (negative role of Mikhail Gorbachev, labelling the dissolution of the USSR and the Communist Party as a ‘catastrophe’). Further analysis of the Soviet experience led to such measures by the Chinese leadership like strengthening of partocracy regime, conducting of media-covered anti-smuggling campaigns, establishing of harsh administrative and security control in areas with ethnic minorities, active counterpropaganda and struggling with foreign information infl uence. Appellation to the negative experience of the USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is using by the Chinese leadership in its propaganda as an argument for unacceptability of any political reforms regarding weakening of the party role.

The Kosovo issue is predominantly researched in academic and expert literature from an international political perspective. However, in light of common socio-political processes taking place in Europe during the last fi ve-seven years, the study of its internal political component, namely the political party transformation under the infl uence of external factors and the international community, regional stabilization eff orts is no less important. Based on J. Sartori’s classifi cation of party systems and R. Harmel and K. Janda’s theory of party change, the article studies the role of international actors, in particular the European Union, played in the institutional transformation of the political party transformation in the Albanian Kosovo. It also studies what opportunities and barriers appeared as a result of the EU’s involvement. The paper explains why the complex confi guration of the international mission in Kosovo in practice did not increase its legitimacy and establish an institutional system of governance but instead resulted in a loss of the mission’s credibility. The paper analyses and describes the process of political party transformation in Kosovo’s “Albanian world” and highlights the signifi cant milestones in the development of a party system involving those that had been borne out of the Kosovo confl ict. The article explains their possible ways of transformation in the future. It also explains the success factors of the populist “Self-Determination” movement and how sustainable this success has been in the changing international balance.

This article analyzes Poland’s policy towards the former Soviet space (Poland’s Eastern policy) through the assumptions of the realist theory of international relations. The fi rst part of the article examines the realist theory in international relations (IR). The second – deals with the existing literature on Poland’s foreign policy. The third part analyses the determinants and the goals of Poland’s policy towards the post-Soviet states (history of its relations with the region, ideological determinants, security concerns, etc.). The last part inquires about the evolution of Poland’s policy till current times. The Russian Federation is perceived as a signifi cant threat by Poland. In that context, since the early 1990s, Poland has been seeking solutions to strengthen its security. It aimed to join the North Atlantic Alliance and establish a close partnership with the United States (bandwagoning). This strategy brought substantial eff ects – in 1999, Poland joined NATO, and since it has hosted allied troops. Poland also wanted to develop cooperation with Ukraine (to a lesser degree also with its other post-Soviet neighbors) and bring them closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures. This policy was, in particular, at weakening Russia’s infl uence in the region (balancing). The results of this strategy have been somewhat ambiguous, though. Ukraine has rejected Russia’s sponsored reintegration projects in the post-Soviet space. The process of reforms in that country, however, is slow and uncertain. As for other post-Soviet states, Poland has largely proven unable to infl uence the desired changes.

Belarus is a country with a blurred identity that has not cut the umbilical cord connecting it with Mother Russia. According to a representative national survey of April 2020, only 25 percent of Belarusians would prefer to retain statehood and national sovereignty of Belarus even if their living standards worsen whereas 52 percent would opt for limited sovereignty if it is the price to pay for retaining or improving the quality of life. This may be the best-kept secret of Belarus and it has implications more serious than just economic dependency on Belarus’s eastern neighbor. Belarus used to be a contested borderland claimed by both Russians and Poles. Today, it is a country with two historical narratives and nation-building blueprints that have been confronting each other since the inception of the Belarusian national movement. While the neo-Soviet/Russo-centric narrative has held sway over the majority of Belarusians, the Westernizing narrative was hard-hit on several occasions but has been making headway since Gorbachev’s Perestroika. Pluses and minuses of two narratives and the attempts at bridging the gap between them are analyzed. There are essentially two kinds of divisions in Belarusian society: between the respective projects of nation-building and between Lukashenka loyalists and his detractors. These two divisions do not quite coincide, but there is a growing tendency to couch the ongoing political crisis in nationalist terms. The point is made that a lack of cohesive Belarusian identity is an existential threat to Belarusian statehood.

This article suggests a rethinking of Serbian-Albanian relations. Contemporary research tends to reduce this problem exclusively to the Serbia-Kosovo issue, which is usually regarded with a value-based approach. As a result, the issue of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the south-west and south direction, which also includes the Republic of Albania and other states (Montenegro, North Macedonia), where the role of the Albanian factor is signifi cant, remains outside the scope of the analysis. The purpose of this article is to examine more closely the logic of Serbia’s foreign policy activities in the south-western (Albanian) direction, taking into account the historical context and current trends associated with the active implementation of infrastructure projects in the entire Balkan region. Given that these projects cover both Serbia and Albania, it is appropriate to assume that Belgrade and Pristina have a mutual interest in forming a predictable non-confl ict space and in certain coordination of their approaches to conducting politics in their border area. This, in turn, requires a rethinking of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the southwestern (Albanian) direction. To this end, the author analyzes both the historical evolution of Belgrade’s position on the Albanian-Kosovo issue and considers it in the context of modern regional infrastructure projects. Considering the structural regional changes, taking place since the second half of the 2010s, the author comes to the conclusion that Belgrade is facing a dilemma between the self-signifi cant signifi cance of the Kosovo issue and the interest in forming a predictable and stable space to the southwest of its own borders. This dilemma determines the logic of modern Serbia’s foreign policy actions.

Lascurettes, Kyle M. Orders of Exclusion: Th e Strategic Sources of Order in International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.