Since 2014 transport and logistics as a dimension of Eurasian economic integration has achieved tangible results (i.e. in terms of transit volumes by rail across the EAEU) disregarding obvious organizational and economic hurdles (mainly of technical and administrative origin), as well as exogenous shocks. The sanctions regime imposed by the West on Russia in 2022 has a bold influence on the cooperation in question. As of today, there is some evidence that EAEU members are involved in logistics schemes allowing Russia to bypass Western sanctions. However, in this essence it is important to differentiate official rhetoric and business rationales in Russia’s partners to the Union, as in some cases politics overweighs economics, while in others it is the other way round.

The paper aims to critically trace the transport and logistics dimension of Eurasian integration in 2014–2024. It has been revealed that increasing transport connectivity within the EAEU, in light of the 2025 agenda to create a common transport space, is in line with the national interests of all member states, as well as the Greater Eurasia region as a whole. A cornerstone impetus for such motion comes from the endeavour of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia to participate qualitatively in global supply chains by offering a guaranteed, secure and sustainable delivery option to the market. In the end, the author concludes that with the on-going fragmentation of global economy and its fierce politicization, as of today the EAEU is ably handling transport and logistics agenda. And more fundamentally, the hurdles involved are being relatively quickly solved by officials in Astana, Bishkek, Yerevan, Minsk and Moscow which is definitely a cause for optimism for all parties concerned.

The transport sector is one of the cornerstones of the European Union’s single internal market. While it allows to logistically connect the countries of the integration union, it also represents challanges, especially climate ones, as transportation is responsible for a significant share of greenhouse gas emissions. Due to the growing significance of this particular sector of the economy, it is becoming increasingly important to analyze and compare regulatory practices adopted at both supranational and national levels. The purpose of this research is to assess the current components of the EU transport policy objectives and to relate them to the reality of the individual elements of the EU transport sector. The article highlights the inconsistencies inherent in the implementation of transport policy due to the mismatch between its goals and capabilities. To a certain extent, this premise makes it difficult to apply the concept of Europeanization to transport policy, which regulates an economic phenomenon that is unique in its internal characteristics. The paper describes the key elements of the EU transport policy, emphasizing its extensive and differentiated nature. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said that there have been significant changes in its goal-setting during evolution. Thus, the policy fits into the following logical construction: its development depends on the depth of the EU integration on the one hand, and is constrained by inherent imbalances on the other. It is these imbalances that are currently preventing the achievement of emission reduction and modal shift targets.

The development of transport infrastructure and the stimulation of investment in this area are also problematic. The ambiguous nature of the effectiveness of the European Union’s transport policy is emphasized due to the above-mentioned controversies in this area. Such results determine the directions of future measures influencing the transport sphere in the EU, taking into account the fundamental inability to resolve the contradiction consisting in the connection between economic growth and the increase in harmful emissions into the atmosphere.

Since 2017, EU and NATO have been discussing the creation of “Military Schengen,” emphasizing the importance of integrating efforts to promptly respond to potential crises on the eastern flank of NATO. With aggravation of contradictions between Russia and the West in the context of the special military operation in Ukraine, this topic acquires even greater relevance. The aim of this study is to determine the role of transport infrastructures, primarily road and rail ones, on NATO’s military mobility in Europe and to examine the main areas and formats of cooperation in this area. Particular attention is paid to the projects of the Three Seas Initiative (Via Carpatia, Via Baltica, Rail-2-Sea), initiatives within the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) programs. Based on the provisions of securitization theory, the author demonstrates mechanisms through which civilian projects acquire military significance, forming dual-use infrastructure. The author concludes that military mobility is becoming a key field for deepening cooperation between the EU and NATO and opens up new strategic opportunities for the alliance, facilitating the rapid transfer of troops and equipment to the Russian borders amid geopolitical tensions. The target task of the EU and NATO is to create a fully functioning transport infrastructure in Europe by 2030 to meet their military needs.

In the medium term, this may create additional challenges for Russia. Accordingly,  the article suggests several ways of responding to them.

This article uses a qualitative and quantitative content analysis of key strategic planning documents and speeches by top government officials from 2008 to 2024 to explore how the image of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has evolved in contemporary Russian official discourse. Throughout this period, and particularly since 2012, the Russian leadership has steadily increased its attention to the Northern Sea Route, a trend that has become particularly pronounced in the 2020s. Despite the Northern Sea Route being legally defined, official discourse uses various formulations when referring to it, shaping perceptions of the route within strategic documents and speeches by top officials. The main dilemma of Russia’s NSR policy, “internationalisation versus nationalization,” manifested itself in official discourse in the 2010s, with two competing images of the Northern Sea Route emerging. The first, as “Russia’s national transport communication in the Arctic,” is virtually identical to the legislative definition, although it originated earlier. This image usually appears in strategic planning and national security documents that are fundamental to the Russian Arctic.

The second, as the “(International) transport (transit) corridor,” emerged in 2018–2019, coinciding with a sharp increase in cargo turnover along the NSR after the commissioning of Yamal LNG in late 2017. With the exception of one international declaration, this image appears in strategic documents with a socio-economic profile targeted at the domestic audience, i.e. the state authorities. Despite the competing images in the Russian official discourse, there is general continuity in official perceptions of the NSR, particularly in foundational Russian Arctic documents. At the same time, as infrastructure development has progressed, perceptions of the Northern Sea Route have evolved from that of a domestic Russian transport route to that of a competitive global one.

In 2024, Qatar announced a third significant expansion of its LNG production planned over  the next six years. While this decision raises concerns about potential shifts in global and regional LNG markets, particularly regarding oversupply and price pressures, the expansion aligns with similar growth in other countries, such as the United States. Oversupply may hinder long-term contracts, which are crucial for Qatar’s stable export revenues. As new LNG volumes enter the market from 2025 to 2035, Doha will need to renegotiate existing contracts, which raises concerns about market oversaturation. However, the study suggests that Qatar’s strategy is forward-looking, extending beyond the anticipated oversupply crisis of the late 2020s to include the 2030– 2050 period. The projected surplus may be temporary, and Qatar seems well-positioned to adjust to market conditions. This proactive ‘all-in’ approach aims to enhance Qatar’s market share ahead of competitors once the market stabilizes post-oversupply, with some scenarios even indicating potential future deficits. However, apart from the economic dimension, the current decision by Doha to expand its LNG production infrastructure will also have a serious impact on Qatar’s relations with the US, the EU and China, increasing the role of the latter as a potential partner and possibly weakening Qatar-EU ties.

The conflict in the Sahel that began in 2012 is closely linked to the phenomenon of trans-Saharan illicit trade routes through Mali, Niger and Libya. These routes represent a type of trans-Saharan trade currently composed of a set of traffic: drug traffic, migrant traffic, and traffic in illegally mined gold. This article examines the factor of these flows in the conflict political economy of the Sahel. It is argued that the emergence and intensification of these flows have intensified inter- and intra-ethnic tensions between the main tribes involved in this trade: the Tuareg, Arabs, and Toubou. Using theoretical and methodological insights from the political economy of conflict, the authors show that these flows not only supported the activities of armed ethnic groups, but were themselves an opportunity for traditionally marginalized groups to redefine their position in the socio-economic hierarchy. The article analyzes this phenomenon through the case studies of three interconnected regions: northern Mali (Azawad), northern Niger (Agadez), and southwestern Libya (Fessan). The article also examines the evolution of the geographical routes of illegal flows and the strategies of state actors to co-opt them. The authors conclude that these flows are central not only to the political economy of conflict in the Sahel, but also to the economies of desert regions in general, suggesting the sustainability of the phenomenon of trans-Saharan illicit trade.

Starting from the first decade of the 21st century, the political elites of Poland have made various efforts to change its position as a transit territory between Germany and Russia, as well as to reduce dependence on both countries. The ‘Law and Justice’ party, traditionally opposed to the development of cooperation with both Russia and Germany, was particularly active in this direction. The article analyzes Poland’s major infrastructure projects in recent years that affect its logistics capabilities.

Specifically, the creation of new routes for transporting hydrocarbons, the emergence of new rail and road networks, the development of port infrastructure, and the construction of new waterways are discussed. The analysis concludes that most of these projects align with the EU’s overall goals of improving connectivity among member states. The significant cost of many of these projects suggests that they would have been practically impossible to implement without financial support from EU structural funds. This is particularly evident in the example of the ‘Via Carpatia’ highway project, which was conceived in the first decade of the 21st century but was not actually developed until the EU showed interest in it. In this context, intergovernmental foreign policy organizations involving Poland, such as the Three Seas Initiative, can be considered primarily as a lobbying tool within the EU for intergovernmental infrastructure projects in Central and Southern Europe.

At the same time, Poland is developing the infrastructure of its Baltic ports, which have the potential to compete with Germany’s container terminals in the North Sea. The launch of some of Poland’s high-profile initiatives in the field of shipping can be seen as primarily driven by domestic political goals aimed at demonstrating a commitment to increasing Poland’s sovereignty, rather than being economically justified. Overall, Poland’s efforts are focused on leveraging its strategic access to the Baltic Sea to create logistical corridors to continental Central European countries.

In March 2022 several G7 countries and their trading partners announced the suspension of the most-favored-nation (MFN) status for imports from Russia. The MFN used to be a fundamental rule of multilateral trade regulation within the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article provides a qualitative analysis of the role of MFN status in the modern international trade system, as well as the impact of the suspension of MFN status on Russian foreign trade and logistics.

Among the countries that suspended MFN status for imports from Russia, the European Union (EU) represented the most significant export destination. It was found that, in addition to the energy sector, industries that have experienced the most significant reductions in exports to the EU include ferrous and non-ferrous metalls, precious metals production, and timber and wood products manufacturing. At the same time, an important trend is observed: anticipating further sanctions escalation, certain sanctioning countries (primarily EU member states) demonstrated an increase in the import of specific goods in 2022. This primarily concerned metals such as copper, aluminum, nickel, and products made from them, as well as fertilizers. The statistics of 2023 show a more significant and comprehensive reduction in Russian exports to the EU, yet this was accompanied by a significant compensatory effect of Russia’s redirecting exports from Western markets towards trade partners in the East (both in 2022 and 2023). The logistics crisis of the first months following the onset of sanctions attacks was largely overcome by the end of 2022. In relative terms, the most severe impact was on air cargo transportation, while sanctions played a key role in the re-equipping and optimization of major railway and sea logistics centres.

The Adriatic Sea, as part of the Mediterranean Sea, plays an important role in the regional and international maritime connected system. Historically, it served as an important trade route, connecting Europe to the East, thanks to the power of the Republic of Venice. Today, the Mediterranean is one of the busiest waterways in Europe, but the main traffic transits to the North Sea – to the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg. In the modern context, there is a perception of this sea as “peripheral“ due to its geographical location and limited access to the world’s shipping routes. The geographical configuration of the Adriatic Sea as a part bordering the continental landmass and partly surrounded by peninsulas or archipelagos makes this sea de facto naturally enclosed and located far away from the main global shipping routes.

The main vector of traffic in the Adriatic is from North to South, with ports orientated towards access to the greater Mediterranean Sea and the delivery of cargo from non-EU countries. The Adriatic is a strategically important region (Adriatic-Ionian macro-region) for the European Union. The EU initiates strategies and promotes projects to improve maritime connectivity and strengthen regional links. The development of pan-European TEN-T transport corridors opens new perspectives for improving maritime connectivity and competitiveness of ports in the northern Adriatic, such as Venice, Koper, Trieste, Ravenna, Rijeka. These ports are becoming an alternative to the traditional Northern European ports of Hamburg – Le Havre, aiming to occupy key positions in the European logistics chain. To a large extent, this competitiveness is ensured, on the one hand, by the development of ‘hinterland’ and, on the other hand, by intermodal transport. Significant challenges remain to modernising infrastructure, improving conditions for intermodal transport, and overcoming the historical legacy of being “peripheral.” The overarching goal of the ports of the northern Adriatic is to become a multiport hub. However, apart from the geographical factor, the competitiveness of the Adriatic ports is increasingly determined by geopolitics and instability – the Houthi attacks are provoking a reduction in shipping traffic in the Suez Canal, which will inevitably affect the demand for Northern Adriatic ports.

For centuries, Eurasia has played a key role in shaping global trade and cultural ties. Transport corridors have been the arteries through which goods, ideas, and people have circulated, determining the economic and political development of regions. Throughout history, these corridors have undergone significant transformations, reflecting the evolution of technology, geopolitical realities, and economic priorities. From the legendary Silk Road to modern transcontinental routes, the history of Eurasian transport corridors is a history of continuous development and adaptation to changing conditions. This paper presents the results of a study aimed at analyzing the transformation of Eurasia’s transport framework that began after the collapse of the USSR and continues to this day. The analysis was conducted taking into account the impact of transport corridors on economic development, optimization of existing routes, and assessment of the development potential of new ones. The analysis of the transformation of the Eurasian transport framework was based on a systems approach – the study of transport corridors as complex systems that include various types of transport (rail, road, air and others), infrastructure, logistics centers, customs procedures, and the legislative framework. Particular attention is paid to identifying the relationships between the elements of the system and their impact on the functioning of the corridors. The transformation of the continent’s transport system, from railways to container ships, has contributed to economic growth, cultural exchange and integration of countries, but has also given rise to new challenges that require solutions in the 21st century. The development of Eurasian transport corridors is an ongoing process that will continue to shape the appearance of the continent and influence the destinies of peoples.